The defendant is well advised in abandoning his demurrer to the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury. The prosecuting witness was direct and positive in his testimony. Its probative value was for the twelve. S. v. Hovis, ante, 359.
A new trial must be granted, however, because of the impeachment and depreciation by the court of the defendant’s evidence and that of his witnesses, Green and Hurlocker. This was done, first, by ordering the defendant and his two witnesses into custody during the trial, which action by the court came to the attention of the jury trying the case, S. v. McNeill, 231 N.C. 666, 58 S.E. 2d 366; and, secondly, by the manner in which the court’s charge was given to the jury. S. v. Rhinehart, 209 N.C. 150, 183 S.E. 388.
First. It would be begging the question to say that “it does not appear on the record” the jury had any knowledge of the order of arrest or the actual incarceration of the defendant and his witnesses during the trial. Kelly v. Boston, 201 Mass. 86, 87 N.E. 494. The jury was in the courtroom and saw what transpired, some of them at the beginning of the noon recess, and all of them after the court had reconvened for the afternoon session. They are presumed to know what goes on in their presence. The case of S. v. McNeill, supra, is controlling on the point.
There is no suggestion of any contumacy on the part of the defendant or his witnesses such as might have justified the court in acting peremptorily, without prejudice to the defendant. S. v. Slagle, 182 N.C. 894, 109 S.E. 844; Seawell v. R. R., 132 N.C. 856, 44 S.E. 610; 53 Am. Jur. 82.
Second. The authorities are to the effect that no judge at any time during the trial of a cause is permitted to cast doubt upon the testimony of a witness or to impeach his credibility. G.S. 1-180, as rewritten, Chap. 107, S.L. 1949; S. v. Cantrell, 230 N.C. 46, 51 S.E. 2d 887; S. v. Owenby, 226 N.C. 521, 39 S.E. 2d 378; S. v. Woolard, 227 N.C. 645, 44 S.E. 2d 29; S. v. Auston, 223 N.C. 203, 25 S.E. 2d 613.
*442Tbe judge may indicate to tbe jury wbat impression tbe evidence bas made on bis mind, or wbat deductions be thinks should be drawn therefrom, without expressly stating bis opinion in so many words. This may be done by bis manner or peculiar emphasis or by bis so arraying and presenting tbe evidence as to give one of tbe parties an undue advantage over tbe other, or, again, tbe same result may follow tbe use of language or form of expression calculated to impair tbe credit which might otherwise and under normal conditions be given by tbe jury to tbe testimony of one of tbe parties. Speed v. Perry, 167 N.C. 122, 83 S.E. 176; S. v. Dancy, 78 N.C. 437; S. v. Jones, 67 N.C. 285.
It can make no difference in wbat way or' manner or when tbe opinion of tbe judge is conveyed to tbe jury, whether directly or indirectly, by comment on tbe testimony of a witness, by arraying tbe evidence unequally in tbe charge, by imbalancing tbe contentions of tbe parties, by tbe choice of language in stating tbe contentions, or by tbe general tone and tenor of tbe trial. Tbe statute forbids any intimation of bis opinion in any form whatever, it being tbe intent of tbe law to insure to each and every litigant a fair and impartial trial before tbe jury. Withers v. Lane, 144 N.C. 184, 56 S.E. 855. “Tbe slightest intimation from a judge as to tbe strength of tbe evidence or as to tbe credibility of a witness will always have great weight with tbe jury, and, therefore, we must be careful to see that neither party is unduly prejudiced by an expression from tbe bench which is likely to prevent a fair and impartial trial”—Walker, J., in S. v. Ownby, 146 N.C. 677, 61 S.E. 630.
It is true, where tbe court misquotes tbe evidence, e.g., here, “tbe defendant went on the stand and never denied that be was driving tbe car,” when tbe fact is be did deny it, tbe misquotation or inadvertence should be called to bis attention at some appropriate time before tbe case is given to tbe jury, so as to afford an opportunity of correction. Where this is done and no correction is made, tbe party is entitled to bis exception on appeal. Harris v. Draper, ante, 221, 63 S.E. 2d 209.
We think tbe court inadvertently conveyed to tbe jury an expression of opinion upon tbe weight of tbe defendant’s evidence in violation of tbe provisions of G.S. 1-180, as rewritten, Chap. 107, S.L. 1949. Tbe error may have been one of those casualties which, now and then, befalls tbe most circumspect in tbe trial of causes on tbe circuit. S. v. Kline, 190 N.C. 177, 129 S.E. 417; S. v. Griggs, 197 N.C. 352, 148 S.E. 547; S. v. Stiwinter, 211 N.C. 278, 189 S.E. 868; S. v. Buchanan, 216 N.C. 34, 3 S.E. 2d 273; S. v. Floyd, 220 N.C. 530, 17 S.E. 2d 658; In re Will of Lomax, 225 N.C. 31, 33 S.E. 2d 63. Even so, tbe question is presented on appeal, and we must “Hew to tbe line, and let tbe chips fall wherever they may.” Barnes v. Teer, 219 N.C. 823, 15 S.E. 2d 379; S. v. Hovis, ante, 359.
*443The defendant is entitled to a new trial. It is so ordered.