Tbe single question presented by tbis appeal is whether tbe codicil revokes by implication tbe original devise to Woodie C. Armstrong of tbe 38% acre tract of land (less 5 acres to be cut off for another devisee) and limits bis devise to 10 acres thereof, thus leaving tbe residue of approximately 23% acres as undevised real estate belonging to tbe beirs at law of William H. Armstrong as tenants in common as in case of intestacy.
Ordinarily, for tbe purpose of determining testamentary intention, a will and codicil thereto are to be treated as a single and entire instrument, taking effect at tbe time of tbe testator’s death. Brown v. Brown, 195 N.C. 315, 142 S.E. 4; Bolling v. Barbee, 193 N.C. 787, 138 S.E. 163; Darden v. Matthews, 173 N.C. 186, 91 S.E. 835.
But tbe mere making of a codicil gives rise to tbe inference of a change in tbe testator’s intention, importing some addition, explanation, or alteration of a prior will. In re Will of Goodman, 229 N.C. 444, 50 S.E. 2d 34; Baker v. Edge, 174 N.C. 100, 93 S.E. 462; Boyd v. Latham, 44 N.C. 365; 57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 608, p. 417.
It is an established rule of construction that where a will and codicil are repugnant and irreconcilable in their provisions, tbe codicil, being the latest expression of tbe testator’s desires, is to be given precedence. Hallyburton v. Carson, 86 N.C. 290; 57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 608, p. 417. And tbe testator’s intent in making the codicil may be found in tbe codicil itself. Homer v. Brown, 16 U.S. 354, 14 L. Ed. 970.
Accordingly, a codicil plainly inconsistent with tbe provisions of tbe will operates, to tbe extent of tbe inconsistency, as a revocation of tbe will, and tbis is so even in tbe absence of any express words of revocation. 57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 485, p. 339.
However, “in order tbat a codicil shall operate as a revocation of any part of a will, in tbe absence of express words to tbat effect, its provisions must be so inconsistent with those of tbe will as to exclude any other legitimate inference than tbat of a change in tbe testator’s intention.” *73668 C.J., p. 810; See also Baker v. Edge, supra; Rhyne v. Torrence, 109 N.C. 652, 14 S.E. 95; Hallyburton v. Carson, supra; Boyd v. Latham, supra; 57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 485, p. 339.
True, where there is a will it is presumed that the testator intended not to die intestate as to any part of his estate. Trust Co. v. Waddell, 234 N.C. 454, p. 460, 67 S.E. 2d 651; Seawell v. Seawell, 233 N.C. 735, 65 S.E. 2d 369; Van Winkle v. Berger, 228 N.C. 473, 46 S.E. 2d 305; Holmes v. York, 203 N.C. 709, 166 S.E. 889.
However, this presumption against partial intestacy will not prevail where the language of the will, fairly construed, discloses a contrary intention, the rule being that the presumption may not be invoked to alter the plain meaning of simple, unambiguous language, nor to include in the will property not comprehended by its terms. 57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 1159.
And it should be kept in mind that the presumption against partial intestacy is applied only as an aid in construction. Seawell v. Seawell, supra; Van Winkle v. Berger, supra; 69 C.J., p. 95.
Accordingly, “a construction based on such presumption will not be made where it is apparent from the language of the will that it would be contrary to the intention of the testator, or where intestacy is effected by the plain and unambiguous language of the will.” 69 C.J., pp. 95 and 96. See also Rigsbee v. Rigsbee, 215 N.C. 757, p. 761, 3 S.E. 2d 331; McCallum v. McCallum, 167 N.C. 310, 83 S.E. 250.
In the instant case, by the terms of Item 7 of the will the testator devised to his son Woodie C. Armstrong the entire tract of 3814 acres (less 5 acres to be cut off for another devisee), whereas by the terms of the codicil the devise to Woodie is cut down to “ten (10) acres of the remainder ... to be cut off from the land adjoining Rufus Shipman, Seth L. Smith, and J. M. Shipman estate.”
This provision of the codicil may not be reconciled with the previous item of the will. Clearly the two'provisions are inconsistent and repugnant. This being so, the codicil prevails and the cognate provision of the will is repealed by implication.
Here the presumption against partial intestacy yields to the plain meaning of the codicillary provision- indicating a contrary intent of the testator. ■ ■
This conclusion is not at variance with the decisions in Jenkins v. Maxwell, 52 N.C. 612, and Rhyne v. Torrence, supra, cited by the appellant. The facts in those cases are distinguishable.
There is no merit in the contention that the fourth paragraph of the codicil is. void for uncertainty. The ten acres devised to Woodie are directed to be cut off on the side “adjoining Rufus Shipman, Seth L: Smith and J. M.- Shipman.” This designation is sufficiently definite to *737support tbe devise. See Freeman v. Ramsey, 189 N.C. 790, 128 S.E. 404; Blanton v. Boney, 175 N.C. 211, 95 S.E. 361; Wright v. Harris, 116 N.C. 462, 21 S.E. 914; Harvey v. Harvey, 72 N.C. 570; Grubb v. Foust, 99 N.C. 286, 6 S.E. 103; Jones v. Robinson, 78 N.C. 396; Anno. 157 A.L.R. 1129, p. 1135.
Tbe record and appeal entries indicate that all plaintiffs appealed. However, tbe plaintiff Woodie C. Armstrong appears to be tbe only party aggrieved by tbe decision below, and tbe appeal as presented on brief challenges tbe validity of tbe judgment below only as it affects bim. Therefore, he is treated as tbe sole appellant, with direction that tbe costs be taxed against bim.
Affirmed.