Tbe plaintiffs appealed at once from tbe order of Judge Eudisill setting aside tbe verdict on tbe third issue at June Term, 1951, allowing tbe verdict to stand as to tbe first two issues, and granting a partial new trial on tbe issue of undue influence. This was beard at Fall Term, 1951, and tbe appeal dismissed, this Court bolding tbat these were matters within tbe discretion of tbe presiding judge. Muse v. Muse, 234 N.C. 205, 66 S.E. 2d 689.
Tbe plaintiffs now bring forward their exceptions noted in tbe first trial to tbe charge of Judge Eudisill on tbe first two issues. However, upon examination of tbe portions of tbe charge excepted to we discover no substantial error, and hence tbe verdict of tbe jury must be taken to have established tbe fact tbat tbe grantors in tbe deeds bad sufficient mental capacity to execute tbe deeds in question.
On tbe trial before Judge Bobbitt at February Term, 1952, tbe plaintiffs noted numerous exceptions to tbe rulings of tbe court in tbe admission of evidence, and to bis action in giving tbe jury peremptory instructions to answer the third and fourth issues in favor of tbe defendants. While some of tbe rulings of tbe court standing alone would not be approved, an examination of tbe entire record leaves us with tbe conviction tbat Judge Bobbitt was right in bolding tbat there was no competent evidence to support tbe allegations of fraud and undue influence on tbe part *184of the defendants, and that his instruction to the jury to that effect may not be held for error. In re Graven’s Will, 169 N.C. 561 (569), 86 S.E. 587; In re Will of Turnage, 208 N.C. 130, 179 S.E. 332; Lee v. Ledbetter, 229 N.C. 330, 49 S.E. 2d 634; In re Will of Kemp, 234 N.C. 495, 67 S.E. 2d 672. Likewise, on all the evidence we think the court correctly held, and so instructed the jury, that whatever cause of action M. A. Muse may have had was barred by the three-years’ statute of limitations. Title, if any, vested in her in 1941. She was found to be mentally competent at that time, and she had knowledge of the facts now asserted by the plaintiffs. She died in 1949. Gr.S. 1-52 (9) ; Peacock v. Barnes, 142 N.C. 215, 55 S.E. 99; Blankenship v. English, 222 N.C. 91, 21 S.E. 2d 891; Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109 (116), 63 S.E. 2d 202. The burden was on the plaintiffs to show this action was brought within the time allowed by law.
Plaintiffs contend that the deeds to the defendants being deeds of gift became void under G.S. 47-26 for failure to have them registered within two years from “the making thereof.” But this position is untenable as the evidence shows the deeds were signed and acknowledged 22 April, 1940, and registered 4 April, 1941. Though apparently bearing date in 1937, the time of “making” the deed, as the word is used in the' statute, means date of execution. “The execution of a deed is not complete until the instrument is signed, sealed and delivered.” Turlington v. Neighbors, 222 N.C. 694, 24 S.E. 2d 648.
Without undertaking to discuss seriatim all the exceptions noted by plaintiffs, we reach the conclusion that upon the whole case as shown by the record no substantial error has been made to appear and that the result reached below should not be disturbed.