Tbis case portrays an atrocious crime, and careful consideration of the assignments of error presented by defendants fails to reveal error for which the judgment from which appeal is taken should be disturbed. However, we advert to and treat specifically the main exceptions.
I. Assignments of error Nos. 10 and 11, covering Exceptions Nos. 14 and 15, relate to the ruling of the trial court in denying defendants’ motions, aptly made, for judgment as of nonsuit as to murder in the first degree.
Murder in the first degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice and with premeditation and deliberation. G.S. 14-17. S. v. Hawkins, 214 N.C. 326, 199 S.E. 284.
The intentional killing of a human being with a deadly weapon’implies malice and, if nothing else appears, constitutes murder in the second degree. S. v. Payne, 213 N.C. 719, 197 S.E. 573.
“The additional elements of premeditation and deliberation necessary to constitute murder in the first degree, are not presumed from a killing with a deadly weapon. They must he established beyond a reasonable doubt, and found by the jury, before a verdict of murder in the first degree can be rendered against the prisoner.” S. v. Miller, 197 N.C. 445, 149 S.E. 590; S. v. Payne, supra; S. v. Hawkins, supra.
“ ‘Premeditation means thought of beforehand’ for some length of time, however short.” S. v. Benson, 183 N.C. 795, 111 S.E. 869; S. v. Hawkins, supra. And it has been said that “deliberation means that the act is done in cool state of blood. It does not mean brooding over it or reflecting upon it for a week, a day or an hour, or any other appreciable length of time, but it means an intention to kill, executed by the defendant in a cool state of blood, in furtherance of a fixed design to gratify a feeling of revenge, or to accomplish some unlawful purpose, and not under the influence of a violent passion, aroused suddenly by some lawful or just cause or legal provocation.” S. v. Benson, supra; S. v. Hawkins, supra, and cases cited.
And “in determining the question of premeditation and deliberation it is proper for the jury to take into consideration the conduct of the defendant, before and after, as well as at the time of, the homicide, and all attending circumstances,” Stacy, C. J., in S. v. Evans, 198 N.C. 82, 150 S.E. 678; S. v. Hawkins, supra, and cases cited.
Applying these principles, the evidence in the present case is abundantly sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the first degree murder charge.
Moreover, murder committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery or other felony shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree. G.S. 14-17. See also S. v. King, 226 N.C. 241, 37 S.E. 2d 684, *312and S. v. Bennett, 226 N.C. 82, 36 S.E. 2d 708, and cases cited. 'Thus, when a homicide is committed in the perpetration of robbery, the State is not put to the proof of premeditation and deliberation. In such event the law presumes premeditation and deliberation. Applying this principle, the evidence in the case in hand is sufficient to justify a finding by the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the killing of the deceased by defendants was done in the perpetration of the crime of robbery.
And there is in this case evidence tending to show a conspiracy between defendants to rob the deceased, and that the killing was' perpetrated in the execution of such conspiracy. Where two or more persons conspire to rob another and he is killed by one of the conspirators in the perpetration, or attempted perpetration of the robbery, each, and all of the conspirators would be guilty of murder. S. v. Bennett, supra, and cases cited.
Applying these principles to the evidence shown in the case on appeal here under consideration, there is no error in submitting the case to the jury on the charge of murder in the first degree.
Indeed, a reading of the charge given to the jury by the trial judge fully and fairly presented the case — so much so, that defendants find no fault with it — and make no exception to any part of it.
II. Assignments of error Nos. 2 to 83 both inclusive, covering Exceptions 5 to 12, both inclusive, relate to photographs, referred to in the evidence as Exhibits A and B, and manifestly in evidence, pertaining to the location of the body of the deceased when found and seen on the floor of the store on the morning of 6 April, 1949, used in the course of the examination of witnesses for the State as to which in each instance in which objection was made, the court ruled that the photograph is allowed or is offered “for the purpose of allowing the witness to illustrate his testimony and no other purpose,” and that “it is not substantive evidence.” Moreover, there is testimony that the photographs are true representations of the position of the body as it was found in the store.
While the decisions of this Court uniformly hold that in the trial of cases, civil or criminal, in this State, photographs may not be admitted as substantive evidence, where there is evidence of the accuracy of a photograph, a witness may use it for the restricted purpose of explaining or illustrating to the jury his testimony relevant and material to some matter in controversy. See S. v. Gardner, 228 N.C. 567, 46 S.E. 2d 824, where the principle has been applied recently, and the- authorities in support of it are assembled. Hence it is not necessary to reiterate and repeat here what is said there. It is sufficient to say that the principle as there declared appears to have been applied properly here, and the use of the photographs properly restricted to the purpose of illustrating the testimony of the witnesses. Indeed, it does not appear that the test!-*313mony sought to be illustrated is irrelevant and immaterial to tbe issue involved in tbe trial. Tbus, tbe assignments of error presently under consideration are beld to be without merit.
III. Assignment of error No. 9 covering Exception No. 13, is directed to tbe action of tbe court in overruling objection by defendant to an hypothetical question, based upon evidence, as to whether tbe medical expert has an opinion satisfactory to himself as to tbe cause of tbe death of deceased. Tbe witness answered “I do.” Then without objection tbe witness was asked, “What is that opinion?”, and in answer thereto without objection, said, “He died from skull fracture caused by tbe blows from tbe pistol, and shotgun.” Tbus tbe record fails to present exception to tbe answer which defendants now seek to contend was erroneously admitted. But, in any event, a reading of tbe evidence fails to show that defendants were prejudiced by tbe answer of tbe witness. Statements of defendants made to officers show that M. L. Blackwell was on bis feet when defendants entered bis store, that one beat him over tbe bead with a pistol, and tbe other with a shotgun; that they left him on tbe floor; that be was later found where they left him; that bis bead and skull were split open and crushed; and that be was dead. In tbe light of this evidence, tbe cause of bis death is unmistakable.
All other assignments of error, brought forward, have been given due consideration, and in them error is not made to appear.
Hence, in tbe judgment below, we find