The original judgment and the order suspending or staying its execution on the condition specified find express statutory authorization in G.S. 14-324 which prescribes that “upon any conviction for abandonment, any judge or any recorder having jurisdiction may, in his discretion, make such order as in his judgment will best provide for the support, as far as may be necessary, of the deserted wife or children or both, from the property or labor of the defendant.”
The defendant concedes this. He confines his attack to the order entered at the February Term, 1949, revoking the suspension or stay of execution of the original sentence and ordering such sentence to be enforced by his commitment. He advances this argument to invalidate this order: (1) That the court had power to revoke the suspension or stay of execution and enforce the original judgment only for a willful breach of the condition specified in the original order; (2) that the entire evidence at the hearing demonstrated that the defendant’s failure to perform the specified condition was not occasioned by willfulness on his part, but arose out of his physical and financial inability to comply; and (3) that by reason of these matters the court erred in adjudging the breach to be willful and in revoking the suspension or stay of execution of the original judgment and in ordering such judgment to be enforced.
The defendant’s position is untenable for his minor premise, i.e., that the entire eAÚdence at the hearing disclosed that his breach of the condition was not willful, lacks validity.
The evidence produced by the State at the hearing was sufficient to show that the defendant possessed complete capacity to support his child according to the terms prescribed by the court from the time of the entry of the original order in November, 1947, down to the summer of 1948, and sustained the finding that the defendant’s violation of the specified condition was willful in character. Since the court was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight of their testimony, this finding supports the order entered at the February Term, 1949, and renders it unnecessary for us to express any opinion as to the validity of the defendant’s major premise, i.e., that when a court pronounces a sentence in a criminal action and suspends or stays its execution on a specified condition, it cannot subsequently revoke the suspension or stay and enforce the sentence for a breach of the condition on the part of the defendant unless such breach be willful.
The defendant complains of the suggestion incorporated in the order 'by the presiding judge “that if the defendant be of good conduct while *746incarcerated tbat be be paroled after serving one-fourtb of bis time and paroled on tbe specific conditions tbat be maintain and support bis wife and minor child.” Tbe basis of tbe objection is tbat tbis placed an additional burden on appellant as be was not convicted of abandonment of bis wife. Tbe defendant should suffer no disquietude on tbis score. Tbe language quoted constitutes no part of tbe order in controversy. It is a mere precatory recommendation to tbe Governor tbat tbe defendant be offered a conditional parole at a future time upon tbe happening of an uncertain event. Even if such a parole should hereafter be tendered, tbe defendant would be at liberty to reject it.
Tbe Solicitor and tbe defendant could not agree upon a case on appeal, and it was settled by tbe judge pursuant to G.S. 1-283. Tbe complaint of defendant tbat tbe judge inserted therein testimony presented at tbe bearing is without merit. S. v. Gooch, 94 N.C. 982.
Tbe judgment revoking the suspension or stay of execution and enforcing tbe original sentence is
Affirmed.