Tbe appellant assigns as error tbe refusal of tbe court below to permit one of tbe plaintiff’s witnesses to testify to tbe contents of a conversation tbe witness bad with a Mr. Hill, wbo was on tbe defendant’s train at tbe time plaintiff’s intestate was killed. Tbe witness did not identify Mr. Hill as being in any way connected witb tbe defendant, and tbe record does not disclose tbe substance or tenor of'tbe conversation or that it would have tended to corroborate tbe testimony of tbe witness or tbe testimony of other witnesses wbo bad testified for tbe plaintiff. Hence, this assignment of error is overruled. Armfield v. R. R., 162 N.C. 24, 77 S.E. 963; Warren v. Susman, 168 N.C. 457, 84 S.E. 760; Hall v. Hall, 179 N.C. 571, 103 S.E. 136.
Assignments of error Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are based upon exceptions to tbe action of tbe court in sustaining tbe objections of tbe defendant to tbe admission of testimony witb respect to a conversation tbe witness bad witb someone be referred to as tbe engineer, and wbat be overbeard between tbis man and some other party whom be took for granted was an employee of tbe defendant. Tbe plaintiff contends tbe conversations took place within five to seven minutes after tbe deceased was killed and were admissible as part of the res gestae. Tbis evidence was offered for no other purpose. An examination of tbis excluded testimony which was given in tbe absence of tbe jury, reveals that tbe man described as tbe engineer is purported to have said to tbe witness: “I think I bit a man up tbe road, I am not sure. ... be was scrambling around between tbe T-irons like be was trying to get off . . . He was down between tbe T-irons.” According to tbe witness tbe substance of tbe above statements were repeated in bis presence to a “gentleman coming from tbe rear of tbe train.”
We think tbe above statements, if made by an agent of tbe defendant, fall within tbe well defined principle of law that a mere narration of a past occurrence is only hearsay and is not admissible as against the principal or employer. Batchelor v. R. R., 196 N.C. 84, 144 S.E. 542, 60 A.L.R. 1091; Hubbard v. R. R., 203 N.C. 675, 166 S.E. 802; Hester v. Motor Lines, 219 N.C. 743, 14 S.E. 2d 794; Coley v. Phillips, 224 N.C. 618, 31 S.E. 2d 757.
Stacy, C. J., in speaking for the Court in Hubbard v. R. R., supra, said: “It is tbe rule witb us that wbat an agent or employee says relative to an act presently being done by him within tbe scope of bis agency or *361employment, is admissible as a part of the res gestae, and may be offered in evidence, either for or against the principal or employer, bnt what the agent or employee says afterwards, and merely narrative of a past occurrence, though his agency or employment may continue as to other matters, or generally, is only hearsay and is not competent as against the principal or employer.”
The remaining assignment of error is based on an exception which challenges the correctness of the ruling of the court below on the motion for judgment as of nonsuit.
The plaintiff’s intestate having entered upon the defendant’s railroad track without license, invitation, or other right, occupied the status of a trespasser at the time he was killed. The accident occurred approximately 200 yards from the nearest crossing. His act in placing himself in a dangerous position on the defendant’s railroad track, constituted such negligence on his part as would preclude a recovery of damages from the defendant for his death, unless the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. Osborne v. R. R., 233 N.C. 215, 63 S.E. 2d 147; Long v. R. R., 222 N.C. 523, 23 S.E. 2d 849; Justice v. R. R., 219 N.C. 273, 13 S.E. 2d 553; Mercer v. Powell, 218 N.C. 642, 12 S.E. 2d 227.
In order to recover of a railroad company for the death of a trespasser on its railroad track, under the application of last clear chance or discovered peril doctrine, the personal representative of the deceased trespasser must establish by competent evidence the following: (1) That the decedent was killed by the railroad company’s train; (2) that the decedent at the time he was killed was down on the track in an apparently help-léss condition; (3) that the engineer saw, or by the exercise of ordinary care in keeping a proper lookout could have seen the decedent in time to have stopped the train before striking him; and (4) that the engineer failed to exercise such care, thereby proximately causing the death of the decedent. Osborne v. R. R., supra, and cases cited therein.
It is admitted that plaintiff’s intestate was killed by the defendant’s train. But it is denied that he was down on the track in an apparently helpless condition. On the contrary, the only witness who saw the decedent on the railroad track was the defendant’s engineer who was plaintiff’s witness. He testified the decedent was sitting on the west rail facing east. He blew the whistle and the man began to move. He applied his emergency brakes and stopped the train as quickly as possible.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply where a trespasser or licensee is upon a railroad track, and is apparently in possession of his normal faculties, the engineer of the train producing the injury having no knowledge or information to the contrary. In such cases the engineer is under no duty to stop his train or to slacken its speed. He has the right to assume that such person will use his faculties for his own pro*362tection and get off the track in time to avoid injury. Mercer v. Powell, supra.
Tbe last clear chance does not mean the last possible chance to avoid the accident. 65 C.J.S., Negligence, section 137 (2) (e), page 744, et seq.; Aydlett v. Keim, 232 N.C. 367, 61 S.E. 2d 109. It means such chance or interval of time between the discovery of the peril of the injured party, or the time such peril should have been discovered in the exercise of due care, and the time of his injury as would have enabled a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances to have acted in time to have avoided the injury. Matheny v. Motor Lines, 233 N.C. 673, 65 S.E. 2d 361; Manufacturing Co. v. R. R., 233 N.C. 661, 65 S.E. 2d 379; Aydlett v. Keim, supra; Ingram v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 35 S.E. 2d 337.
In our opinion, the evidence presented by the plaintiff in the trial below is insufficient to invoke the last clear chance or the discovered peril doctrine, and the judgment as of nonsuit entered below is
Affirmed.