The plaintiff’s appeal from the judgment of involuntary nonsuit rendered by the court below requires consideration of the plaintiff’s evidence in the light most favorable for him. Nash v. Royster, 189 N.C. 408, 127 S.E. 356; James v. R. R., 236 N.C. 290, 72 S.E. 2d 682.
Making due allowance for the somewhat varying estimates of distance, speed and visibility in plaintiff’s evidence, the over-all picture presented is that of a collision between two automobiles on a clear day approaching a street intersection at approximately the same time. Hence the question of the negligence of the defendant whose automobile was approaching from plaintiff’s right, and that of the plaintiff whose automobile was approaching from the defendant’s left must he determined in the light of the duty imposed by the statute G.S. 20-155 (a), as interpreted by the decisions of this Court, notably in S. v. Hill, 233 N.C. 61, 62 S.E. 2d 532, and Cox v. Freight Lines, 236 N.C. 72, 72 S.E. 2d 25.
The statute provides that when two automobiles approach an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right. Under these circumstances the statute makes it the duty of the driver of the automobile on the left to yield the right of way to the automobile approaching from his right, and to permit it to pass before attempting to cross. The phrase right of way has been interpreted to mean “the right of a vehicle to proceed uninterruptedly in a lawful manner in the direction in which it is moving in preference to another vehicle approaching from a different direction into its path.” 60 C.J.S. 865; S. v. Hill, supra. The rule applies when two automobiles approaching an intersection and “their respective distances from the intersection, their relative speeds, and the other attendant circumstances show that the driver of the vehicle on the left should reasonably apprehend that there is danger of collision unless he delays his progress until the other vehicle has passed.” S. v. Hill, supra.
*380When tbis situation at an intersection is made to appear tbe duty devolves upon tbe driver of tbe automobile on tbe left to observe tbe statute and permit tbe automobile approaching from bis right to pass before attempting to enter tbe intersection. If tbe driver of tbe automobile on tbe left sees, or in tbe exercise of reasonable prudence should see an automobile approaching from bis right in such a manner that apparently tbe two automobiles will reach tbe intersection at approximately tbe same time, it is bis duty to decrease bis speed, bring bis automobile under control and if necessary stop, and to yield tbe right of way to tbe driver of tbe automobile on bis right in order to enable him to proceed and thus avoid a collision. Cab Co. v. Sanders, 223 N.C. 626, 27 S.E. 2d 631; Yost v. Hall, 233 N.C. 463, 64 S.E. 2d 554. Tbe law imposes tbis duty on tbe driver of an automobile approaching an intersecting highway unless tbe automobile coming from bis right on the intersecting highway is a sufficient distance away to warrant tbe assumption that be can proceed before the other automobile operated at a reasonable speed reaches tbe crossing. Yost v. Hall, supra; Cab Co. v. Sanders, supra.
If, in tbe instant case, tbe two automobiles approached tbe intersection at approximately tbe same time, tbe driver of defendant’s automobile, in approaching tbe intersection, bad tbe right to assume that tbe driver of tbe automobile coming from her left would yield tbe right of way and stop or slow down sufficiently to permit her to pass in safety. Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N.C. 377, 64 S.E. 2d 276. “One is not under duty of anticipating disobedience of law or negligence on tbe part of others, but in tbe absence of anything which gives or should give notice to the contrary a person is entitled to assume, and to act on tbe assumption, that others will obey tbe law and exercise ordinary care.” Cox v. Freight Lines, 236 N.C. 72, 72 S.E. 2d 25. If, on tbe other band, tbe automobile of tbe plaintiff approaching from tbe left reached the intersection first and bad already entered tbe intersection, tbe driver of defendant’s automobile was under duty, to permit tbe plaintiff’s automobile to pass in safety. Cf.S. 20-155 (b); Davis v. Long, 189 N.C. 129 (136), 126 S.E. 321; Donlop v. Snyder, 234 N.C. 627, 68 S.E. 2d 316. However, tbe evidence in tbe case at bar is insufficient to invoke tbis principle of law as determinative of tbe questions involved.
The fact that tbe defendant’s automobile was being driven at tbe speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour in a residential district with no other vehicle in view would not prevent tbe application of tbe rule as to right of way for automobiles entering an intersection at tbe same time, in tbe absence of evidence that tbe speed of defendant’s automobile proximately caused the collision. Cox v. Freight Lines, supra.
*381From consideration of tbe evidence plaintiff bas offered, it seems reasonably clear tbat tbe plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout for automobiles approaching tbe intersection from bis right and failed to see tbe defendant’s automobile in time to avoid tbe collision.
Plaintiff’s witness, tbe highway patrolman, testified tbat at a point 100 feet east of tbe intersection one could see 300 feet along tbe intersecting street to tbe right. Though plaintiff testified be looked to bis right shortly before entering tbe intersection, yet be admitted be failed to see a moving object as obvious as an automobile approaching along tbe street from bis right until tbe defendant’s automobile was almost upon him, a distance of several feet. Powers v. Sternberg, 213 N.C. 41, 195 S.E. 88. Tbe collision occurred slightly west of tbe center of tbe intersection, and plaintiff’s witness testified tbe skid marks from each automobile measured tbe same, 36 feet.
The facts in Donlop v. Snyder, 234 N.C. 627, 68 S.E. 2d 316, where tbe refusal to nonsuit was affirmed, were somewhat different from those in our case. There it did not appear tbat tbe two cars approached tbe intersection at approximately the same time.
We think tbe evidence insufficient to warrant submission to tbe jury, and tbat tbe judgment of nonsuit was properly entered.
Affirmed.