We think the court’s charge on tbe issue of damages must be held for error. In tbe first place, it is peremptory or directory in character; and, secondly, it takes from tbe defendants their plea in bar, or of waiver, under subsection (a), Eule 19, of tbe Southern Cotton Tarn Association. Tbe trial court seems to bave overlooked, for tbe moment, tbe defendants’ contentions in respect of tbe amount, even if tbe issue of liability should be answered against them.
Tbe orders were given and tbe shipment made, “subject to tbe provisions of tbe Cotton Yarn Eule of 1938.” Under these, tbe merchandise purchased is deemed to bave been accepted when received, and tbe buyer’s right to reject or cancel an order, “because of defect,” expires ten days after tbe buyer “knows or should bave known of such defect.” It is tbe position of tbe defendants tbat all tbe shipments, here involved, were barred from rejection under this provision. Certainly, they say, not more than tbe last three shipments could survive its effect, and as to these, they contend, tbe issue was at least one for tbe jury. Tbe plaintiff takes tbe opposite view. We think tbe court was in error in resolving these mooted points against tbe defendants and in directing the amount of damages, should tbe jury reach tbat issue.
It is required of tbe trial judge that he “state in a plain and correct manner tbe evidence given in tbe case and declare and explain tbe law arising thereon,” and this without expressing any opinion on tbe facts. G-. S., 1-180. Tbe manner in which tbe trial court shall state tbe evidence and declare and explain tbe law arising thereon must necessarily be left in large measure to bis sound discretion and good judgment, “but be must charge on tbe different aspects presented by tbe evidence, and *102give the law applicable thereto.” Blake v. Smith, 163 N. C., 274, 93 S. E., 596. “On the substantive features of the case arising on the evidence, the judge is required to give correct charge concerning it.” S. v. Merrick, 171 N. C., 788, 88 S. E., 501. “The failure of the court to instruct the jury on substantive features of the case arising on the evidence is prejudicial. This is true even though there is no request for special instructions to that effect.” Spencer v. Brown, 214 N. C., 114, 198 S. E., 630. The pertinent decisions are to the effect that the statute “confers upon litigants a substantial legal right and calls for instructions as to the law upon all substantial features of the case”;.and further, that the requirements of the enactment “are not met by a general statement of legal principles which bear more or less directly, but not with absolute directness, upon the issues made by the evidence.” Williams v. Coach Co., 197 N. C., 12, 147 S. E., 435.
In charging on the issue of damages, the court appears to have been unmindful of the position of the defendants in respect of the delay of the plaintiff in rejecting or canceling orders “because of defect.” They not only invoked the three-months provision in subsection (c) of Rule 19, Cotton Yarn Rule of 1938, but also the 10-days provision in subsection (a) of this Rule. As the plaintiff had the laboring oar in respect of the issues of liability and extent of recovery, both being controverted, it was error for the court to determine the amount and instruct the jury to answer the issue of damages accordingly. Haywood v. Ins. Co., 218 N. C., 736, 12 S. E. (2d), 221, and cases cited.
There are other exceptions appearing on the record which would require attention, if the charge on the issue of damages were upheld, but as these may not arise on the further hearing, we omit any present rulings thereon.
For error in the charge, as indicated, the defendants are entitled to another day in court. It is so ordered.
New'trial.