The appellant Seashore Transportation Company assigns error in the ruling of the court below in allowing the motion of the defendant Construction Company for nonsuit as to plaintiff’s causes of action against the Construction Company. This motion was interposed and ruled upon at the close of plaintiff’s evidence. As the evidence which *705bad been offered by tbe plaintiff bad failed to show actionable negligence on tbe part of defendant Construction Company, we tbink tbe movent was entitled to tbe allowance of its motion, in so far as tbe plaintiff was concerned, and tbe plaintiff did not except or appeal. Ve perceive no error therein of wbicb tbe appellant can complain. However, in view of tbe appellant’s pleading tbe court properly beld open tbe question of tbe Construction Company’s negligence as it might affect appellant’s claim for contribution. Subsequently, appellant introduced .evidence tending to show negligence on tbe part of tbe Construction Company’s flagman in that be gave an improper signal to tbe driver of tbe bus, but there was evidence contra, and appellant’s contentions were submitted to tbe jury under an appropriate issue and answered against tbe appellant. Tarkington v. Printing Co., 230 N.C. 354, 53 S.E. 2d 369; Charnock v. Taylor, 223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E. 2d 911. Since plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to support tbe finding of negligence on tbe part of tbe appellant, and tbe only relief sought by appellant against tbe Construction Company was for contribution or indemnity, as to wbicb it bad its day in court, tbe adverse determination of tbe fact leaves appellant no ground for complaint on that score.
Tbe appellant assigns error in tbe ruling of the trial court in respect to tbe issues submitted and tbe court’s failure to submit other issues tendered, but we tbink those submitted were sufficient to embrace all essential questions in controversy and to afford each party opportunity to present its case to tbe jury. Potato Co. v. Jeanette, 174 N.C. 236, 93 S.E. 795; Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N.C. 504, 193 S.E. 814.
Tbe appellant brought forward in its assignments of error numerous exceptions noted to tbe judge’s charge to tbe jury on tbe issues submitted. While there are some expressions used by tbe court wbicb may be open to criticism, when we consider tbe entire charge contextually we find it free from prejudicial error. Braddy v. Pfaff, 210 N.C. 248, 186 S.E. 340. “Tbe charge must be considered contextually and not disjointedly.” Milling Co. v. Highway Com., 190 N.C. 692 (697), 130 S.E. 724. The case seems to have been submitted to tbe jury fairly and in substantial accord with well settled principles of law. Tbe burden was on tbe appellant not only to show error but also to show that tbe error complained of was material and prejudicial, and that tbe result was affected thereby. Collins v. Lamb, 215 N.C. 719, 2 S.E. 2d 863.
Tbe statutes relative to tbe speed of motor vehicles on tbe highway confer authority upon tbe State Highway & Public Works Commission to declare a speed limit applicable to a particular place in tbe highway, wbicb shall become effective and obligatory when appropriate signs are erected, as appears to have been done in this ease. G.S. 20-141 (b); G.S. 20-141 (5) (d). It may be noted that tbe statutes establishing *706limits to the speed of motor vehicles on the highway were amended by Chapter 1067, Session Raws 1947, which declares; that: speed in excess of the limifsiso'.fixed shall-be “unlawful,” father than merely "prima facie evidenceVntjhaift'sueh speed was not reasonable or prudent. In view of the statutes imforee- at the time of the collision, the exception to the charge in this connection is untenable. Holland v. Strader, 216 N.C. 436, 5 S.E. 2d 311; Conley v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., 224 N.C. 211, 29 S.E. 2d 740.
Theufevidenfe''here was not: such-as to call for'the. application as a -matter of law1 aT the'doctrine of insulating negligence (Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., ante, 270, 56 S.E. 2d 689; Warner v. Lazarus, 229 N.C. 27, 47 S.E. 2d 496; Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E. 2d 808), or to require' specific instructions to the jury on the question whether the negligence, "if any, of the Transportation Company in respect to speed was insulated b'y: the subsequent intervention of the active negligence of the Construction'Company in giving an improper signal to the bus driver; as the conflicting views as to responsibility for the injury were submitted to the jury for determination, from the evidence, of the ultimate fact of proximate cause. As was said in Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward, supra, “the doctrine of insulating negligence is after all an application of the definition of proximate cause.” Butner v. Spease, supra; Lee v. Upholstery Co., 227, N.C. 88, 40 S.E. 2d 688; McIntyre v. Elevator Co., 230 N.C. 539, 53 S.E. 2d 528.
After an examination of the- entire record, we reach the conclusion Jhat the verdict and judgment should hot be disturbed.