When all the evidence offered on the trial of this case in the court below is taken in the light most favorable to the State, did the trial court err in denying defendants’ motion for judgment as of nonsuit aptly made at the close of all the evidence, pursuant to provisions of G. S., 15-173? In other words, is the evidence, so taken, sufficient to support a verdict of guilty of the charge under which defendants are indicted. This is the determinative question involved on this appeal.
A careful consideration of the evidence in the light of pertinent principles of law leads to the conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, and that there is no error.
Applicable principles of law are found in the case of S. v. Cope, 204 N. C., 28, 167 S. E., 456, where in opinion by Stacy, G. J., the line which separates the principle of actionable negligence in the law of torts, and that of culpable negligence in the law of crimes is delineated, and *633in accordance therewith previous decisions of this Court are aligned. As there summarized, these are pertinent principles: “Culpable negligence in the law of crimes is something more than actionable negligence in the law of torts. . . . Culpable negligence is such recklessness or ■carelessness, proximately resulting in injury or death, as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others. . . . And an intentional, willful or wanton violation of a statute or ordinance, designed for the protection of human life or limb, which proximately results in injury or death, is culpable negligence. . . . But an unintentional violation of a prohibitory statute or ordinance, unaccompanied by recklessness or probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision, is not such negligence as imports criminal responsibility. . . . However, if the inadvertent violation of a prohibitory statute or ordinance be accompanied by recklessness or probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision, amounting altogether to a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others, then such negligence, if injury or death proximately ensue, would be culpable and the actor guilty of an assault or manslaughter, and under some circumstances of murder.”
Moreover, the statutes relating to operation of motor vehicles upon the public highways of this State declare: (1) That “any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving, and upon conviction shall be punished . . .” G. S., 20-140; (2) that “drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the right, each giving to the other at least one-half of the main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible,” G. S., 20-148; and (3) that “it shall be unlawful and constitute, a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this article unless such violation is by this article or other law of this state declared to be a felony,” G. S., 20-176 (a), — and the punishment for violation of various sections, including G. S., 20-148, follows in G. S., 20-176 (b).
Testing the evidence in the present case by these principles, it tends to show, and is sufficient to justify the jury in finding that as the vehicles were meeting each other, traveling in opposite directions, the drivers were violating the provisions of the statute, G. S., 20-148, requiring each to give to the other at least one-half of the main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible. The evidence is that the two vehicles collided in the middle of the road. And the evidence tends to show, and is sufficient to justify the jury in finding that at the time of the collision, *634even though the violation of the statute, G-. S., 20-148, be unintentional, each of the defendants was driving his automobile carelessly and heedlessly, without due caution and circumspection and in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger persons on the highway when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision. Injury and death did ensue. In all it was a question for the jury.
And in the absence of the charge, it will be assumed that the court properly charged the law applicable to the evidence in the case.
Hence, in the judgment from which appeal is taken, we find
No error.