It is well established in this jurisdiction that no appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another. Phillips v. Ray, 190 N.C. 152, 129 S.E. 177; Wellons v. Lassiter, 200 N.C. 474, 157 S.E. *533434; Revis v. Ramsey, 202 N.C. 815, 164 S.E. 358; S. v. Lea, 203 N.C. 316, 166 S.E. 292; S. v. Oil Co., 205 N.C. 123, 170 S.E. 134; Fertilizer Co. v. Hardee, 211 N.C. 56, 188 S.E. 623; Rail v. Hawkins, 211 N.C. 283, 189 S.E. 774. Nor, does one Superior Court judge have tbe power to overrule or reverse tbe judgment of another Superior Court judge previously made in tbe same action, except in certain well-defined cases. Roulhac v. Brown, 87 N.C. 1; Henry v. Hilliard, 120 N.C. 479, 27 S.E. 130; Price v. Insurance Co., 201 N.C. 376, 160 S.E. 367; Newton v. Mfg. Co., 206 N.C. 533, 174 S.E. 449; Davis v. Land Bank, 217 N.C. 145, 7 S.E. 2d 373; In re Adams, 218 N.C. 379, 11 S.E. 2d 163; Bank v. Daniel, 218 N.C. 710, 12 S.E. 2d 224.
One of tbe exceptions to tbis rule is a decree awarding tbe custody of minor cbildren. Sucb a decree determines only tbe present rights with respect to sucb custody and is subject to judicial alteration or modification upon a change of circumstances affecting tbe welfare of the cbildren. In re Means, 176 N.C. 307, 97 S.E. 39; Hardee v. Mitchell, 230 N.C. 40, 51 S.E. 2d 884.
Plaintiff’s brief admits that there is no allegation of a change of circumstances adversely affecting tbe welfare of tbe cbildren involved in tbis litigation since tbe order of Judge Harris.. It appears that tbe facts justify and tbe record supports that admission. It is true tbe defendant has suffered a heart attack, but tbis occurred on 11 February, 1952, which was prior to tbe order of Judge Harris. Tbe defendant’s physical condition was evident at tbe time that order was entered and tbe only change since that time has been an improvement.
There appear no grounds sufficient to justify tbe order appealed from and for that reason tbe same must be
Eeversed.