Den ex dem. Shultz v. Young, 25 N.C. 385, 3 Ired. 385 (1843)

June 1843 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

25 N.C. 385, 3 Ired. 385

DEN EX DEM. HENRY A. SHULTZ AND WIFE vs. ROBERT YOUNG.

June 1843

Where part of the description of the boundary of a tract of land, contained in a grant, was from a certain point “ South with A. B’s line 310 poles to C.' D’s old comer,” and A. B’s line did not reach C. D’s corner, nor run in the direction towards it, but at the expiration of the 310 poles on A. B’s line you had to run nearly at right angles to arrive at C. D’s corner. Held that you must run on A. B’s line 310 poles, and then a straight line to C. D’s corner, as by so doing you would best conform to the whole description of the deed, though you would ran two lines instead of one called for.

The case of Sandifer v Foster, 1 Hay. 337, cited and approved as a leading case.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Stokes county, at Spring Term, 1843, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.

This was an action of ejectment, in which the plaintiff claimed title under a Grant, shewing mesne conveyances to himself, and proving the defendant to be in possession of the land claimed. Upon the trjal, a question arose respecting the construction of the description of the land contained in the grant. The grant, alter setting forth several lines, concerning which there was no dispute, called for “ the northwest corner of Richard Goode’s tract,” and then proceeded thus : “ thence south with Richard Goode’s line 310 poles to Thomas Goode’s old corner, thence west in said line to the beginning.” All these termini, “ the north-west corner of Richard Goode’s tract,” “ Thomas Goode’s old corner,’”'and the beginning of the grant were admitted. It was insisted on the part of the defendant, that, in construction of law, the line of the grant from the north- west corner of Richard Goode’s tract to Thomas Goode’s old corner was a straight line, although such straight line departed from Richard Goode’s line, and ran a different course and distance from those mentioned in the grant. On the part of the plaintiff it was insisted, that, in construction of law, the line of the grant pursued Richard Goode’s line south 310 poles, and thence turned directly to the next terminus, “Thomas Goode’s old corner,” although, in so doing, it diverged at the end of the 310 poles nearly at a right angle, and thus formed two lines instead of one. His Honor left it to the jury, as a question of fact, whether the line of Richard Goode did run from the north-west corner of the tract south 310 poles as called for in the grant, and instructed the jury, if they so found upon the proofs, they should extend the line of the grant as contended for by the plaintiff. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and a judgment being rendered pursuant to the verdict, the defendant appealed.

Morehead for the plaintiff.

Hoyden for the defendant.

Gaston, J.

Prima facie a call in a grant for one terminus to another is understood to mean a direct line from the former to the latter point. But assuredly there may be accompanying words of description, which will indicate that the line is not to be a direct line. Thus it is of ordinary occurrence, that, when the call is with a river-or creek from one terminus to another, the river or creek, however crooked its direction or numerous its courses, if it will carry you to the proposed terminus, must be followed throughout. Nor could there be any difficulty in holding, that, if the call were for a county line or the line of another tract, or a marked line, such line, however sinuous or indirect, if it ended at the terminus called for, must be faithfuily followed.— In these cases, and cases like these, the whole of the description of the thing granted is obviously consistent, and every part of it by this construction receives its full effect. You go from one terminus to another, and you go by the guide which you are directed to follow. But when the minus cannot be reached merely by following the mode pointed out in the description, the question occurs, shall this mode be wholly disregarded, or shall it be observed so far as it is represented as leading to the terminus, and then to be relinquished for a direct line to the terminus? Herein it appears that the law distinguishes between the degrees of certainty, which different descriptions hold forth. If the description be one by course and distance only, it is clear that such description is disregarded, and the line is in law a direct line from one point to the other. But if it bo by a permanent natural boundary, then the description is regarded as sufficiently certain to require that it should be respected, and the line must pursue that description so for as it conducts towards the terminus. This is fully established in Sandifer v Foster, 1 Hay. 237, which is always referred to as a leading authority on questions of boundary.

Now, independently of the peculiar respect which natural boundaries command with us, this decision is proper on general principles. By following the line referred to in the description, so for as it leads towards the terminus or is expressly directed, the call for the terminus is not disregarded. The terminus is still reached, though not reached by the direct line, which would have been presumed to be intended, had that call been the only description. But by running a direct line-to the terminus, a part of the description, which is perfectly intelligible, and which was assuredly designed to aid in ascertaining the thing granted, is wholly rejected. It is a leading rule in the construction of all instruments, that effect should be given to every part thereof; and, in expounding the descriptions in a deed or grant of the subject matter thereof, they ought all to be reconciled if possible, and as far as possible. If they cannot stand together, and one indicate the thing granted with superior certainty, the other may be disregarded as a mistaken reference. But so long and so far as they may stand together, each of them is to be considered as declaring the intent of the parties. When, indeed, the description accompanying a is, “running with a line” of another deed or tract, such description is ordinarily less certain than where it refers to a natural object. The latter is usually notorious, and can gej,jom therefore be mistaken ; while the former may not be well known, and is consequently sometimes misapprehended. But in fact the lines oí other tracts may be as notorious and certain as any natural objects, and by making one of these lines a part of the description of the thing granted, the parties represent it as a known line, by which the certainty of the thing granted is defined. It seems to us, therefore, that such a description, as a guide for reaching a terminus, ought equally to be respected with one referring to natural objects, if the line described can be ascertained to have been then well known — and that.it ought never to be disregarded altogether, unless there be reason to believe that it was misapprehended by' the parties.

In this case there was no reason tor such belief, unless it were that the line described did not directly reach the terminus ; and to hold this a sufficient reason were to decide that the call for the terminus overruled the rest of the description. On the contrary, there were manifest and strong reasons for believing that this line was well known to the parties. The terminus, described in the grant as the northwest corner of the Richard Goode tract, is admitted to be the true north-west corner of that grant; and the call thence South with the line of the tract 310 poles,” corresponds with the course and distance of the line of the tract, which runs from that north-west corner. The jury have found that the line was where the parties to the grant called for it, and this must exclude the inference that they called for it by mistake.

Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.