The defendants stress their contention that the trial court ought to have dismissed both charges for insufficiency of proof in conformity to their motions for judgment of nonsuit under the statute. G. S., 15-173. It is obvious that this position is well taken with respect to the indictment wherein the defendants are alleged to have robbed *662Stewart Fox! The consequence is that consideration will be given in detail here only to the assignments of error relating to the case in which the defendants have been convicted of the perpetration of robbery with firearms upon Ernest Fox.
In so far as it is now germane, the statute concerning robbery with firearms or other dangerous weapons reads as follows: “Any person or 'persons who, having in possession or with the use or threatened use of any firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means, whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes or attempts to take personal property from another ... or who aids or abets any such person or persons in the commission of such crime, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than thirty years.” G. S., 14-87.
In his lucid opinion in S. v. Keller, 214 N. C., 447, 199 S. E., 620, Mr. Justice Winborne pointed out that the Legislature enacted this statute “to provide for more severe punishment for the. commission of robbery with firearms, and other specified weapons, than is prescribed for common law robbery.” See, also, S. v. Jones, 227 N. C., 402, 42 S. E. (2d), 465. Robbery at common law is the felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence or putting him in fear. S. v. Burke, 73 N. C., 83.
The defendants claim at the outset that the testimony of the State itself negatives the existence of the essential element of robbery, whether at common law or under the statute, that the taking of the property must be effected by violence or by putting the victim in fear. They point out that the defendants falsely pretended,that they and their companion were officers possessing legal authority to make arrests, and assert that the prosecuting witness, Ernest Fox, gave the money to Glenn Bell merely because the defendants threatened to arrest or prosecute him and his brother, Stewart Fox, for alleged crimes. The evidence is not susceptible to this construction. All of the testimony is to the effect that in addition to impersonating officers, the defendants and their companion enforced their demands upon Ernest Fox for the money in question by the use of physical force and by threats to inflict bodily injury upon him. If a person takes personal property with the requisite felonious intent from the person or presence of another against such other’s will by physical force or by threats of bodily injury, he commits robbery, notwithstanding his taking of the property may be accompanied by a pretense that he is an officer of the law and by threats on his part to arrest or prosecute the other for alleged crime. Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla., 82, 93 So., 157, 27 A. L. R., 1291; State v. Parsons, 44 Wash., *663299, 87 P., 349, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.), 566, 120 Am. St. Rep., 1003, 12 Ann. Cas., 61; Bussey v. State, 71 Ga., 100, 51 Am. Rep., 256. See, also, the following authorities: 23 E. C. L., 1148; 54 C. J., 1022; 46 Am. Jur., Eobbery, section 18.
The defendants further insist, however, that, in any event, the evidence at the trial was insufficient to support the action of the court in submitting to the jury the question of whether the defendants were guilty of the major felony of robbery with firearms upon the prosecuting witness, Ernest Eox, within the purview of the statute. The evidence adduced by the State not only tended to show that Glenn Bell took the money of Ernest Fox from his person against his will by violence and intimidation with intent to steal, but it also tended to establish that Glenn Bell was armed with a pistol, that he took the money in question from Ernest Fox by the use and threatened use of such pistol, and that he thereby threatened, if he did not, in fact, actually endanger, the life of Ernest Fox, and that Millard Bell was present, encouraging and inciting Glenn Bell to do such acts. Consequently, the testimony amply supported the theory of the State that Glenn Bell actually committed the crime of robbery with firearms upon Ernest Fox within the meaning of the statute, and that Millard Bell was present, aiding and abetting him in its perpetration.
The defendants excepted to the failure of the court to charge the jury that they might acquit the defendants of the crime of robbery with firearms charged in the indictment under consideration, and convict them of a crime of less degree. G. S., 15-169, 15-170. It is true that in a prosecution for robbery with firearms, an accused may be acquitted of the major charge and convicted of an included or lesser offense, such as common law. robbery, or assault, or larceny from the person, or simple larceny, if a verdict for the included or lesser offense is supported by allegations of the indictment and by evidence on the trial. 42 C. J. S., Indictments and Information, sections 275, 283, 293; S. v. Jones, supra; S. v. Moore, 211 N. C., 748, 191 S. E., 840; S. v. Holt, 192 N. C., 490, 135 S. E., 324; S. v. Cody, 60 N. C., 197. If the jury believed the testimony in the case under review, however, it was its duty to convict the defendants of robbery with firearms because all of the evidence tended to show that such offense was committed upon the prosecuting witness, Ernest Fox, as alleged in the indictment There was no testimony tending to establish the commission of an included or lesser crime. The evidence necessarily restricted the jury to the return of one of two verdicts as to each defendant, namely, a verdict of guilty of robbery with firearms upon Ernest Fox, or a verdict of not guilty. It follows that the court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that they might acquit the defendants of the crime of robbery with firearms charged in the indict*664ment in question and convict them of a lesser offense. S. v. Sawyer, 224 N. C., 61, 29 S. E. (2d), 34; S. v. Manning, 221 N. C., 70, 18 S. E. (2d), 821; S. v. Cox, 201 N. C., 357, 160 S. E., 358.
A painstaking examination of tbe entire record leaves us witk the abiding impression that none of the other assignments of error of the defendants in the case under consideration are tenable.
For the reasons given, we find no error in the trial of the action in which the defendants were convicted of robbing Ernest Fox with firearms, and reverse the judgment in the case in which the defendants are charged with having committed a like offense upon Stewart Eox.
No error in criminal action No. 199.
Judgment reversed in criminal action No. 210.