State v. Fisher, 25 N.C. 111, 3 Ired. 111 (1842)

Dec. 1842 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

25 N.C. 111, 3 Ired. 111

STATE vs. MICHAEL N. FISHER.

December 1842.

An inJictment-charging a person with. disturbing “a religious assembly, commonly called a quarterly meeting conference,” -cannot be supported.

The indictment should charge that the assembly had met “ for divine worship,” “ divine service,” “ religious worship or service,” or something of the same import.

The case of the State v-Jasper. 4 Dev. 323, cited -and approved. -

Appeal from the Superior Court -of Law of Craven County, at Fall Term, 1842, his Honor Judge Manly presiding.

The defendant was -tried upon the following indictment, to which he pleaded not guilty, viz:

State of North Carolina, ) Superior Court of Law— Craven County. \ Fall Term, 1841.

The jurors for the State, upon their oath, present, that, on the first day of October, one thousand, eight hundred and forty one, a certain assembly of people, at a certain church or meeting house, devoted to the service of Almighty God, situate, lying and being in the county of Craven, and commonly called Brice’s Greek meeting house, did meet and congregate for the purpose of public worship of God; and the said certain assembly -of people, within the church or meeting house aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, then and there did worship Almighty God, and engagein religious services 5 and after the said services and worship of Almighty God were finished and concluded, afterwards to wit, on the said first day of October, in the year aforesaid, the said congregation and assembly of people, then and there in the said church or meeting house, in the county aforesaid, did immediately meet and assemble together and hoM a re-Iigious assembly, commonly called Quarterly Meeting Con- ; and the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that Michael N. Fisher, late of the county 0f Craven, afterwards, on the said first day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-one, whilst the said congregation and assembly of people were so assembled as aforesaid, and engaged in the services, duties and business of the said religious assembly, commonly called Quarterly Meeting Conference, in the said church, or meeting house, commonly called Brice’s Creek meeting house, in the county aforesaid, unlawfully, wittingly and of purpose, maliciously and' contemptuously did come into the said congregation, during the services of the said religious assembly, commonly called Quarterly Meeting Conference as aforesaid, and did then and there, unlawfully, wittingly and of purpose, maliciously and contemptuously disquiet and disturb the said congregation, by then and there talking and cursing and swearing with a loud voice, and also by cursing and abusing with a lond voice Robert J. Carson, he the said Robert J. Carson being a regular minister of the gospel, and then and there presiding in the said religious assembly, and also by ridiculing and denouncing, then and there in a loud voice and in an insulting manner, the doctrines of our Saviour, as had been preached and held forth by the said Robert J. Carson, then and there from the pulpit during divine service as aforesaid, and by then and there making divers ridiculous and indecent actions and grimaces, and otherwise misbehaving himself during the performance and business of the said religious assembly in said church or meeting house, to the great disturbance, insult and common nuisance of the orderly people then and there assembled, and against the peace and dignity of the State.

Upon the trial, it was proved that the defendant was one of a congregation of persons, who assembled at a meeting house in Craven county, for’the worship of Almighty God ; that after divine service was concluded, and the assembly dismissed, certain members ot the society, to the number of ten, or thereabouts, (including the preacher,) assembled in the meeting house-,, and formed' themselves into what is called “ Quarterly Meeting Conference,” for the transaction business connected with the temporal welfare of the that soon after they were organized, and while the people were dispersing, the defendant came near the door of the meeting house, and in a very angry manner walked backwards and forwards repeatedly before it, using loud, profane’ and threatening language, so that those persons, who were within the house, as well as those who stood around, heard him. In behalf of the defendant, it was contended that there should not be a conviction, for the reason that it was' not a congregation engaged in religious exercise, and this was the charge. But the presiding Judge believed', and so stated, that the substance of the charge was,- the disturbing of an assembly of religious people, not engaged in divine worship, but whilst they were performing duties- and services of a secular character, appertaining to their association ; and the Judge instructed the jury, that if they believed-from the evidence, that ten or more persons, congregated for such purpose had' been disturbed and interrupted in the performance of their business by the defendant,- they might and should find him guilty of the charge in the bill. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Upon a motion in arrest of judgment, the court arrested the judgment upon the ground that the indictment does not set- forth any criminal offence. It does not charge that the- assembly disturbed was-engaged in the worship of God, or engaged about any other public duty, and such allegation is indispensable to make the charge in the bill a public wrong, proper to be redressed by complaint of the State. From this judgment, the Solicitor for the State appealed to the Supreme Court.

