The defendant assigns as error the refusal of his Honor to allow her motion for judgment as of nonsuit on the ground that the evidence shows conclusively that the negligence of Henry Beaman was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
The defendant seriously contends that her motion for judgment of nonsuit dismissing the two actions should have been sustained under the authority of Spease v. Butner, 217 N. C., 82, 6 S. E. (2d), 808. In that case Spease and Butner were traveling at night in opposite directions. The collision occurred when Spease turned his truck left and cut in front of the approaching car driven by Butner. A guest passenger, Mrs. Myrtie Spease, who was riding in the Spease car and was injured, brought an action against L. T. Butner. Mrs. Bertha Butner, a guest passenger in the Butner car, was injured and brought an action against E. A. Spease. The eases were consolidated for trial. The intervening negligence of E. A. Spease in the case against Butner, was established by his evidence. He testified that he saw the Butner car approaching from the opposite direction, but that he misjudged its speed and turned to the left into the pathway of the approaching car. His negligence was very properly held to be the sole proximate cause of the collision.
The defendant contends in the instant case, that the condition of the brakes on the Beaman car, the failure of Henry Beaman to give a proper signal before turning into the side road, his conduct in pulling a slow moving car to the left side of the road before turning to his right, together with the fact that he did not have a driver’s license, established negligence per se on his part and that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision; and that the negligent acts of defendant’s driver, if any, were insulated thereby, and would not have resulted in any injury to the intestates of the plaintiffs except for the intervening negligence of Henry Beaman, citing Murray v. R. R., 218 N. C., 392, 11 S. E. (2d), 326; Van Dyke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 218 N. C., 283, 10 S. E. (2d), 727; Jeffries v. Powell, 221 N. C., 415, 20 S. E. (2d), 561; Dillon v. Winston-Salem, 221 N. C., 512, 20 S. E. (2d), 845; Beaver v. China Grove, 222 N. C., 234, 22 S. E. (2d), 434; Brady v. R. R., 222 N. C., 367, 23 S. E. (2d), 334; Battley v. Powell, 223 N. C., 134, 25 S. E. (2d), 448.
Even though the violation of a traffic statute may be negligence per se, such negligence is not actionable unless there is a causal relation between the violation of the statute and the injury; and ordinarily whether such negligence is the proximate cause or one of the proximate causes which *604resulted in an injury, is for the determination of the jury. Grimes v. Carolina Coach Co., 203 N. C., 605, 166 S. E., 599; Stovall v. Ragland, 211 N. C., 536, 190 S. E., 899; White v. R. R., 216 N. C., 79, 3 S. E. (2d), 310; Smith v. Whitley, 223 N. C., 534, 27 S. E. (2d), 442; Morgan v. Coach Co., 225 N. C., 668, 36 S. E. (2d), 263. The evidence offered in behalf of the plaintiffs, does not establish such intervening negligence on the part of Henry Beaman as may be held, as a matter of law, to be the sole proximate cause of the collision. The case of Spease v. Butner, supra, and similar cases, are not controlling on this record. The evidence fails to show any causal relation between the condition of the brakes on the Ford coupe or the failure of Henry Beaman to have a driver’s license and the injury inflicted.
The relative duties automobile drivers owe one another when they are traveling along a highway in the same direction, are governed ordinarily by the circumstances in each particular ease. In Dreher v. Divine, 192 N. C., 325, 135 S. E., 29, Stacy, C. J., in speaking for the Court said: “The driver of a forward vehicle cannot be required to yield the road unless and until the conditions are such as to render a passage reasonably safe. And if the forward driver be not allowed sufficient time to turn to the right before the rear vehicle runs upon him, or is forced off the road in order to avoid striking him, he cannot be held liable for negligence, contributory negligence or otherwise. One who operates an automobile should have it under control and if the driver of a front car has no knowledge of an approaching vehicle from the rear, and apparently does not hear its approach, the driver of the rear trailing vehicle should reduce his speed and stop, if necessary, to avoid a collision or an injury. He cannot proceed regardless of the fact that the driver of the front vehicle does not turn to the right of the road, unless there be ample room to pass in safety without it.”
In the instant case the driver of the truck testified that he blew his horn as an indication he intended to pass the Ford coupe when he was about 50 to 75 feet behind the Ford. The driver of the Ford car testified that when he got in front of his father’s house he pulled a little towards the center of the road, in order to make a right hand turn. “At this time I started turning right to go into a driveway on the right side of the road. I had given a signal for a right hand turn just prior to making my turn. As I started turning right I heard the horn of the truck, . . . which had been following me, but which I had not seen since I left the top of the hill about one-tenth of a mile away. This truck hit my car just after the front wheels had gone off the pavement into the driveway.”
The conflicting evidence on the issue of negligence was for the jury; it has passed upon it and has answered the issue favorable to both plain*605tiffs. Tbe ruling on tbe motion for judgment as of nonsuit will be upheld.
Tbe defendant bas assigned as error certain exceptions to tbe admission of evidence and bas preserved ber exceptions to certain portions of bis Honor’s charge. However, after a careful examination and consideration of these exceptions, we do not think any prejudicial error is shown.
In tbe trial below, we find
No error.