Near the conclusion of the charge, counsel for defendant orally requested the court “to go into the law with respect to circumstantial evidence,” and the court declined to do so because it understood that “the State relies upon direct evidence.” The failure of the court to charge on the law concerning circumstantial testimony is assigned as error on the appeal.
*347Before tbe oral prayer was made, the court fully, clearly, and correctly charged the jury as to the presumption of innocence surrounding the accused, and as to the burden resting upon the State to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a condition precedent to his conviction, and as to the rules of the law of homicide arising upon the evidence given in the case. Since the request of the defendant for the court to instruct the jury on the law relating to circumstantial evidence was not reduced to writing in conformity to G. S., 1-181, the court was at liberty to disregard it unless the instruction orally asked concerned a “substantial and essential feature of the case embraced within the issue and arising on the evidence.” S. v. Johnson, 193 N. C., 701, 138 S. E., 19.
It is a well settled principle in this jurisdiction that the duty imposed upon the trial court by G. S., 1-180, to “declare and explain the law” arising in the case on trial does not require the court to instruct the jury upon the law of circumstantial evidence in a criminal action involving both direct and circumstantial testimony where the State relies principally upon the direct evidence and the direct evidence is sufficient, if believed, to warrant the conviction of the accused. S. v. Warren, 228 N. C., 22, 44 S. E. (2d), 207; S. v. Sutton, 225 N. C., 332, 34 S. E. (2d), 195; S. v. Wall, 218 N. C., 566, 11 S. E. (2d), 880; S. v. Neville, 157 N. C., 591, 72 S. E., 798; S. v. West, 152 N. C., 832, 68 S. E., 14.
This principle applies to the instant action. While some of the testimony was circumstantial in nature, the State relied in the main upon direct evidence to establish both the corpus delicti and the identity of the slayer. The identification of the accused as the killer of the deceased was made to depend primarily and principally on the credibility of the State’s witness, Will Hooker, who testified with positiveness that he saw the defendant fire the death-dealing bullet. Hence, it follows that the court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the law relating to circumstantial evidence.
We have carefully considered the other assignments of error and have concluded that none of them are of sufficient moment to justify a new trial. They raise no novel questions. The judgment rendered below is upheld because we find in law
No error.