Tbis appeal presents two questions: (1) Was tbe evidence, considered in tbe light most favorable to tbe State, sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit? (2) Did tbe •court below comply with G.S. 1-180 in its charge to tbe jury? Both of these questions must be answered in tbe affirmative.
It has long been a violation of tbe common law to inflict injury upon a human being by culpable negligence, and if death results, tbe offender under certain circumstances may be called upon to answer to tbe charge of manslaughter or even murder. 99 A.L.E., 756.
With tbe development of civilization and tbe resulting transition from animal-drawn vehicles to tbe intricate and expansive system of motorized transportation, it has become neGesSafy' for tbe protection of life and property to enact and maintain a code of rules regulating tbe operation -of motor vehicles on tbe highways. A part of tbis code is G.S. 20-140, which is as follows :
“Any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of tbe rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving, and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in 20-180.”
A violation of this statute may subject the offender to both civil and criminal liability. There may be a violation of this statute as a result of which the offender is subjected, in addition to civil liability, only to the penalty prescribed by statute, but when the negligent acts are reckless to the point of culpability and are sufficient to evince a complete and thoughtless disregard for the rights and safety of other persons using the highways, it then becomes criminal negligence and the driver of a motor vehicle so offending may be called upon to answer for manslaughter.
The distinction between criminal and civil liability arising out of the reckless operation of an automobile on the public highways of North Carolina is clearly pointed out in S. v. Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456, where it is said:
“Actionable negligence in the law of torts is a breach of some duty imposed by law or a want of due care — commensurate care under the circumstances — which proximately results in injury to another. Small v. Utilities Co., 200 N.C. 719, 158 S.E. 385; Eller v. Dent, 203 N.C. 439; *286 Hurt v. Power Co., 194 N.C. 696, 140 S.E. 730; Ramsbottom v. R. R., 138 N.C. 39, 50 S.E. 448; Drum v. Miller, 135 N.C. 204, 47 S.E. 421.
“The violation, of a statute or ordinance, intended and designed to’ prevent injury to persons or property, whether done intentionally or otherwise, is negligence per se, and renders one civilly liable in damages, if its violation proximately result in injury to another; for, in such case, the statute or ordinance becomes the standard of conduct or the rule of the prudent man. King v. Pope, 202 N.C. 554, 163 S.E. 447; Godfrey v. Coach Co., 201 N.C. 264, 159 S.E. 412; Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N.C. 203, 90 S.E. 134.
“Culpable negligence in the law of crimes is something more than actionable negligence in the law of torts. S. v. Stansell, 203 N.C. 69, 164 S.E. 580; S. v. Rountree, 181 N.C. 535, 106 S.E. 669.
“Culpable negligence is such recklessness or carelessness, proximately resulting’ in injury or death, as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others. S. v. Whaley, 191 N.C. 387, 132 S.E. 6; S. v. Rountree, supra.
“However, if the inadvertent violation of a prohibitory statute ox-ordinance be accompanied by recklessness or probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision, amounting altogether to a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others, then such negligence, if injury or death proximately ensue, would be culpable and1 the actor guilty of an assault or manslaughtei-, and under some circumstances of murder. S. v. Trott, supra (190 N.C. 674, 130 S.E. 627); S. v. Sudderth, supra (184 N.C. 753, 114 S.E. 828); S. v. Trollinger, 162 N.C. 618, 77 S.E. 957; S. v. Limerick, 146 N.C. 649, 61 S.E. 567; S. v. Stitt, 146 N.C. 643, 61 S.E. 566; S. v. Turnage, 138 N.C. 566, 49 S.E. 913.”
The evidence of the State, which was accepted by the jury, briixgs the conduct of the defendant within the culpable negligence rule and subjects him to criminal responsibility for the wrongful acts which resulted in the death of James Edward Medlin.
This case does not turn upon the question of defendant’s intoxication, although there was substantial evidence on that point which the jury was entitled to take into consideration. The fact of intoxication may well have been a contributing factor in the defendant’s reckless operation of his automobile. He knew that Medlin was perched precariously on his running board and that he might be seriously injured or killed by the swaying motion of the automobile, whether it came iix contact with another vehicle or not, and notwithstanding this fact, the defendant at a speed of 40 to 50 miles an hour drove through a cloud of dust of sufficient density to interfere with his vision, swinging his car back and forth across the highway.
*287Tbe Court fully instructed tbe jury as to tbe evidence and tbe contentions of tbe parties and defined tbe law applicable thereto. “If tbe defendant desired further elaboration and explanation of tbe law be should have tendered prayers for instructions. In tbe absence thereof be cannot now complain.” S. v. Gordon, 224 N.C. 304, 30 S.E. 2d 43 (decided prior to 1949 amendment).
Tbe remaining exceptions in tbe record have been carefully examined and each is found to be without merit. Tbe Judge’s charge substantially complied with all tbe provisions of Gr.S. 1-180, as amended by Chapter 107, Session Laws 1949. On tbe entire record defendant appears to have bad a fair and impartial trial and as no reversible error has been made to appear, tbe result will be upheld.
No error.