It is conceded that the freight charges here sued for were those contained in the legally applicable tariff schedules filed with the North Carolina Utilities Commission and were in effect at the time of the shipments referred to. Hence it follows that under well settled principles of law and in accord with the statutes enacted to prevent rebates and discrimination among shippers, and to provide equal and impartial service to all alike (G. S., 60-5; 60-6; 60-52; 60-114; 49 U.S.C.A. sec. 41 (3)), it was the duty of the plaintiff as a common carrier of freight to collect the full amount at the correct rate for transportation, and where a lawful charge therefor was negligently omitted, or rate misquoted, resulting in undercharge, the carrier was equally bound to exhaust all legal remedies to require payment in full of the proper charge. Cotton Mills v. R. R., 178 N. C., 212, 100 S. E., 341; Davis v. Gulley, 188 N. C., 80, 123 S. E., 18. The rates fixed in accordance with the tariff schedules duly filed and approved by the North Carolina Utilities Commission as to intrastate shipments, or by the Interstate Commerce Commission as to interstate shipments, are binding not only upon the carrier but also on consignor and consignee. R. R. v. Latham, 176 N. C., 417, 97 S. E., 234; Cotton Mills v. R. R., 178 N. C., 212, 100 S. E., 341; R. R. v. Armfield, 189 N. C., 581, 127 S. E., 557; Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Fink, 250 U. S., 577; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S., 94; Kansas City Sou. R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S., 639; Southern Ry. Co. v. Herndon (S. C.), 179 S. E., 306. Since the carrier is required under penalty to collect the full amount of the commission-fixed rates, payment in accord therewith is not merely a private obligation between shipper and carrier, but the duty to pay is a public one. Steele v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 91 Law. Ed. Adv. Opinions, 315 (decided 6 January, 1947); Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Johnson, 41 S. W. (2d), 14, 83 A. L. R., 241. Hence the carrier may not he prevented by plea of estoppel from the performance of a public duty. Notwithstanding the negligence of the carrier in misquoting the correct charge, or omitting a part of the established rate, it may not be held estopped thereby from enforcing payment of the undercharge. R. R. v. Latham, 176 N. C., 417, 97 S. E., 234; Cotton Mills v. R. R., 178 N. C., *98212, 100 S. E., 241; Davis v. Gulley, supra; Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Mugg & Dryden, 202 U. S., 242; Kansas City Sou. R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S., 639; Steele v. Gen. Mills, Inc., supra; Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Pink, 250 U. S., 577. While the tariffs do not prescribe who shall pay the freight charges and while the parties to the shipment, the consignor and consignee, are free to stipulate as between themselves who shall pay, an agreement between them may not be held to prevent the carrier from collecting the full amount according to the rate fixed from any party legally liable therefor. R. R. v. Latham, 176 N. C., 417, 97 S. E., 234; Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 320 U. S., 508; Steele v. Gen. Mills, Inc., supra; Gardner v. Rich Mfg. Co. (Cal.), 158 P. (2d), 23.
Hence the ruling of the court below will be upheld in allowing the motion to strike from the answer of defendant Paving Company those allegations which attempted to set up as a defense to plaintiff’s action to collect the lawful freight charges a contract with its codefendant whereby it sought to exempt itself from liability therefor, or which attempted to allege facts as the basis of a plea of estoppel-against the maintenance of this action against this defendant. The court below properly ruled to confine the pleadings to justiciable issues.
The allegations contained in defendant Paving Company’s cross-complaint against the defendant Stone Company are not included in the portions of the answer ordered stricken, and are not affected by the ruling below.
Defendant Paving Company’s demurrer ore tenus, .interposed on the hearing in this Court, on the grounds set out in the defendant’s brief, may not be held sufficient to overthrow the complaint, and must be overruled. Winston v. Lumber Co., 227 N. C., 339, 42 S. E. (2d), 218; Blachmore v. Winders, 144 N. C., 212, 56 S. E., 874. The right of the plaintiff to sue the defendant Paving Company, the consignee of the shipments referred to, under the allegations of the complaint, may not be denied. R. R. v. Armfield, 189 N. C., 581, 127 S. E., 557; Davis v. Gulley, 188 N. C., 80, 123 S. E., 318; R. R. v. Iron Works, 172 N. C., 188, 90 S. E., 149; Pittsburgh G. G. & St. L. R. Co. v. Pink, 250 U: S., 406; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U. S., 59; Western Grain Co. v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 56 F. (2d), 160; Transportation Co. v. Chemical Co., 148 F. (2), 777; Northern Alabama R. Co. v. Phillips, 220 Ala., 541; New York C. R. Co. v. Stanziale, 105 N. J. L., 593; 83 A. L. R., 249 (annotation). The acceptance of delivery of the shipments by the consignee imports liability for the charges for the transportation. Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 320 U. S., 508.
*99Tbe case of R. R. v. Simpkins and others, 178 N. C., 273, cited by appellant, is not in point. Tbe only parties whose liability was considered by tbe court in tbat case were tbe bank wbicb paid tbe draft and tbe mortgagor of tbe goods shipped. No judgment was asked against tbe consignor and tbe liability of the consignee was not involved. In Davis v. Ford, 193 N. C., 444, tbe Court considered tbe effect of an express or special contract between carrier an<j consignor providing tbe consignee should pay all charges before delivery. See Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., supra.
We do not think tbe plaintiff’s complaint in this case should be rejected as fatally defective upon either of tbe grounds stated in tbe demurrer.
We conclude tbat tbe ruling of tbe court below must be
Affirmed.