The State ordinarily is not bound by the adverse testimony'of one of its witnesses but may offer other conflicting evidence. That is, it is not precluded from showing that the facts are other than as related by one or more of its witnesses. S. v. Mace, 118 N. C. 1244; S. v. Edwards, 211 N. C. 555, 191 S. E. 1; S. v. Freeman, 213 N. C. 378, 196 *649S. E. 308; S. v. Todd, 222 N. C. 346, 23 S. E. (2) 47; S. v. Watts, 224 N. C. 771, 32 S. E. (2) 348.
When its evidence is conflicting—some tending to inculpate and some to exculpate the defendant—it is sufficient to repel a demurrer thereto and must be submitted to the jury. S. v. Edwards, supra; S. v. Mace, supra; S. v. Todd, supra.
. When, however, the State’s case is made to rest entirely on testimony favorable to the defendant, and there is no evidence contra which does more than suggest a possibility of guilt or raise a conjecture, demurrer thereto should be sustained. S. v. Todd, supra; S. v. Coffey, 228 N. C. 119; S. v. Watts, supra; S. v. Boyd, 223 N. C. 79, 25 S. E. (2) 456; S. v. Penry, 220 N. C. 248, 17 S. E. (2) 4; S. v. Prince, 182 N. C. 788, 108 S. E. 330; S. v. Gordon, 225 N. C. 757, 36 S. E. (2) 143.
When the State offers evidence which tends to exculpate the defendant, he is entitled to whatever advantage the testimony affords and so, when it is wholly exculpatory, he is entitled to his acquittal. S. v. Cahoon, 206 N. C. 388, 174 S. E. 91.
The record before us, viewed in the light of these principles of law, leads to the conclusion that the court below should have sustained defendant’s motion to dismiss as in case of nonsuit.
All the testimony points to an accidental shooting. While we may surmise that the whole truth has not been told and that an intentional assault was in fact committed, there is no evidence to support that inference. There is no testimony tending to show either that the rifle was intentionally discharged or was so recklessly used as to constitute criminal liability for the resulting injury. There is no testimony tending to show the defendant committed any criminal offense.
It may not be amiss to note that the .court below, in its charge, giving the contentions of the State, referred to evidence tending to show that defendant’s wife was in bed asleep when she was shot, that there was some argument following which defendant picked up his rifle and intentionally shot her, and to other incriminating facts and circumstances which do not appear in the testimony included in the record before us. This would seem to indicate that the record fails to include all the evidence offered by the State.
Be that as it may, the record on appeal imports verity, and this Court is bound thereby. S. v. Debnam, 98 N. C. 712; S. v. Price, 175 N. C. 804, 95 S. E. 478; S. v. McWhirter, 193 N. C. 845, 137 S. E. 657; S. v. Stansberry, 197 N. C. 350, 148 S. E. 546; S. v. Goff, 205 N. C. 545, 172 S. E. 407; S. v. Sheffield, 206 N. C. 374, 174 S. E. 105. This is true even though the case is settled by counsel, S. v. Chaffin, 125 N. C. 660; S. v. Brown, 207 N. C. 156, 176 S. E. 260; and not by the judge, S. v. Griggs, *650197 N. C. 352, 148 S. E. 547, or is fixed by operation of law, S. v. Starnes, 220 N. C. 384, 17 S. E. (2) 346.
The Supreme Court is bound by the case on appeal, certified by the clerk of the Superior Court, even though the trial judge has had no opportunity to review it, and must decide questions presented upon the record as it comes here, without indulging in assumptions as to what might have occurred. S. v. Wolfe, 227 N. C. 461, 42 S. E. (2) 515; S. v. Gause, 227 N. C. 26, 40 S. E. (2) 463; S. v. Miller, 214 N. C. 317, 199 S. E. 89; S. v. Dee, 214 N. C. 509, 199 S. E. 730; S. v. Batson, 220 N. C. 411, 17 S. E. (2) 511, 139 A. L. R. 614.
The defendant is entitled to his discharge. To that end the judgment below is