Copeland v. Parker, 25 N.C. 513, 3 Ired. 513 (1843)

June 1843 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

25 N.C. 513, 3 Ired. 513

MARTHA COPELAND vs. JOHN F. PARKER.

June 1843

An overseer, from whom a slave is retreating against his orders, has no right to shoot him for the purpose of stopping him.

A plaintiff has a right to recover damages for an injury done by a defendant to his slave, while hired out, if the injury was unjustifiable and was of such a nature as impaired the value after the term of hiring expired.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Gates County, at Spring Term, 1843, his Honor Judge Pearson presiding.

This was an action ou the case to recover damages for an injury done by the defendant to the plaintiff’s slave. The plaintiff proved that she had hired the boy Gilbert, who was her slave and about twenty years of age, to certain gentlemen, who were opening a turnpike road in Gates county, for the year ending the 25th of December, 1840; that, in November, 1840, the defendant, at the distance of ten paces, fired at him with a shot gun, loaded with squirrel shot, and lodged the load in his back and thigh. In consequence of the wound, Gilbert was disabled from work for the balance of the year, and for nearly half the year, 1841. Several doctors were examined, as to whether the wound impaired his value permanently, the shot remaining in the flesh after the wound had healed. About this the doctors differed in opinion. The defendant relied on the plea of justification, and proved that he was the overseer of the hands ; that Gilbert had left his work without leave the day before, but came back in the morning and went to work; that about 10 o’clock the defendant requested the witness, who was passing by, to stop and help him whip Gilbert for having run away. As the witness was getting off his horse, Gilbert stuck his spade in the ground and started off in a walk ; the defendant ordered him to stop; Gilbert continued to walk and L ' rather quickened his pace, and the defendant then fired and brought him to the ground. This was done at a place in the swamp, where, at the distance of some twenty or thirty paces, the bushes and water rendered it difficult to get along. The defendant’s counsel moved the court to charge, 1st. that the defendant was fully justified; 2ndly. that the plaintiff could not at any rate be entitled to a verdict, unless the jury was satisfied that the value of the negro was permanently impaired ; that a temporary injury, extending only a few months alter the hiring for the year expired, would not support an action, inasmuch as the overseer had a right to chastise on the last day, and might be under the necessity of disabling the slave, in which event the owner had no right to complain.

The court charged that a gun was not a fit instrument for chastisement, and that an overseer had no' right to shoot a negro down, who refused to stop, when ordered, and was in the act of making off. If he did so, it was a wrongful act, and he was responsible to the owner for any loss sustained by reason thereof. That to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, it was not necessary, that the negro should have been permanently injured after' the wound healed up — it was sufficient if tne negro was disabled from working after the expiration of the year, so that the plaintiff sustained damage by losing his services. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment having been rendered, the defendant appealed.

No counsel for either party in this court.

Daniel-, J.

The charge of the judge we think was unexceptionable. The overseer had a right to correct the slave for leaving his work the day before without permission.— But in attempting to perform this duty, as the slave was not in resistance to him, but was only retreating against his orders, he had no right, we think, to use a deadly instrument to stop him. The slave was not likely then to be lost: it was probable that, in a few hours or in a few days, he would have returned, or would have been brought back, when the overseer might have corrected him for his misdeeds in a reasonable manner. The act of shooting the slave betrayed passion in the overseer, rather than a desire to promote the true interest of his employers, or to keep up that subordination, whichthe state of our society demands.

Secondly ; We agree with his Honor in the opinion, that any injury to the plaintiff’s reversion in the slave, done by the illegal act of the defendant during the time of the particular estate, might be redressed in an action on the case.—

The judgment must be affirmed.

Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed,