Appellant, in its brief, does not deal separately with each challenged allegation. It presents its position as if the case were before us on demurrer to defendants’ Further Answer and Defense, challenging the sufficiency of defendants’ pleading to constitute a defense rather than the propriety of particular allegations.
As stated by Ervin, J.: “A motion to strike an allegation from a pleading for irrelevancy admits, for the purposes of the motion, the truth of all facts well pleaded in the allegation, and any inferences fairly deducible from them. But it does not admit the conclusions of the pleader.” Dixie Lines v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552 (556), 78 S.E. 2d 410. Appellant concedes and indeed cites this statement of the applicable rule.
Assuming sufficient interest or other recognized consideration, it is generally held that where one agrees to procure the issuance of insurance *612on the property of another, affording protection against designated risks, and fails to do so, he will be held liable, within the amount of the proposed insurance, for the loss attributable to his default. This Court has recognized the breach of such agreement as a basis of liability where the parties to the agreement were in the following relationships:
1. In actions by a property owner against an insurance agent or broker. Elam v. Realty Co., 182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632, 18 A.L.R. 1210; Case v. Ewbanks, 194 N.C. 775, 140 S.E. 709; Boney, Insurance Comr., v. Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 563, 197 S.E. 122; 29 Am. Jur. p. 130, Insurance, secs. 108, 109; 44 C.J.S. p. 861, Insurance, sec. 172 (a); Annotations: 18 A.L.R. 1214; 29 A.L.R. 2d 171.
2. In actions by a vendee against a vendor in relation to personal property subject to a conditional sales contract. Truck Corp. v. Trust Co., 200 N.C. 157, 156 S.E. 787; Meiselman v. Wicker, 224 N.C. 417, 30 S.E. 2d 317; 23 N.C.L.R. 64.
3. In actions by a property owner against a warehouseman. Box Co. v. Storage Co., 210 N.C. 829, 186 S.E. 155.
4. In actions by the owners of real property, subject to deed of trust, against the owners of the secured debt. Dixon v. Osborne, 204 N.C. 480, 168 S.E. 683; Crouse v. Vernon, 232 N.C. 24, 59 S.E. 2d 185; 36 Am. Jur. p. 852, Mortgages, sec. 328; 59 C.J.S. p. 449, Mortgages, sec. 328 (b).
To enforce such liability the plaintiff, at his election, may sue for breach of contract, or for negligent default in performance of duty imposed by contract. Elam v. Realty Co., supra; 44 C.J.S. p. 863, Insurance, sec. 172 (b).
In Crouse v. Vernon, supra, plaintiff, a property owner, obtained a $2,500 construction loan from a bank. She secured her $2,500 note to the bank by deed of trust conveying the property on which she was building a house and gave additional security. Her house burned while in process of construction. She sued the bank official with whom she had dealt, the bank, and the trustee in the deed of trust. In dealings with the plaintiff, the named official was acting for the bank. In addition, however, there was allegation and evidence that the named bank official had a broker or agency relationship with certain (unnamed) fire insurance companies. Plaintiff recovered judgment against the bank official individually and against the bank, predicated upon the jury’s verdict to the effect that the bank official agreed to procure and have issued to plaintiff a fire insurance policy in amount of $4,500 covering the house being built on plaintiff’s property and failed to do so. The allegations of the complaint as disclosed by the original record bear close resemblance to the allegations of defendants now challenged by plaintiff’s motion.
*613Here, tbe insurance policy contemplated by tbe agreement alleged by defendants was to provide coverage against tbe risk of tbe death of Wayne Bryan during tbe term of ninety days from 6 July, 1953. But we discern no substantial distinction because tbe insurance to be procured was life insurance ratber than to protect against property risks.
In our view, it may be fairly deduced from tbe challenged allegations that tbe bank, through its said agent, agreed to cause tbe issuance of tbe policy on tbe life of Bryan; and that at tbe time tbe loan was renewed, Bryan paid an amount sufficient to cover interest on .the renewal note and premium on insurance policy. Plaintiff insists that tbe allegations compel tbe conclusion that the interest was paid to tbe bank and that tbe premium was paid to Eeetor as agent of the insurance company. Under tbe rule of liberal construction in favor of tbe pleader, tbe relationships alleged do not require such an attenuate distinction. Tbe allegations indicate plainly that the issuance of tbe insurance policy was not independent of but ratber an integral feature of tbe loan renewal transaction. Tbe allegations are clear to tbe effect that tbe death benefit under tbe proposed insurance policy was to be payable to tbe bank, thereby protecting it as well as tbe obligors on tbe $700.00 note in case of Bryan’s death during tbe ninety day term. Whether tbe amount of tbe premium was paid to Eeetor, in bis capacity as bank official or in bis capacity of insurance agent, tbe defendants are entitled to allege and show, if they can, that tbe bank made tbe agreement to cause tbe life insurance policy to be issued. Tbe circumstance that its official was also an agent for a life insurance company would not affect its liability if in fact it made such agreement. Indeed, if, within its own organization, there was an agent authorized to issue such policy, its failure to cause tbe issuance thereof could hardly be justified.
Tbe defendants’ pleading is sufficient to survive tbe motion to strike, leaving for jury decision upon tbe evidence presented tbe issue as to whether tbe bank made tbe alleged agreement. Of course, tbe ease now before us is on tbe pleadings. Whether defendants can support their allegations by sufficient evidence is another matter.
Affirmed.