Tbe defendant has been convicted of murder in tbe first degree, uxoricide, with no recommendation from tbe jury and sentenced to die as tbe law commands. He appeals, assigning as errors an incautious remark of tbe judge during tbe selection of tbe jury, and alleged inaccuracies in tbe charge.
During tbe selection of tbe jury and after four jurors bad been seated, tbe next prospective juror expressed some doubt on tbe voir dire as to bis ability to distinguish between tbe different degrees of an unlawful homicide or to appreciate tbe significance of a reasonable doubt. Whereupon counsel for defendant asked tbe court to excuse tbe juror. In response, tbe court remarked: “It is no reflection on tbe juror’s mental capacity not to know these things, as some college professors know little, if anything, except about what they teach.” Tbe defendant objected and excepted to tbe remark. Tbe court found that no prejudice bad resulted therefrom to tbe defendant as no college professors were on tbe jury, but did excuse tbe juror for cause. He was not asked to do more.
Conceding tbe infelicity of tbe remark, it was obviously without material significance to the defendant’s cause. In tbe first place, it bad no reference to tbe testimony of defendant’s witness, Dr. George Silver, psychiatrist and college professor, whó bad not yet gone upon tbe witness stand or testified in tbe case. Moreover, it did not purport to disparage tbe testimony of a college professor in bis field, tbe only field in which tbe defendant’s expert witnesses professed to speak. S. v. Howard, 129 N.C. 584, 40 S.E. 71. Tbe authorities are opposed to any invalidation of the trial on tbe basis of this exception. S. v. Lippard, 223 N.C. 167, 25 S.E. 2d 594; S. v. Baldwin, 178 N.C. 687, 100 S.E. 348; S. v. Robertson, 121 N.C. 551, 28 S.E. 59; S. v. Savage, 78 N.C. 520.
Exception is also taken to a portion of tbe court’s definition of a reasonable doubt: “a reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense, and arising from tbe testimony in tbe case.” Of course, a reasonable *742doubt may arise from tbe lack of evidence as well as from tbe testimony in the case. But here, the court further instructed tbe jury: “If upon the conclusion of all tbe testimony and tbe arguments in tbe case, and tbe charge of tbe court, you cannot say that you have an abiding faith to a moral certainty of tbe defendant’s guilt, it would in that event become your duty to find him not guilty.” This was as favorable to tbe defendant as be could expect, and perhaps more, in tbe face of bis admission that be killed bis wife under tbe circumstances disclosed by tbe record. He would hardly be entitled to an acquittal since bis confession of guilt comes from tbe mouths of bis own witnesses, unless be were insane, and as to this be has tbe burden of satisfaction. S. v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E. 2d 348; S. v. Swink, 229 N.C. 123, 47 S.E. 2d 852; S. v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697, 28 S.E. 2d 232; S. v. Norwood, 115 N.C. 789, 20 S.E. 712; S. v. Potts, 100 N.C. 457, 6 S.E. 657. It was conceded on tbe bearing that tbe defendant’s wife met a cruel death at bis bands.
Tbe cases of S. v. Tyndall, ante, 174, 52 S.E. 2d 272, and S. v. Flynn, ante, 293, 52 S.E. 2d 791, cited and relied upon by the defendant, are inapplicable to tbe facts of tbe instant record. Indeed, tbe Flynn case and authorities there cited, properly interpreted, seem to support tbe State’s contention. No violence was done to tbe rule as stated in S. v. Schoolfield, 184 N.C. 721, 114 S.E. 466.
Complaint is also registered to tbe court’s reference to tbe defendant’s absence from tbe witness stand, calling attention to tbe fact that this was bis right and should not be considered as a circumstance against him. Gr.S. 8-54. Tbe defendant elected not to testify in bis own behalf, but offered two expert witnesses, psychiatrists, who addressed themselves to bis mental deficiency. Under these circumstances, tbe defendant contends that bis silence should not have been brought to tbe attention of tbe jury at all by tbe trial court. He cites as authority for bis position tbe recent case of S. v. McNeill, 229 N.C. 377, 49 S.E. 2d 733. Suffice it to say McNeill’s case is not at war with what tbe judge said. Moreover, tbe following cases are in support of tbe present charge: S. v. Proctor, 213 N.C. 221, 195 S.E. 816; S. v. Horne, 209 N.C. 725, 184 S.E. 470; S. v. Riddle, 205 N.C. 591, 172 S.E. 400; S. v. Turner, 171 N.C. 803, 88 S.E. 523.
Tbe remaining exceptions are too attenuate to work a new trial or to require elaboration. They are not sustained, albeit they have been carefully examined.
On tbe record as presented, no reversible error has been shown. Hence, tbe verdict and judgment will be upheld.