The exception to the failure of the court to sustain defendant’s challenge to the entire array of petit jurors is not brought forward, as required by the Rules of this Court, Rule 28. However, the defendant discusses the exception at some length in his brief. Consequently, we have considered the exception and find it without merit.
His Honor’s findings of fact are supported by the evidence and are conclusive on appeal, since the exception presents no reviewable question of law. G.S. 9-14; S. v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 42 S.E. 2d 686; S. v. Lord, 225 N.C. 354, 34 S.E. 2d 205; S. v. DeGraffenreid, 224 N.C. 517, 31 S.E. 2d 523; S. v. Walls, 211 N.C. 487, 191 S.E. 232; S. v. Cooper, 205 N.C. 657, 172 S.E. 199; S. v. Daniels, 134 N.C. 641, 46 S.E. 743. The question raised has been considered in a number of recent cases before this Court and no useful purpose would be served by a further discussion of the subject here. See S. v. Speller, ante, 345, 53 S.E. 2d 294; S. v. Speller, 229 N.C. 67, 47 S.E. 2d 537; S. v. Brunson, 229 N.C. 37, 47 S.E. 2d 478; S. v. Koritz, 227 N.C. 552, 43 S.E. 2d 77, certiorari denied 332 U.S. 768, 92 L. Ed. 354, and a rehearing denied 332 U.S. 812, 92 L. Ed. 390; and the cases cited.
Exception No. 16 is brought forward in the brief, but no argument is made or authority cited in support thereof, hence it will be considered as abandoned. Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, Rule 28, 221 N.C. 546.
The defendant moved for judgment as of nonsuit at the close of the State’s evidence, on the ground that while the bill of indictment charges *565the defendant with burglarious entry with the felonious intent to ravish and carnally know Mrs. James Barnes, forcibly and against her will, the evidence he contends, tends to show only an intent to commit a crime against nature, condemned by G.S. 14-177.
The conduct of the defendant in breaking and entering the bedroom of the prosecutrix in the nighttime, and under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, indicates the extent to which he was willing to go to accomplish his purpose. He might have preferred and intended to commit a crime against nature, or his statement in that respect might not have been indicative of his actual intent. We think the evidence was sufficient to carry the case to the jury under the allegations contained in the bill of indictment, and it was for the jury to determine, under all the circumstances, whether or not the defendant had the ulterior criminal intent at the time of the breaking and entering, to commit the felony charged in the bill of indictment. S. v. Allen, 186 N.C. 302, 119 S.E. 504; S. v. Boon, 35 N.C. 244.
The trial judge charged the jury on the defendant’s contention in this respect, and instructed the jury to acquit the defendant if it found as a fact that the defendant entered the home of the prosecuting witness with the intent to commit a crime against nature and not with the intent to commit rape, as alleged by the State in the bill of indictment.
In S. v. Boon, supra, Pearson, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “The evidence of the intent charged is certainly very slight, but we cannot say there is no evidence tending to prove it. The fact of the breaking and entering was strong evidence of some bad intent; going to the bed and touching the foot of one of the young ladies tended to indicate that the intent was to gratify lust. . . . And the hasty retreat without any attempt at explanation, as soon as the lady screamed, was some evidence that the purpose of the prisoner, at the time he entered, was to gratify his lust by force. It was, therefore, no error to submit the question to the jury. Whether the evidence was sufficient to justify a verdict of guilty is a question about which the Court is not at liberty to express an opinion.
In the instant case, it is clear the defendant wanted the prosecutrix to know he would resort to other means if she screamed. Whether he had the intent to commit the crime of rape, as charged, or the intent to commit a crime against nature, at the time of breaking and entering, was a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
Evidence as to the conduct of the defendant after breaking and entering may be considered by the jury in ascertaining the intent of the accused at the time of the breaking and entering. But where there is a breaking and entering into a dwelling house of another, in the nighttime, with the intent to commit a felony therein, the crime of burglary is con*566summated, even though the accused person by reason of unexpected resistance or the outcry of his intended victim, may abandon his intent to commit the felony. S. v. Hooper, 227 N.C. 633, 44 S.E. 2d 42; S. v. Allen, supra; S. v. McDaniel, 60 N.C. 245; S. v. Boon, supra.
Exceptions 65 and 67 are directed to the refusal of the court below to grant the defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant its submission to the jury.
The appellant is relying largely on the case of S. v. Minton, 228 N.C. 518, 46 S.E. 2d 296, where the defendant’s fingerprint was found upon broken glass from the front door of a store that had been unlawfully entered. That case is distinguishable from the present one. The defendant in the Minton case was lawfully in the store in the afternoon of the day on which the crime was committed, and he may have made the fingerprint at that time.
We must keep in mind that a motion for judgment as of nonsuit in a criminal prosecution is properly denied if there is any competent evidence to support the allegations of a bill of indictment; and all the evidence tending to sustain the allegations in the bill of indictment upon which a defendant is being tried, will be considered in a light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. S. v. Braxton, ante, 312, 52 S.E. 2d 895; S. v. Gentry, 228 N.C. 643, 46 S.E. 2d 863; S. v. Well, 228 N.C. 304, 45 S.E. 2d 345; S. v. Hough, 227 N.C. 596, 42 S.E. 2d 659; S. v. Ewing, 227 N.C. 535, 42 S.E. 2d 676; S. v. McKinnon, 223 N.C. 160, 25 S.E. 2d 606; S. v. Brown, 218 N.C. 415, 11 S.E. 2d 321. Here the defendant was never lawfully in the apartment of the prosecutrix, and the presence of his fingerprint on the inside of the window sill in the sleeping quarters of the prosecutrix, when considered with the other evidence, was sufficient to carry the case to the jury.
The defendant has abandoned the remaining sixty-seven exceptions set out in the record.
The exceptions brought forward and argued in the defendant’s brief fail to show any prejudicial error in the trial below.
No error.