Attorney General and J. H. Bryan for the State.

No counsel for the defendant.

Ruffin, C.- J.

The’ points arising upon the record in this case were, We- think, correctly apprehended, and decided upon proper principles in the Superior Court.-

The offence charged is, that the defendant disturbed “a assembly, commonly called a Quarterly Meeting Conference,” by certain acts set forth in the indictment. But ^ ^oes not state the purpose of that assembly, and, particularly, that it was for divine worship. Without possessing precise information of the province of that body, which is known as “ Quarterly Meeting Conference,” among one of our respectable religious sects, we can only say, that we suppose it is not a meeting for divine service by worship, but for the secular service of the society in its temporal matters, oí-as a local ecclesiastical tribunal, for the purposes of discipline. But whether that be the true character of the body or not, certainly we are so to consider it on this indictment; for it expressly stales, that, “after the religious services and worship of Almighty God were finished and concluded,” the defendant committed the disorderly acts charged. Calling it “a religious assembly,” means nothing more in this case than “an assembly of religious persons,” who were disturbed by the defendant, but not while engaged in the exercise of their mode of .worship. In the opinion of the court, that, although a grossly indecent and immoral act, is not a criminal offence, punishable by indictment. There was no interference with the rights and duties of conscience, which are secured both to individuals and congregations, by the guaranty in the constitution oí liberty of worship. That is an offence, which cannot be described either in a statute or an indictment, without the use of such general terms as “divine worship,” “divine service,” “religious worship or service,” or the like ; or by some more special phrase, denoting the interruption or hindrance of the performance of a specific part of the religious service adopted by the church or sect. Thus our statutes of 1800 and 1807, (Rev. St. c. 99, s. 8, 10,). punish disorderly conduct at churches or meeting houses, at which '■ persons are assembled for divine worship.” In like manner the precedents, whether at common law or under the English acts of parliament, use the same language some of which may be found, 2 Chitty’s C. L. 21, 24 to 84. In Jasper’s case, 4 Dev. 323, the indictment was conformable to those precedents, using, in one part of it, the words “ public worship of God,” and in another part, “ during the performance of divine service.” Nor can the defendant be regarded as hindering a legal — as contradistin-guished from a religious — duty, in the performance of which, men are brought together in masses, in order to exercise political functions, or execute public service, such as attending an election, or holding a court. The interruption of such a duty by violence or menace, must be an injury to many individuals, and a detriment to the community ; the duty being imposed by public law, and concerning the public welfare. But the association, on which this outrage was prac-tised, though formed for purposes undoubtedly lawful and useful, is yet entirely voluntary. Not.being required by the law, nor, like an assemblage of religious worshippers, its inviolability assured by the constitution, the law cannot treat, as public wrongs, acts which incommode it as a private, secular and voluntary association, hut can only punish them, when they amount to offences against the persons of the individuals, who compose the meeting, or some other specific offence. There must be some such restriction upon the doc-trino, else we should be obliged to hold any conduct indictable, which annoys tyvo or more persons called together for a purpose not unlawful; which would be extending the principle much farther than it has been, or ought to be carried.

It was. not even contended at the bar, that the indictment could be sustained, as one for blasphemy, by that part of it which states, the “ridiculing and denouncing, in an insulting manner, the doctrines of our Saviour, as had been set forth and preached by the minister, during the divine service,” which had preceded, and it was properly not so contended. For, if an indictment for blasphemy will lie in this State, the present is clearly not one, since it does not state-the doctrines set forth by the preacher, nor the blasphemous language of the defendant, whereby it might appear that the doctrine of the preacher is adoctrine of Christianity, as known to the law, and that the object of the defendant was not to discuss a controverted point of that religion, 1 ° 1 but maliciously .to undermine or subvert the whole system.

In no point of view, therefore, can the indictment be supported ; and it must accordingly becertified, that there is no error in the decision under appeal.

Per. Cujriajsi. Ordered to be certified accordingly.