The statute, G. S., 14-90, under which defendant is indicted and convicted, provides in pertinent part that “If . . . any agent, . . . except persons under the age of sixteen years, of any person, shall embezzle or fraudulently or knowingly and willfully misapply or convert to his own use, or shall take, make away with or secrete, with intent to embezzle or fraudulently or knowingly and willfully misapply or convert to his own use any money, goods or other chattels ... or any other valuable security whatsoever belonging to any person . . . which shall have come into his possession or under his care, he shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be punished as in cases of larceny.”
In the light of the provisions of this statute, defendant stresses for error the denial of his motions for judgment as of nonsuit. It is the well settled law in this State that in considering a motion for judgment as of nonsuit in a criminal prosecution, the evidence must be taken in .the light most favorable to the State, and if when so taken there is any competent evidence to support the allegations of the bill of indictment, the case is one for the jury. And, on such motion the State is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference which may be fairly deduced from the evidence. See S. v. Davenport, 227 N. C., 475, 42 S. E. (2d), 686, and cases there cited.
*649Applying this rule to the present case, there is evidence tending to show, or from which reasonable inferences may be- drawn as tending to show every essential element which enters into the crime of embezzlement, as required by the provisions of the statute. G. S., 14-90. There is evidence tending to show that in the transaction in question based upon valuable consideration defendant became the agent of Woodrow Price (1) to obtain money from National Trading Company of Hickory, N. C., on Price’s account evidenced by his note, and (2) to pay the money to the National Investment Company of Baltimore for the purpose of having title to Price’s automobile released. The evidence also tends to show that defendant obtained the money in cash from National Trading Company of Hickory, N. C., on papers executed or purporting to be executed by Price, and had the money in his possession. The evidence further tends to show that defendant misapplied the money, or converted it to his own use. Also there is sufficient evidence from which it may be inferred that the misapplication of the money by defendant, or the conversion of it to his own use was knowingly and willfully done with fraudulent intent.
Fraudulent intent which constitutes a necessary element of the crime of embezzlement, within the meaning of the statute, G. S., 14-90, is the intent of the agent to embezzle or otherwise willfully and corruptly use or misapply the property of the principal or employer for purposes other than those for which the property is held. S. v. Howard, 222 N. C., 291, 22 S. E. (2d), 917. See also S. v. McDonald, 133 N. C., 680, 45 S. E., 582; S. v. Lancaster, 202 N. C., 204, 162 S. E., 367; S. v. McLean, 209 N. C., 38, 182 S. E., 700.
Hence, the motions for judgment as of nonsuit were properly denied.
Defendant also bases other assignments of error upon general exceptions taken to the admission of. the Exhibits A to E. The principal argument is that these exhibits are hearsay evidence. It appears, however, that the existence of such papers tended to corroborate the witness Woodrow Price, and were competent for that purpose. It will not be ground of exception that evidence competent for some purposes, but not for all, is admitted generally, unless the appellant asks, at the time of admission, that its purpose shall be restricted. Rule 21 of Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, 221 N. C., 544. Here the record on the present appeal does not show that any such request was made by appellant. Hence, in the admission of the exhibits in evidence, no error is made to appear.
Regarding Exception No. 11. The argument here advanced is that the question and answer are incompetent for the reason that the witness could not know why his car had been repossessed and that he did not say what Baltimore company had repossessed the same. In the light of *650the stipulation of record, p. 25, it would seem that the court below must have deemed the objection to the answer insufficient, and perhaps too late. Hodges v. Wilson, 165 N. C., 323, 81 S. E., 340. But, be that as it may, we fail to see harmful error. The witness had testified without objection that “The Baltimore company took the car.” The National Investment Company of Baltimore is the only Baltimore company to which reference had been made. It was the only Baltimore company, so far as the evidence discloses, that had any claim against the ear. The reasonable inference is that it was that company that repossessed the car and that it did so because there was default in the payment of the indebtedness to it. Moreover, the evidence that when Price emphatically challenged the veracity of defendant in stating that he had sent his personal check to the Baltimore company, — that he had never sent them anything, defendant did not say anything for a bit, did not remember what he sent, but did not deny it. Those are circumstances tending to show an admission that he had not sent the money to pay the debt to National Investment Company. Compare S. v. Hawkins, 214 N. C., 326, 199 S. E., 284, and cases cited.
The assignments of error directed against the charge are not well taken. They relate to portions of the charge in which the court was recapitulating the evidence, and stating contentions, and the record does not show that the court’s attention was called to any misstatement. Ordinarily, an error in stating the contentions of a party or in recapitulating the evidence should he called to the attention of the court in time to afford an opportunity of correction, — otherwise it may be regarded as waived or as a harmless inadvertence. See S. v. McNair, 226 N. C., 462, 38 S. E. (2d), 514, and cases cited.
All other assignments of error, after due consideration, have been found to be without merit.
Hence, in the judgment below, we find
No error.
EbviN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.