The crime of which defendants stand convicted is the entrance without a bona fide claim of right on land in the possession of another after having been forbidden to so enter. The act is made a crime by statute, G.S. 14-134. The statute carries the heading “Trespass on land after being forbidden . .
“. . . every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, entry into the close of another, is a trespass.” Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 230 N.C. 201, 52 S.E. 2d 362; Lee v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 287, 10 S.E. 2d 804; Brame v. Clark, 148 N.C. 364.
By the common law an unauthorized entry on the lands of another was redressed by civil action, but where the entry was made by means of force or threats apt to disrupt the peace, the trespass was made a crime in England prior to Sir Walter Raleigh’s ill-fated attempt to establish a colony on our shores. Such a disturbance of possession is a statutory crime under our laws. G.S. 14-126. To convict one of the crime of forcible trespass, it is essential for the State to establish an entry with such force as to be “apt to strike terror” to the prosecutor whose possession was disturbed. It is necessary to allege and establish actual possession in the prosecutor. S. v. Simpson, 12 N.C. 504; S. v. McCauless, 31 N.C. 375; S. v. Ray, 32 N.C. 39; S. v. Laney, 87 N.C. 535; S. v. Davenport, 156 N.C. 597, 72 S.E. 7. Whether the right to possession was a good defense at common law was left unsettled in S. v. Ross, 49 N.C. 315.
In 1866 the Legislature made it a crime to invade possession even though the forbidden entry was made without force or threats. Good faith in making the entry is a defense. S. v. Wells, 142 N.C. 590; S. v. Crosset, 81 N.C. 579; S. v. Hause, 71 N.C. 518; S. v. Hanks, 66 N.C. 612. But possession is an essential element of the crime. If the State fails to establish that prosecutor has possession (actual or constructive) no crime has been established. S. v. Baker, 231 N.C. 136, 56 S.E. 2d 424; S. v. Faggart, 170 N.C. 737, 86 S.E. 31; S. v. Yellowday, 152 N.C. 793, 67 S.E. 480; S. v. Whitehurst, 70 N.C. 85.
Where an interference with the possession of property is a crime, it is necessary to allege in the warrant or bill of indictment the rightful owner or possessor of the property, and the proof must correspond with the charge. If the rightful possession is in one other than the person named in the warrant or bill, there is a fatal variance. Such has been the holding in forcible trespass, S. v. Sherrill, 81 N.C. 550; in trespass after being forbidden, S. v. Baker, supra; in malicious injury to property, S. v. Hicks, 233 N.C. 31, 62 S.E. 2d 497; S. v. Mason, 35 N.C. 341; in larceny, S. v. Law, 227 N.C. 103, 40 S.E. 2d 699; S. v. Harris, 195 *521N.C. 306, 141 S.E. 883; S. v. Harbert, 185 N.C. 760, 118 S.E. 6. See also Adams v. State, 119 So. 189 (Miss.); Brown v. State, 85 S.E. 262 (Ga.); 87 C.J.S. 1113; 42 C.J.S. 1054; 27 Am. Jur. 649.
On the appeal defendants could only be tried for the crime for which they were convicted in the Municipal-County Court, viz., disturbing the possession of Gillespie Park Golf Course. The Superior Court could try them for a different crime upon a bill found or waived. S. v. Mills, 242 N.C. 604, 89 S.E. 2d 141; S. v. Banks, 241 N.C. 572, 86 S.E. 2d 76; S. v. Hall, 240 N.C. 109, 81 S.E. 2d 189; S. v. Thomas, 236 N.C. 454, 73 S.E. 2d 283; S. v. Mills, ante, 237.
The Superior Court has broad power to allow amendments to warrants. This power to amend is the power to make accurate and sufficient the statement of the crime asserted or attempted to be asserted. The court has no power to permit a warrant to be amended so as to charge an entirely different crime from the one on which defendant was convicted in the lower court. S. v. McHone, 243 N.C. 231, 90 S.E. 2d 536; S. v. Clegg, 214 N.C. 675, 200 S.E. 371; S. v. Goff, 205 N.C. 545, 172 S.E. 407; S. v. Taylor, 118 N.C. 1262.
When the court permitted the warrants to be amended so as to charge a trespass on property of a person (Gillespie Park Golf Club, Inc.) other than property of the person named in the original warrant, it substituted one criminal charge for another criminal charge. This different crime could only be charged by bill found or waived. The defendants have not waived bills.
The record discloses the fatal variance. It is our duty to note it. S. v. Scott, 237 N.C. 432, 75 S.E. 2d 154; S. v. Stonestreet, 243 N.C. 28, 89 S.E. 2d 734; S. v. Strickland, 243 N.C. 100, 89 S.E. 2d 781. Defendants may, of course, now be tried under the original warrant since the court was without authority to allow the amendment changing the crime charged; or they may be tried on bills found in the Superior Court for the crime attempted to be charged by the amendment. S. v. Strickland, supra; S. v. Hicks, 233 N.C. 511, 64 S.E. 2d 871; S. v. Sherrill, 82 N.C. 694.
The judgment is