Tbe only question raised on this appeal is whether, on tbe above stated facts, G. S., 105-160, read in pari materia with other pertinent provisions of tbe Revenue Act, operates to deny tbe Commissioner of Revenue authority to make additional assessments or refunds after tbe expiration of three years from the filing of tbe originál return in tbe special instance of changes made in tbe taxpayer’s liability on returns made by it to tbe Federal taxing department.
For a long period during which tbe General Assembly enacted its tax income laws biennially or at each regular session, and since tbe enactment of tbe permanent Revenue Act in 1939, it has been tbe policy of tbe State, as reflected in these statutes, to require tbe taxpayer to notify tbe Commissioner of Revenue and file an additional return under oath when any change or correction affecting tbe taxable net income has been made *766by the Federal authority, and on such change authority is given the Commissioner to -make additional assessments or refunds on “such evidence as may be brought to his attention” or he “shall otherwise acquire.” G. S., 105-159. Whether this provision was inspired by a desire for uniformity, since both Federal and State governments resort to the same source for income tax, or a desire to make available the superior facilities of the Federal department in checking returns, we need not inquire. Neither the'Validity nor the propriety of the provision is questioned: The point is that the statute imposed on the plaintiff a positive duty with respect to its income tax liability beyond that required in G. S., 105-152, respecting its original return; it was its duty not only to report the change made by the Federal department but to file another return under oath reflecting it, and this the plaintiff failed to do. The reason assigned for that failure is that three years had already elapsed after the filing of the original return before the plaintiff received notice of the change made by the Federal department, and as appellee contends, the statute of limitations provided by Section 105-160 had already applied, and relieved it of the duty. This brings up for review pertinent provisions of the income taxing sections of the Revenue Act as affecting the limitation relied on by the plaintiff.
It is well to observe here that the provision found in Section 105-160 is not, strictly speaking, a statute of limitations like those addressed to the limitations of actions. The section defines the time within which the authority given the Commissioner to review returns and make assessments may be exercised. Limitations of both classes are equally fatal to further procedure where they apply. But in the one case the limitation would directly affect the right to the tax, and in the other apply to the administrative procedure by which the tax is assessed. And in the latter case, — and it is this with which we deal, — it becomes a question whether, in the special instance of change made in the taxpayer’s liability by the Federal taxing department, the statute does not justify and contemplate the exercise of the power to assess additional tax in case of deficiency, or make refunds for overpayment, regardless of the three-year limitation provided in Section 105-160.
The power to make additional assessments or make refunds, predicated on changes made in the taxpayer’s liability to the Federal authority, is based on a distinctly new condition not contemplated in G. S., 105-158, respecting the original returns; and the power exercised in the particular instance could only by implication be brought within the scope of the limitation provided in G. S., 105-160, so as to construe this latter section as an over-all or all-inclusive limitation. The statute taken as a whole seems to deal with this incident as an independent situation, inseparable in administrative procedure as well as in fact, since it requires a new *767return under oath., under all the sanctions provided for the original return; and it does not necessarily, at least, fall within the suggested limitation.
In recognizing and adopting, to this extent, Federal revision as an aid to local taxation the legislative body was in the field of remedial legislation, and is presumed to have had a knowledge of the new conditions upon which administrative action must depend. It is pointed out that the Legislature must have known that only a small proportion of the Federal corrections mentioned in the statute actually occur during the three-year period, and that under the construction contended for by the appellee the remedy provided would be inadequate. The Federal .income tax law has a provision similar to ours limiting the authority of the taxing unit to deal with original returns and make corrections. However, in Federal practice, when the taxpayer, with his return, files a waiver of this limitation the authority of the department to make corrections is continued without limitation of time. Hence a large proportion of the corrections is made beyond the period limited by our statute in G. S., 105-160.
As we have pointed out, the requirement that a taxpayer within 30 days after receiving notice of the correction of the Federal taxing authority shall file with the State Commissioner of Revenue a return reflecting such change, under oath, is positive, mandatory, and separately implemented with heavy penalties for failure to do so, and makes no reference to the three-year statute of limitations provided in Section 105-160, or any other deadline on the Commissioner’s authority; but it does impose duties upon him when the return is filed. (We are referring to the statute before the 1937 amendment.) The authority of the Commissioner must be presumed to be coextensive with the duties imposed. If, as suggested, he had no authority to deal with the return when made, as the law directs, the Legislature did nothing more than make a futile gesture.
It is pointed out by the appellant that the latter construction of the statute has been uniform for many years in administrative practice and acquiesced in by the General Assembly for a long period of time, and is entitled to -the weight accorded administrative interpretation by the cited precedents; Cannon v. Maxwell, 205 N. C., 420, 171 S. E., 624; Powell v. Maxwell, 210 N. C., 211, 186 S. E., 326; Valentine v. Gill, 223 N. C., 396, 27 S. E. (2d), 2; that it has had the consistent approval of the Attorney-General both before and after the 1937 amendment to the statute. See P-H, State and Local Tax Service, North Carolina, paragraphs 11,320, 13,012, 13,154, 13,158, 13,161, 13,163, 13,202; Hannah v. Commissioners, 176 N. C., 395, 97 S. E., 160.
Decision might well rest on these principles, but not necessarily so. The General Assembly of 1937 amended the pertinent sections of the *768existing law, now G. S., 105-159, 105-160, clarifying both sections by expressly excepting tbe special instance of assessment or refund made upon notice of Federal correction or revision of tbe taxpayer’s liability— where the taxpayer has failed to notify the Commissioner of such additional assessment (Chapter 127, Public Laws 1937, Secs. 334, 335)-— from tbe operation of tbe tbree-year limitation, and provided no limitation on bis continued authority; and this was carried forward in tbe 1939 Revenue Act, Chapter 158, Public Laws 1939, Secs. 334, 335; and there were no material changes in 1941, 1943 and 1945. And that is tbe law applicable to plaintiff’s case.
In 1947 tbe Legislature amended Section 105-159 of tbe General Statutes so as to substitute for tbe clauses expressly rendering tbe suggested statute of limitations inapplicable, a provision fixing a limitation of five years on tbe authority of tbe Commissioner to make assessments or refunds upon changes made by tbe Federal taxing authority, Session Laws 1947, Chapter 501, sec. 4,, pp. 624, 625. Tbe amendment in its setting and history is merely cited to confirm tbe position taken by appellant that theretofore no time limit bad been set for tbe exercise of tbe Commissioner’s authority in this special instance. It is to be noted that under tbe amendment to this statute tbe defendant Commissioner would be well within bis authority in making tbe additional assessment.
For tbe reasons stated, tbe judgment overruling tbe demurrer and declining tbe nonsuit must be reversed. It is so ordered.
Reversed.
EeviN, L, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.