The question presented for decision is whether the bequests to the defendants designated in the will as mortgage notes were adeemed by the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgages securing the notes and *709purchase of the mortgaged lands by the testator, or whether the legatees' are entitled under the will to the lands thus acquired by the testator.
The principle of ademption is firmly imbedded in the law of wills, and is recognized in this jurisdiction as applicable to specific legacies as a rule of law rather than of particular intent on the part of the testator. Grogan v. Ashe, 156 N.C. 286 (291), 72 S.E. 372; Page on Wills, sec. 1527. It applies to defeat a bequest where the subject of a specific legacy has been withdrawn, disposed of, or has ceased to exist during the lifetime of the testator. Anthony v. Smith, 45 N.C. 188; Starbuck v. Starbuck, 93 N.C. 183; Tyer v. Meadows, 215 N.C. 733, 3 S.E. 2d 264. In the language of Justice Brown in Rue v. Connell, 148 N.C. 302, 62 S.E. 306, “It denotes the act by which a specific legacy has become inoperative on account of the testator’s having parted with the subject of it.” Said Chief Justice Pearson in Chambers v. Kerns, 59 N.C. 280, “These are well settled principles of law, and if by their application the intention of the testator is disappointed, the Court can say it is not the fault of the law, but the neglect of the testator in not adding a codicil to set out his intention, made necessary by the alteration in the condition of his estate, caused by his act.” In the language of Justice Brogden in King v. Sellers, 194 N.C. 533, 140 S.E. 91, “the test of ademption is such a change in the subject matter of the legacy as to destroy its identity.”
While most of the cases on this subject which have been considered by this Court relate to the ademption of devises of land by subsequently executed conveyances by the testator, the same rules must be held equally to apply where notes receivable described in the will are paid, or rendered inoperative, or discharged by foreclosure of the security, and real property acquired by the testator indirectly as result of such foreclosure.
This is illustrated by the case of Chambers v. Kerns, 59 N.C. 280, where, subsequent to the execution of the will specifically devising land, the testator agreed to sell the land and executed bond for title in consideration of a note for the purchase money. After the death of the testator the note was paid, and the question arose whether the money should be paid to the devisee or the testator’s executor. It was held the devise had been defeated, for the reason that at the time of his death the testator “had ceased to be the owner of the land which was the subject of the devise.” We note a similar ruling in Perry v. Perry, 175 N.C. 141, 95 S.E. 98, where the testator directed his executor to sell his real property and distribute the proceeds to certain named legatees, but later in his lifetime testator sold the land. It was held by this Court that the legacies were adeemed, and the provision for the legatees defeated.
A somewhat different result was reached in Nooe v. Vannoy, 59 N.C. 185, where the testator devised “the proceeds of the sale” of certain land which he had contracted to sell. Though the testator completed the sale *710in bis lifetime, it was held tbe legacy “in tbe proceeds” was not defeated. To tbe same effect was tbe bolding in Rue v. Connell, 148 N.C. 302, 62 S.E. 306, where tbe devise was of “all and every right, title and interest in” certain land. At tbe time of tbe execution of tbe will tbe extent of testator’s interest bad been in litigation. Subsequent to bis death by court decree bis title to tbe land was lost but tbe successful litigant was required to pay a certain sum, which it was held should go to tbe devisee. Those cases and others of similar import illustrate tbe modification of tbe rule where tbe language of tbe devise is sufficiently comprehensive to prevent tbe application of the principle of ademption. In Hill v. Colie, 214 N.C. 408, 199 S.E. 381, a legacy of tbe household and^ tangible property in and about testator’s residence and farm was defeated by tbe subsequent conveyance of tbe land by tbe testator.
Tbe principle of tbe ademption of a legacy by subsequent conveyance or material alteration in tbe character of tbe subject of tbe legacy has been generally upheld in other jurisdictions, and applied to a change from mortgage notes to absolute ownership of the property mortgaged. In 65 A.L.R. 640 (note) tbe majority rule is stated as follows: “In a majority of cases it is held that a change from interest by way of security to an absolute ownership of property adeems a legacy.” And in 57 A.J. 1093, it is stated “in a majority of tbe cases involving tbe point, tbe view is taken that a bequest of personal property or of notes and mortgages is adeemed to tbe extent of any mortgage with respect to which tbe testator has acquired tbe absolute ownership of tbe real estate mortgaged. In a few instances a different result has been necessitated by tbe language of tbe will involved or tbe peculiar facts and circumstances shown.” See also 59 C.J. 1013.
The following cases may be cited as supporting the view that tbe disposition of tbe mortgage notes by foreclosure by tbe testator constitutes ademption. In re Behre’s Estate, 130 Wash. 458; Franck v. Franck, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1790, 72 S.W. 275; Tolman v. Tolman, 85 Me. 317; In re Keller’s Estate, 225 Iowa 1349, 282 N.W. 362; Willoughby v. Watson, 114 Kan. 82; Alexander v. House, 133 Conn. 725; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 187 Ky. 324; Lewis v. Thompson, 142 Ohio St. 338; Blaisdell v. Coe, 83 N.H. 67; Lenzen v. Miller, 309 Ill. App. 617; In re Hilpert’s Estate, 300 N.Y.S. 886; Page on Wills, secs. 1521.
In a California case, cited by defendants, In re McLaughlin, 275 Pac. 874, where tbe devise was “all my interest in that certain mortgage,” it was held tbe devise was not adeemed by subsequent conveyance of tbe mortgaged land to tbe testatrix in satisfaction of tbe debt. A similar result was declared in Van Wagenan v. Brown, 26 N.J.L. 196, in view of tbe peculiar language of the will. Van Wagenan v. Baldwin, 7 N.J. Ed. 211. See also Succession of Shaffer, 50 La. Ann. 601, 23 So. 639 *711(other notes substituted for those bequeathed); Bills v. Putnam, 64 N.H. 554 (decided on phraseology of the will); Eddington v. Turner, 38 A. 2d 738, 155 A.L.R. 562.
It may be noted here the testator, after making bequest of mortgage notes in his will. executed in 1932, proceeded in 1933 to. foreclose the mortgages securing the unpaid notes and obtained title to the mortgaged lands as result of such foreclosure. Notwithstanding this substantial change in the character and form of the subjects of his bequest, he made no change in his will, though he lived some fifteen years thereafter. If it be thought the testator intended the legatees should have land in substitution for notes, the disappointment is due to his failure to effectuate his intention.
After careful consideration of the facts found by the court below, we reach the conclusion that the character of the bequests contained in the second and third paragraphs of the will had been, by the act .of the testator, materially changed and their identity destroyed, so that at the time of his death these subjects of his bounty were no longer in existence. Hence the undevised lands of which James E. Green died seized descended to his heirs at law.
The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded for appropriate proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed.