The evidence was legally sufficient to support conviction as to all the defendants, and the demurrers to the evidence were properly overruled. If any doubt existed as to the sufficiency of the evidence against Maude Laymon, it must be dispelled when we look at the whole series of transactions she was sharing with her codefendants as raising an inference of a conspiracy to commit the crime alleged, and to cover it up by devices and maneuvers that would baffle pursuit. During the ride near Jonesville, and just before Winters missed his pocketbook and found the money gone, this woman was transferred from the front seat to the back so that Winters was between her and Flynn. She was closely associated with the defendants at almost every critical part of the story; *298with, them when the evidence points to a division of the spoils, and finally, after crossing several states, was found with the defendant Vestal in Cedartown, Georgia. The defense suggests that she was an abandoned woman, following the fortunes of Vestal through other motives; this does not remove the inferences of her participation in the crime.
The more serious challenge to the trial refers us to the admission in evidence of Sheriff Moxley’s testimony in which he related the voluntary statements made to him by Dunk Vestal, while in jail. We examine the question of its competency, keeping in mind the limitations and cautions imposed by the judge — that it should be taken only against Vestal and not against any of his codefendants. The connected and revealing story of Vestal contained at points references to conversations, declarations, acts and incidents said and performed by his codefendants pending the transactions which the State contends led to the parting of Winters and his money, which if directly in evidence would be legally unobjectionable, however damaging against the actors or declarants to whom they refer. At the same time they all unquestionably are competent evidence against Vestal, bearing not only on his guilty knowledge, but his actual participation in the crime charged. The trial judge, as we have indicated, upon every objection, meticulously instructed the jury that the evidence must be taken against Vestal alone and not against any of the other defendants.
The involvement and unraveling of closely knitted transactions in which a number of persons have played a part often presents perplexing questions of competency in this respect. A major operation in dissection of the evidence by rule cannot be undertaken by the court without destroying the subject or leading to confusion. Ordinarily the only device is that used by the judge in the instant case; cautioning the jury as to its application, under an instruction formulated as we find it here. Its use has not been seriously questioned. As a matter of necessity arising out of what appears to have been the close co-operation of the participants and conspiratorial character of the evidence leading to the crime, the necessity of its application occurred rather more frequently than defendants desired.
Numerous exceptions have been taken to the charge of the court, largely in preservation of objections to the admission of evidence as we have outlined it. Space forbids discussing the exceptions by number; but we do not find that those related to this subject disclose reversible error.
We do not find the exceptions to the charge based on inaccuracies in the statement of contentions or the statements of evidence of such a character that would take the case out of the rule that such matters might be called to the attention of the court at the time, so that the error *299or mistake made may be then corrected. In re Will of West, 227 N.C. 204, 41 S.E. 2d 838.
Tbe defendants object that tbe court failed to define tbe crime charged because it did not refer to larceny from tbe person. Since tbe fact that larceny was from tbe person is but an aggravation of tbe offense, and it is not necessary to charge it in order to prove it, and since tbe court correctly defined tbe crime of larceny as is usually done, tbe objection seems to be without merit. S. v. Bynum, 117 N.C. 749, 23 S.E. 218.
Tbe evidence in this case was mixed, the direct evidence of observers of tbe facts related, and circumstantial evidence arising out of tbe whole complex of facts presented. While tbe court may, with propriety, and frequently does, pay special attention to tbe nature of circumstantial evidence, it has never suggested that circumstantial evidence is any different from so-called direct evidence with regard to tbe degree of conviction necessary to establish guilt. Nor is it required, except upon request, to elaborate on tbe peculiar nature of that evidence.
In tbe case at bar tbe judge instructed tbe jury in formula approved by this Court that they should be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to tbe guilt of any defendant before finding him guilty. S. v. Brackett, 218 N.C. 369, 11 S.E. 2d 146; S. v. Schoolfield, 184 N.C. 721, 114 S.E. 466; S. v. Pierce, 192 N.C. 766, 770, 136 S.E. 121; S. v. Wiseman, 178 N.C. 784, 794, 101 S.E. 629.
Tbe appeal of Delmar Lee (Dunk) Vestal not having been perfected, is not before us and is not considered. *
It has been impossible to treat all tbe exceptions of tbe defendants individually without writing a book, — they have been too numerous. In tbe classifications we have given them may be found tbe more serious contentions of tbe appellants. Many of tbe undiscussed exceptions present nothing novel or meirtorious and we have been constrained to reject them, although they have been considered. In those discussed, we find no reversible error.
No error.