The doctrine of res judicata embodies the general rule that any right, fact, or question in issue and directly adjudicated on or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and privies. Armfield v. Moore, 44 N.C. 157; Southern Distributing Co. v. Carraway, 196 N.C. 58, 144 S.E. 535; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, section 592.
In short, the general rule is that “A final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, on the merits, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and as to them constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, and cause of action.” 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, section 172.
Also, the rules which preclude the splitting of a cause of action or the relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties are applicable where a cause of action is adjudicated upon, even though all the relief to which the party asserting the cause of action is entitled is not requested or granted in such action. The general rule is that the whole cause of action must be determined in one action, and where an action is brought for a part of a claim, a judgment obtained in the action ordinarily precludes the owner thereof from bringing a second action for the residue of the claim. Bruton v. Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 6 S.E. 2d 822; Allison v. Steele, 220 N.C. 318, 17 S.E. 2d 339; 1 Am. Jur., Actions, section 96; 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, section 173.
It is to be noted that the phase of the doctrine of res judicata which precludes relitigation of the same cause of action is broader in its application than a mere determination of the questions involved in the prior action. The bar of the judgment in such cases extends not only to matters actually determined but also to other matters which in the exercise *536of due diligence could have been presented for determination in the prior action. Bruton v. Light Co., supra; Moore v. Harkins, 179 N.C. 167, 169, 101 S.E. 564; Wagon Co. v. Byrd, 119 N.C. 460, 26 S.E. 144; 1 Am. Jur., Actions, section 96; 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, sections 179 and 180.
And under application of the rule precluding subsequent litigation of the same cause of action, a party defendant who interposes only a part of a claim by way of recoupment, setoff, or counterclaim is ordinarily barred from recovering the balance in a subsequent action. Mann v. Mann, 176 N.C. 353, 97 S.E. 175; Manufacturing Co. v. Moore, 144 N.C. 527, 57 S.E. 213; 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, section 189; Annotation: 8 A.L.R. 694, 734.
Ordinarily, for the breach of an entire and indivisible contract only one action for damages will lie. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, section 459. An examination of the building contract sued here discloses it is an entire and indivisible contract. 9 Am. Jur., Building and Construction Contracts, section 14; Annotation: 53 A.L.R. 103; 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, section 315 et seq.
In the prior action in Craven County Gaither Corporation, the plaintiff herein, set up against Skinner by way of counterclaim a cause of action for damages for failure to perform the building contract. Several items of breach were declared upon in the counterclaim. In the instant case Gaither Corporation attempts to relitigate the same cause of action by seeking damages for another item of the alleged breach; that is, for Skinner’s failure to construct the roof in accordance with the terms of the contract. Further recovery is precluded under application of the doctrine of res judicata.
True, under application of this doctrine, where the omission of an item from a single cause of action is caused by fraud or deception of the opposing party, or where the owner of the cause of action had no knowledge or means of knowledge of the item, the judgment in the first action does not ordinarily bar a subsequent action for the omitted item. 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, sections 202 and 203.
However, there is no evidence in the instant case of fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation or concealment on the part of the defendant Skinner in respect to the construction of the roof. And the evidence is plenary that the plaintiff, Gaither Corporation, was fully apprised of the defects in the roof in October, 1952; whereas the consent judgment disposing of the Craven County action was not entered until 21 November, 1952. Moreover, it is noted that this judgment expressly stipulates “that the parties take nothing further by reason of this action.” And ordinarily recitals of a judgment are conclusive as to the issues involved. 50 C. J.S., Judgments, section 713, p. 182. See also Bell v. Machine Co., 150 N.C. 111, 63 S.E. 680.
*537Tbe judgment of involuntary nonsuit entered below will be upheld on tbe ground tbat tbe evidence clearly sustains tbe defendant’s plea of res judicata.
We bave considered tbe plaintiff’s contention tbat tbe defendant’s plea of res judicata raised an issue of fact for tbe jury. On tbis record tbe contention is without substantial merit. It is a well-established principle of procedural law with us tbat where the plaintiff’s evidence establishes as a matter of law an affirmative defense set up by tbe defendant, nonsuit is proper. Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E. 2d 248; Hedgecock v. Insurance Co., 212 N.C. 638, 394 S.E. 86. It is also established with us tbat while ordinarily tbe defendant’s evidence may not be considered in passing upon a motion for nonsuit, nevertheless, where tbe defendant’s evidence is not in conflict Avith tbat offered by tbe plaintiff, it may be considered in so far as it tends to explain or clarify tbe plaintiff’s evidence. Nance v. Hitch, 238 N.C. 1, 76 S.E. 2d 461; Hare v. Weil, 213 N.C. 484, 196 S.E. 869; Harrison v. Railroad, 194 N.C. 656, 140 S.E. 598. During tbe trial below tbe plaintiff’s president and principal witness was cross-examined at length concerning the judgment roll in tbe prior action in Craven County. In tbe course of the cross-examination counsel for tbe plaintiff stated be was willing for tbe complaint, answer, and judgment in tbe prior action to be offered in evidence. Thereafter, on motion of tbe defendant, while tbe plaintiff was in process of offering its evidence, tbe judgment roll in the prior action was received in evidence, without objection. When tbe plaintiff rested its case, tbe defendant offered no further evidence. Tbe contents of tbe judgment roll in nowise conflict Avith tbe plaintiff’s evidence. On tbe contrary, tbe judgment roll merely explains and clarifies tbe testimony of tbe plaintiff’s witness in respect thereto. Accordingly, it is proper for tbe contents of tbe judgment roll to be considered with tbe plaintiff’s evidence on tbe question of nonsuit. And when tbis is done, it is manifest tbat .the evidence adduced below establishes as a matter of law tbe defendant’s affirmative defense of res judicata. Tbis being so, tbe judgment of nonsuit entered below will be upheld.
Affirmed.