The 'Sole question on this appeal is -as to w>hat interest, if any, does Charles Ronald Ohamfelee, son of Lucille Cham-blee, deceased daughter ¡of Mildred Lucille Jones, have in the land ■involved in this proceeding. The trial judge held, and properly so, that Charles Ronald Ohamlblee takes the interest which his mother Lucille Chamblee would have taken bad she been living at the time of the death of her mother Mildred Lucille Jones, life tenant.
In this 'connection, where a will devises a life estate to a woman for life, with remainder to her children, and there .are children in being at the death of the testator, such children take a vested remainder, “subject to open and let in any that may afterwards be bom before the termination of the particular estate.” Lbr. Co. v. Herrington, 183 N.C. 85, 110 S.E. 656, and cases cited. To like effect are: Bell v. Gillam, 200 N.C. 411, 157 S.E. 60; Beam v. Gilkey, 225 N.C. 520, 35 S.E. 2d 641.
The same .principle applies to like provisions in deeds. See Griffin v. Springer, 244 N.C. 95, 92 S.E. 2d 682; Blanchard v. Ward, 244 N. C. 142, 92 S.E. 2d 776; Edwards v. Butler, 244 N.C. 205, 92 S.E. 2d 922.
And the principle is recognized in these cases: Waddell v. Cigar Stores, 195 N.C. 434, 142 S.E. 585; Trust Co. v. Stevenson, 196 N.C. 29, 144 S.E. 370; Greene v. Stadiem, 198 N.C. 445, 152 S.E. 398; Spencer v. McCleneghan, 202 N.C. 662, 163 S.E. 753; Perry v. Bassenger, 219 N.C. 838, 15 S.E. 2d 365; Neill v. Bach, 231 N.C. 391, 57 S.E. 2d 385.
In the present case testator devised the land involved in this proceeding to bis three daughters, sbaan and ©hare alike, for the term of their natural lives only, with provision that upon the death of any one of them her one-third share to go to her children, if any; and bearing in mind that each of the daughters had ¡children living at the date of the death of the testator, — such children took a vested remainder subj ect to open and let in ¡any child thereafter born to either of said daughters. The daughter Mildred Lucille, whose 'husband is T. G. Jones, had two children so living, a son Lucius Jones, and a daughter Lucille, who married Charles Chamblee. This ¡son and this daughter each took a vested remainder by purchase and became “a new stirpes of inheritance or new stock of descent.” King v. Scoggin *39492 N.C. 99, cited and applied in Blanchard v. Ward, supra, and upon the death of the daughter Lucille Gbaanlblee her estate passed directly by descent to her son, Charles Ronald Chiamblee.
And in accordance therewith, the judgment from which appeal is taken is
HiggiNS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.