It is tbe general rule that an unfulfilled promise cannot be made tbe basis for an action for fraud. Williams v. Williams, 220 N.C. 806, 18 S.E. 2d 364; Shoffner v. Thompson, 191 N.C. 664, 150 S.E. 195; Trust Co. v. Yelverton, 185 N.C. 314, 111 S.E. 299; Pritchard v. Dailey, 168 N.C. 330, 84 S.E. 392; 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, section 38, page 799, et seq. Tbe rule, of course, is otherwise, where tbe promise is made fraudulently with no intention to carry it out, and such promise constitutes a misrepresentation of a material fact which induces tbe promisee to act upon it to bis injury. Williams v. Williams, supra.
Tbe evidence of tbe plaintiff, however, is not sufficient to show that J.. L. Davis and wife, Josie Davis, bad no intention of supporting tbe plaintiff at tbe time tbe agreement for support was entered into. Tbe defendants bad lived in tbe plaintiff’s home approximately 7 years before tbe deed was executed, and plaintiff bad lived with tbe defendants for more than five years thereafter before any serious controversy arose with respect to tbe plaintiff’s support. Moreover, tbe plaintiff made it clear that be would not have instituted this action if bis son bad sent him tbe $50.00 (apparently an amount be bad requested) for food and clothes, and be and bis wife bad not conveyed tbe premises in question to- their minor son.
Tbe plaintiff insists that a confidential relationship existed between tbe adult defendants and tbe plaintiff which raised tbe presumption of fraud and entitled him to go to tbe jury, irrespective of any other evidence. Tbe contention is untenable. This action does not involve a fiduciary relationship as was tbe case in McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N.C. 178, 25 S.E. 2d 615. Here, we are dealing with a parent and bis son and daughter-in-law. It is a family relationship, not a fiduciary one, and such relationship does not raise a presumption of fraud or undue influence. Gerringer v. Gerringer, 223 N.C. 818, 28 S.E. 2d 501; In re Craven, 169 N.C. 561, 86 S.E. 587.
Likewise, tbe allegation in tbe complaint to tbe effect that tbe deed was executed and delivered without consideration is negatived by tbe plaintiff’s own testimony. At tbe time of its execution, tbe plaintiff received tbe equivalent of $1,300 and tbe promise of support. Tbe latter promise alone was sufficient consideration for tbe transfer of tbe property. Minor v. Minor, 232 N.C. 669, 62 S.E. 2d 60; Lee v. Ledbetter, 229 N.C. 330, 49 S.E. 2d 634; Ayers v. Banks, 201 N.C. 811, 161 S.E. 550; Salms v. Martin, 63 N.C. 608.
Tbe plaintiff excepts to tbe exclusion of certain evidence purporting to be statements made by tbe plaintiff prior to tbe execution of tbe deed involved herein. Tbe exception will not be upheld.
*212A careful consideration of all tbe evidence disclosed by tbe record, wben considered in tbe light most favorable to tbe plaintiff, at most, shows only a breach of contract for support. Gerringer v. Gerringer, supra. Tbe evidence is clearly insufficient to warrant the submission of an issue to the jury on tbe question of fraud, undue influence, or lack of consideration.
Tbe judgment of tbe court below is