The defendants in their appeal raise two questions:
I. Did the court err in admitting only a portion of paragraph 3 of defendants’ amended answer? As the admission was of a distinct fact, to wit, that the ancestor from whom plaintiff derived title died seized of the land described, it was competent for the plaintiff to offer this without adding the other allegations in the paragraph in which defendants asserted title in themselves to the entire interest in the land. Lupton v. Day, 211 N.C. 443, 190 S.E. 722; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Banking Co., 191 N.C. 500, 132 S.E. 468.
2. Were defendants entitled to the allowance of their motion for non-suit upon the ground that plaintiffs had offered in evidence a deed to the defendants from Hulin and wife? The answer is no. The rule is that a party who introduces a deed admits its execution but not necessarily the truth of its recitals or its legal effect, and may show by further evidence the truth of the matter and the relation of the deed to the entire transaction.
The deed here offered recited that the grantors derived title from three of the heirs of the ancestor under whom plaintiff claims, and tends to support plaintiff’s contention that he had not conveyed his interest in the land, and that by virtue of the deed to defendants conveying interests of other heirs, the plaintiffs and defendants were tenants in common in the land. 20 Am. Jur. 771. By analogy a party who calls a witness to the stand may not impeach his veracity but by other evidence may show the facts are different. Helms v. Green, 105 N.C. 251, 11 S.E. 470; 58 A. J. 442.
In the trial we find