We think the evidence adduced in the trial below is sufficient tp warrant the submission of this case.to the jury.
The burden of proving the carrier’s negligence was upon the plaintiff, and he made out a prima facie case when he introduced evidence to show delivery of the shipment to the defendant in good condition and its delivery to the consignee in bad condition. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U.S. 416, 70 L. Ed. 659; Fuller v. R. R., 214 N.C. 648, 200 S.E. 403; Edgerton v. R. R., 203 N.C. 281, 165 S.E. 689; Moore v. R. R., 183 N.C. 213, 111 S.E. 166; Bivens v. R. R., 176 N.C. 414, 97 S.E. 213. Upon such showing a plaintiff is entitled to go to the jury, and the jury may, but is not compelled to find for him. However, in such cases; the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the defendant and if the defendant elects to offer no evidence he merely assumes the risk of an adverse verdict. Vance v. Guy, 224 N.C. 607, 31 S.E. 2d 766; Star Mfg. Co. v. R. R., 222 N.C. 330, 23 S.E. 2d 32; McDaniel v. R. R., 190 N.C. 474, 130 S.E. 208; Speas v. Bank, 188 N.C. 524, 125 S.E. 398.
Whether the defendant and its connecting carrier for whose negligence, if any, the defendant is liable, Moore v. R. R., supra, were negligent in failing to move this shipment from Eaison to Seawell’s Point more promptly, or in failing to re-ice the car, as required by the rules and regulations governing the shipment of perishable goods by standard refrigeration, or the damages were sustained by reason of the inherent *198condition of the shipment, are- questions of fact to be determined by a jury:
It is the duty of a common carrier to transport perishable goods in proper cars and to use reasonable care for their preservation and prompt delivery. Bivens v. R. R., supra; Forrester v. Railroad, 147 N.C. 553, 61 S.E. 524.
The defendant insists that the destination of this shipment was to a point on a private track owned by the Government of the United States, and that its liability ended the moment the car was placed on such track. Conceding this to be so, the car in question was not so placed until Sunday morning, 16 July, 1944, at 8:00 a.m., 43% hours after its last re-icing in Rocky Mount. It appears from the record the car arrived at the terminal yards of the delivering carrier at Norfolk or Seawell’s Point, at 11:00 p.m. the previous day, and according to Rule 225 set forth above: “After the arrival of the car in the terminal yards serving destination, and up to the time car is in process of unloading ... or until car has been placed on private track, carriers will examine bunkers or tanks daily and re-ice to capacity when necessary.”
We note from the defendant’s evidence that when it made out its report to its connecting carrier on the exchange of cars, this particular shipment was listed as originating at Faison, N. C., and the final destination was given as Norfolk, Ya. Therefore, we presume that Seawell’s Point is just one of many delivery points in the Norfolk area, served by the terminal yards of the Virginian Railway Company in Norfolk.
We think the court committed error in sustaining the defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit, and the plaintiff’s exception thereto will he upheld.