One assignment only is debated on this appeal. It challenges the correctness of the ruling of the trial court in denying defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit, and in submitting the case to the jury.
In this connection, the evidence set out in the case on appeal tends to show that, as seen by -two officers, a still, — “submarine-like,” for the manufacture of whiskey was “fired up” and in operation. Barrels of beer or mash were at the still. Whiskey was running out of the still at the time. About a gallon in a jug had just run out. And defendant alone was present, — stooping over, and, upon seeing the officer, he fled.
When this evidence is taken in the light most favorable to the State, as is done in considering a motion for judgment as of nonsuit, it is suffi*739cient to take tbe ease to the jury, and to support a verdict of guilty on both, counts with which, defendant stands charged.
This holding finds support in numerous decisions of this Court. S. v. Ogleston, 177 N. C., 541, 98 S. E. 537; S. v. Perry, 179 N. C., 718, 102 S. E., 277; S. v. Blackwell, 180 N. C., 733, 105 S. E., 178; S. v. Smith, 183 N. C., 725, 110 S. E., 654.
The Ogleston case is similar in factual situation to that in the present case. In that case the still was in actual operation and defendants were the only persons present. The Court held that the inference that defendants were in charge of the still and operating it was at least permissible.
Moreover, the fact of flight by defendant, when discovered at the still, is competent evidence to be considered by the jury in connection with other circumstances in passing upon the question of guilt. S. v. Payne, 213 N. C., 719, 197 S. E., 573; and cases cited. See also S. v. Adams, 191 N. C., 526, 132 S. E., 281.
After careful consideration of all questions presented, we find in the judgment below
No error.
Regarding the appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court in No. 2788 affirming judgment of the General County Court No. 5892, which put into effect the eight -months road sentence theretofore imposed by it and suspended on condition, and which the court finds the defendant has breached:
The Attorney-General moves to dismiss this appeal on the ground that no provision is made for an appeal from an inferior court to the Superior Court in such cases, — the remedy being by certiorari to be obtained from Superior Court upon proper showing aptly made. S. v. King, 222 N. C., 137, 22 S. E. (2d), 241; S. v. Miller, 225 N. C., 213, 34 S. E. (2d), 143.
In this connection, in the absence of a showing of record that the case came to the Superior Court by means of a writ of certiorari, or to show that the case docketed in Superior Court as upon appeal was treated as a return to a writ of certiorari, the Superior Court acquired no jurisdiction, and the case should have been dismissed. And, in this Court, where the lack of jurisdiction is apparent, the Court may, and will, on plea, suggestion, motion, or ex mero motu, stop the proceedings. See S. v. King, supra, S. v. Miller, supra; Gill, Comr., v. McLean, 227 N. C., 201, 41 S. E. (2d), 514.
The argument directed to the assignments of error in the principal case on this appeal is the only argument advanced by the defendant as reason for disturbing the action of the General County Court, — a kind *740of saving clause, just in case error be found therein. Motion to dismiss is allowed.