Did the trial court err in rendering judgment -as of nonsuit from which this appeal is taken ? This is the only question here presented. And taking the evidence offered by plaintiff, as shown in the case on appeal, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and giving to plaintiff the benefits of every reasonable intendment upon the- evidence .and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, as must be done in considering a motion for judgment as of nonsuit, Gr.S. 1-183, we are of opinion and hold that the evidence is insufficient to carry the ease to the jury.
*678Tbe burden was on plaintiff to show by evidence not only that defendant was negligent as alleged in the complaint, but that her negligence Avas the proximate cause, or one of the proximate causes of the intestate’s death. The proof should hai^e been of such character as reasonably to warrant the inference required to be established, and not merely sufficient to raise a surmise or conjecture as to the existence of the essential fact. Smith v. Wharton, 199 N.C. 246, 154 S.E. 12.
The plaintiff contends that there is error in the judgment below in several respects: First: It is contended that the defendant, in extracting the teeth of intestate, Avas practicing dentistry without a license so to do, in violation of the statute, G.S. 90-29, enacted for the protection of the public, and in the interest of public safety, for which a penalty is prescribed by the provisions of G.S. 90-40; that, hence, she was guilty of negligence per se; and that the evidence tends to show that such negligence was the proximate cause, or one of the proximate causes of the pain the intestate suffered, and of her subsequent death.
As to this first contention: the mere Avant of a license to practice dentistry does not raise any inference of negligence. If an unlicensed dentist exercises the requisite skill and care in administering treatment to a patient, he is not liable in damages for injury to the patient, merely because of his want of a license. 41 Am. Jur. 202. Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197, 44 A.L.R. 1407; Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788.
In the Hardy case, in Avhich the plaintiff sought to hold defendant, an unlicensed naturopathist, liable for alleged wrongful death, it is said in opinion by Devin, J.: “The fact that the defendant was engaged in treating patients without haA'ing obtained license so to do, in violation of C.S. 6708, was not eAÚdence of negligence in the treatment of plaintiff’s intestate . . . The question was not whether he was licensed, or not, but whether he exercised proper care in the treatment of a patient. As was said in Brown v. Shyne . . . 'Unless the plaintiff’s injury was caused by carelessness or lack of skill, the defendant’s failure to obtain a license was not connected with the injury.’ ” And the opinion there concludes that “if defendant has been engaged in treating diseases in violation of the statute, he is liable to indictment, and, upon conviction, to suffer the prescribed penalty, but in a civil action, bottomed upon the law of negligence, the failure to possess a State certificate is immaterial on the question of due care.”
And in keeping with the ruling in the Hardy case, while it is provided by statute, in this State, that the practice of dentistry Avithout a license is forbidden, G.S. 90-29, for violation of Avhich, upon conviction, a punishment is prescribed, G.S. 90-40, the failure to possess such license is immaterial on the question of due care.
*679Second: It is contended tbat defendant, in practicing dentistry, without a license so to do, was required to exercise the care and skill of a licensed dentist. This appears to be the law. See Hardy v. Dahl, supra. And “dentists, in their particular fields, are subject to the same rules of liability as physicians and surgeons.” Smith v. McClung, 201 N.C. 648, 161 S.E. 91, citing McCracken v. Smathers, 122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E. 354, and Nash v. Royster, 189 N.C. 408, 127 S.E. 356.
In Nash v. Royster, it is stated that the law holds a physician or surgeon “answerable for any injury to his patient proximately resulting from a want of that degree of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by others of his profession, or for the omission to use reasonable care and diligence in the practice of his art, or for the failure to exercise his best judgment in the treatment of the case.”
And in the case of McCracken v. Smathers, supra, the Court held that the degree of care and skill required of a dentist to his patient is that possessed and exercised by the ordinary members of his profession.
In the light of these principles, plaintiff in the present case contends, in the first place that there is evidence from which a jury might reasonably find that defendant, in extracting the teeth of intestate, failed to use reasonable care, that is, was negligent in the way and manner she performed the operation, and that such negligence was the proximate, or one of the proximate causes of the wrongs of which complaint is made. As to this contention, evidence is lacking as to how defendant extracted the teeth, whether she did or did not perform the operation in keeping with the care required of a licensed dentist. The evidence on which plaintiff relies is purely conjectural and speculative. Such evidence is insufficient to support a finding that defendant extracted the teeth in a negligent manner, that is, failed to exercise due care in extracting them.
In the next place, plaintiff contends that all the evidence shows that defendant lacked the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by members of the dental profession; that a dentist possessing such knowledge and skill, upon examination of intestate’s mouth, would have detected the symptoms of Yincent’s disease, or trench mouth, with which intestate was suffering, and would have so diagnosed her condition, and, upon such diagnosis, would have known that it would be dangerous to extract teeth in the presence of such disease; and that, hence, in extracting the teeth of intestate under such circumstances and conditions defendant negligently violated the duty she owed to the intestate, which negligence proximately caused or contributed to wrongs of which complaint is made.
As to this contention, it is conceded on this record that defendant lacked the knowledge and skill of a licensed dentist.
But the evidence offered by plaintiff fails to show that defendant’s lack of knowledge and skill in dentistry was the proximate cause or one of the *680proximate causes of the wrongs alleged by plaintiff. And in this connection, there is evidence that in the study of dentistry there is a course in oral pathology, the science that treats of diseases of the mouth, including-Yincent’s disease, and that there is danger in pulling teeth in the presence of this disease. There is no evidence as to what was the condition of the mouth of intestate on 18 August, 1947, the day the teeth were extracted. While Dr. Barnes, in examining intestate on 22 August, found her gums swollen and her mouth inflamed, and detected odors characteristic of Vincent’s disease, he was unwilling to give an opinion as to whether these conditions existed on 18 August, 1947. And Dr. Rasberry testified that he predicated his opinion upon the impression that Dr. Barnes had testified that in examining intestate on 22 August he found the “one, two and three things necessary to diagnose it as Vincent’s disease, general mouth infection, ulcers in the mouth, white caps in the ulcers.” And the record fails to show that Dr. Barnes so testified. Moreover, Dr. Rasberry says that if only two of these essentials were present, he would not give it as his opinion that intestate had Vincent’s disease on 18 August, and, furthermore, if all three conditions existed, he would not make a diagnosis without a smear test. Thus the evidence is insufficient to support a finding by the jury that intestate had Vincent’s disease at the time her teeth were extracted by defendant. Hence, no causal relationship is shown.
The judgment below is
Affirmed.