Defendant challenges on this appeal the appropriateness and correctness of the instructions given to the jury by the trial *524judge as to the law of self-defense upon the facts of this case. It is pointed out that the right of self-defense interposed by plea of the defendant, and upon which he relies as justification of his act in shooting Roy Woods, is made to depend upon the establishment by the defendant to the satisfaction of the jury, among other legal requisites, that at the time of firing the fatal shot Roy Woods was making a felonious assault' upon him; and that, if at the time the fatal shot was fired Roy Woods were making a nonfelonious assault upon defendant, defendant had retreated to the wall, within the meaning of the law.
While it is conceded that the theory of the charge as given may be entirely correct when applied to a different set of facts, defendant points out and contends that it is inapplicable to a case, such as the present one, where the party assaulted is at the time in his own place of business. The point is well made, and is supported by the uniform decisions of this Court. Here the evidence shows that the defendant was in his own place of business at the time the fatal shot was fired.
Ordinarily, when a person, who is free from fault in bringing on a difficulty, is attacked in his own dwelling or home or place of business or on his own premises, the law imposes upon him no duty to retreat before he can justify fighting in self-defense, — regardless of the character of the assault. S. v. Harman, 78 N. C., 515; S. v. Bost, 192 N. C., 1, 133 S. E., 176; S. v. Glenn, 198 N. C., 79, 150 S. E., 663; S. v. Bryson, 200 N. C., 50, 156 S. E., 143; S. v. Roddey, 219 N. C., 532, 14 S. E. (2d), 526; S. v. Anderson, 222 N. C., 148, 22 S. E. (2d), 271; S. v. Pennell, 224 N. C., 622, 31 S. E. (2d), 857; S. v. Minton, ante, 15, 44 S. E. (2d), 346, and numerous other cases. See also S. v. Spruill, 225 N. C., 356, 34 S. E. (2d), 142, where the eases on the subject are assembled.
The principle is expressed in S. v. Harman, supra, in opinion by Reade, J., in this manner: “If prisoner stood entirely on defensive and would not have fought but for the attack, and the attack threatened death or great bodily harm, and he killed to save himself, then it was excusable homicide, although the prisoner did not run, or flee out of his house. For, being in his own house, he was not obliged to flee, and had the right to repel force with force and to increase his force so as not only to resist but to overcome the assault.”
Again, in S. v. Bryson, supra, Stacy, C. J., speaking to the subject, said: “The defendant being in his own home and acting in defense of himself, his family and his habitation . . . was not required to retreat, regardless of the character of the assault,” citing S. v. Glenn, supra, and S. v. Bost, supra.
And in S. v. Pennell, supra, the principle is restated by Barnhill, J.: “Defendant was in his own place of business. If an unprovoked attack was made upon him and he only fought in self-defense, he was not required to retreat, regardless of the nature of the assault.”
*525Applying these principles, tbe doctrine of retreat bas no place in tbe present case, and it is immaterial whether tbe assault was felonious or nonfelonious.
It must be observed, however, that this principle does not relieve tbe defendant of burden of satisfying tbe jury as to tbe essential elements of principle of law as to tbe right of self-defense available to one assaulted in bis own place of business.
Tbe error pointed out is prejudicial to. tbe defendant, and on account thereof be is entitled to a
New trial.