No attack is made upon the validity of the bonds referred to in this action. The sole question raised is whether or not, under the facts and circumstances disclosed, the Board of Commissioners of Meck-lenburg County has the legal authority to authorize a transfer of funds from the First Ward School project, as requested by the plaintiffs.
We concur in the ruling of the court below in so far as it holds that the purpose for which these funds may be used is the general purpose set forth in the bond order, as provided in G.S. 153-78. The detailed estimates given and the projects described in the bond order were not essential to the validity of the order, and it is so provided in the statute. Therefore, the inclusion of this detailed information would not change the purpose for which these bonds were issued and create a multiplicity of purposes in lieu thereof. These bonds were issued for the purpose of providing funds for erecting, remodeling and enlarging school buildings, including the acquisition of necessary land and equipment, in order to maintain the constitutional six months’ school term in Mecklenburg County.
The statute provides (G.S. 153-78) that the bond order must state the purpose for Yvhieh the bonds are to be issued, but not more than one purpose of issue shall be stated, and that the purposes set forth in any one subsection of G.S. 153-77 shall be deemed as one purpose.
The defendants contend that the proceeds of the sale of these bonds must be used only for the purposes specified in the bond order authorizing the bonds, citing G.S. 153-107. It is so prorbded in this statute, which further provides : “If any member of the governing body or any county officer shall vote to apply or shall apply, or shall participate in applying any proceeds of bonds ... in violation of this section, such member or such officer shall be guilty of a felony . . .”
In construing this statute, howermr, we must keep in mind that a bond order may contain several sections and authorize the issue of bonds for *756different purposes. G.S. 153-77 sets out eleven different purposes for which bonds may be issued. But G.S. 153-107, in our opinion, does not place a limitation upon the legal right to transfer or allocate funds from one project to another included within the general purpose for which bonds were issued. The inhibition contained in the statute is to prevent funds obtained for one general purpose being transferred and used for another general purpose. For example, the statute prohibits the use of funds derived from the sale of bonds to erect, repair and equip school buildings, from being used to erect or repair a courthouse or a county home, or similar project. This view is in accord with the provisions of G.S. 159-49.1, which provides: “If for any reason the whole or any part of the proceeds of the sale of bonds heretofore issued by a county, city or town, cannot be applied to the purpose for which such bonds were authorized, such proceeds may be invested in either bonds, notes or certificates of indebtedness of the United States of America . . .,” etc.
We are of the opinion and so hold that the Board of Commissioners of Mecklenburg County does have the legal authority to transfer the funds in question: Provided, however, the Board upon investigation, shall find as a fact that since these bonds were authorized, conditions have so changed in the First Ward area that such funds are no longer necessary for the adequate repair, renovation and equipment of First Ward School. In the event the Board so finds, it may then transfer the $100,000.00 to be used for further enlarging and improving Chantilly and Park Road Elementary Schools; and any additional part of the $230,000.00 not required on the First Ward School project may also be transferred to other school building or repair projects : Provided, however, the Board of Commissioners shall find upon investigation, that the use of such funds is necessary to provide the proper buildings and equipment for Chantilly and Park Road Elementary Schools and for constructing, repairing and equipping other school buildings in the City of Charlotte. G.S. 115-83.
The county board of education and the school commissioners or trustees of an administrative unit, are charged with the responsibility of building all new schoolhouses and repairing the old ones in their respective administrative units. However, the board of county commissioners is charged with the duty to determine what expenditures shall be made for the erection, repair and equipment of school buildings in the respective administrative units in the county. And when a board of commissioners, upon investigation, finds that an expenditure is necessary in order to maintain the constitutional six months’ school term in the county, or in an administrative unit therein, it becomes the duty of the county commissioners to *757provide the funds necessary to meet such expenditures. G.S. 115-83. Johnson v. Marrow, 228 N. C. 58, 44 S. E. (2) 468.
This control over the expenditure of funds for the erection, repair and equipment of school buildings by the board of county commissioners, will not be construed so as to interfere with the exclusive control of the schools vested in the county board of education or the trustees of an administrative unit. School Commissioners v. Aldermen, 158 N. C. 191, 73 S. E. 905.
The question of changing the location of a sehoolhouse, as well as the selection of a site for a new one, is vested in the sound discretion of the school authorities, and their action cannot be restrained by the courts, unless in violation of some provision of the law, or the authorities have been influenced by improper motives, or there has been a manifest abuse of discretion on their part. G.S. 115-85; Venable v. School Committee, 149 N. C. 120, 62 S. E. 902; School Commissioners v. Aldermen, supra; Board of Education v. Forrest, 190 N. C. 753, 130 S. E. 621; Board of Education v. Pegram, 197 N. C. 33, 147 S. E. 622.
Likewise, all expenditures for the construction, repair and equipment of school buildings in a county, must be authorized by the board of county commissioners, acting in good faith, pursuant to statutory and constitutional authority.
The judgment of the court below will be modified in accordance with this opinion, and, except as modified, it will be upheld.
Modified and affirmed.