Tbe motion for judgment of nonsuit upon tbe evidence was properly overruled.
*251Tbe objections to tbe admission of evidence is witb respect to (a) warnings given tbe defendant by tbe occupants of tbe car that be was driving too fast and to slow down; (b) to tbe statement made by tbe “cop” at Danville, to Fentress that be was “to bigb” to drive, compelling bim to relinquish tbe wheel to tbe “boy from Missouri” who seemed to be sufficiently sober; (c) admitting tbe evidence of J. T. Foster as to bearing tbe car pass witb the accelerator wide open and going at terrific speed.
All these exceptions are subject to criticisms which affect their validity as presenting reversible error. First, objection is only to tbe answers and not made until tbe matter was in, under conditions which made exclusion discretionary witb tbe court. S. v. Hunt, 223 N.C. 173, 176, 25 S.E. 2d 598; S. v. Stancill, 178 N.C. 683, 687, 100 S.E. 241. Second, testimony as to tbe identical matter was later introduced without objection. S. v. Hunt, supra; S. v. Stancill, supra.
We observe a distinction witb respect to tbe warning given between Greensboro and Danville as being too remote in time elapsed and distance traveled to stand alone as independent evidence; but there is evidence that defendant was speeding from tbe time be left Greensboro until tbe accident. Taken witb tbe whole evidence we do not find it sufficient to justify reversal on tbe theory of prejudicial error.
Furthermore, tbe evidence of Foster who testified that be beard tbe car passing witb a great noise and at a rapid rate of speed does not lack circumstantial support, since its roaring progress stopped witb a loud crash at tbe point where be found it a moment later, torn to pieces and its occupants lying on tbe ground about tbe wreck.
When relevant to tbe issue, a witness may testify to any thing be has apprehended by any of bis five senses, or all of them together. Tbe objection goes to tbe weight and significance rather than to tbe competency of tbe evidence. At any rate, tbe witness later testified to substantially tbe same thing without objection.
Appellant objects to tbe reading of tbe statute relating to drunken driving, on tbe ground that there was no evidence of defendant’s intoxication. We do not agree witb tbe ground of tbe objection and, therefore, not witb its merit. Tbe instruction to tbe jury brought forward by exception in defendant’s brief was given in relation to this statute. Tbe objection is based upon tbe same theory, that is that there is no evidence in tbe record of defendant’s intoxication. As already stated, we cannot so bold, and cannot sustain tbe exception.
Other exceptions not discussed have been examined. On tbe whole, record we do not find reversible error.
No error.