The plaintiffs’ appeal presents the question of the propriety of the judgment of involuntary nonsuit. Considering .the evidence *516in the light most favorable for the plaintiffs, it appears that defendant’s truck, a tractor and trailer unit, was being driven toward and into an intersection of two busy highways at a speed of 35 miles per hour, and that the driver without slackening speed or giving signal or warning, or applying brakes, drove into the intersection at a time when the truck in which plaintiffs’ intestates were riding, coming from defendant’s right, had already entered the intersection. The statute then in force placed speed restriction on motor vehicles with trailer attached at 30 miles per hour. G. S., 20-141 (b) 3; G. S., 20-141 (c). We think there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. Swinson v. Nance, 219 N. C., 772, 15 S. E. (2d), 284.
However, it is urged that the ruling of the court below should be upheld on the ground that contributory negligence on the part of plaintiffs’ intestates conclusively appears from the evidence, for the reason, chiefly, that they failed to heed the highway signs warning drivers of motor vehicles approaching the intersection from the east to stop before attempting to cross, as required by G. S., 20-158. This statute, while imposing the duty on motorists to heed highway traffic signs, adds this pertinent proviso : “No failure to stop, however, shall be considered contributory negligence per se in any action at law for injury to person or property, but the facts relating to such failure to stop may be considered with the other facts in the case in determining whether the plaintiff in such action was guilty of contributory negligence.”
This provision has been considered in several recent decisions, notably, Hill v. Lopez, ante, 433, 45 S. E. (2d), 539; Swinson v. Nance, 219 N. C., 772, 15 S. E. (2d), 284; Pearson v. Stores Corp., 219 N. C., 717, 14 S. E. (2d), 811; Groome v. Davis, 215 N. C., 510, 2 S. E. (2d), 771; Sebastian v. Motor Lines, 213 N. C., 770, 197 S. E., 539; Kennedy v. Smith, 226 N. C., 514, 39 S. E. (2d), 380.
In view of the language of the statute and the decisions of this Court in cases involving collisions between motor vehicles at highway intersections, it seems well settled that a party may not be precluded solely by reason of his failure to stop as enjoined by a traffic sign. His failure to do so is evidence of negligence, but the question of proximate cause remains to be answered before the rights of the parties can be determined.
Was the evidence in this case such as to warrant the trial judge in holding as a matter of law that the negligence of plaintiffs’ intestates was the proximate cause of their injury and death, and, upon this view, sustaining the motions to nonsuit ?
In considering the question of nonsuit, under the rule, the evidence tending to support plaintiffs’ claims must be construed most favorably for them, and they are “entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment upon the evidence, and every reasonable inference to be drawn *517therefrom.” Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C., 408, 127 S. E., 356. Tbe question of proximate cause is ordinarily one for tbe jury. It is only when but one inference can be drawn from tbe facts in evidence that tbe court may declare that an act or omission is tbe proximate cause of an injury. Lineberry v. R. R., 187 N. C., 786 (793), 123 S. E., 1. In tbe language of Justice Barnhill in Conley v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., 224 N. C., 211, 29 S. E. (2d), 740, “Proximate cause is an inference of fact, to be drawn from other facts and circumstances. ... It is only when tbe facts are all admitted and only one inference may be drawn from them that tbe court will declare whether an act was tbe proximate cause of an injury or not. But this is rarely tbe case. Hence, what is tbe proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question for tbe jury. . . . It is to be determined as a fact in view of tbe circumstances of fact attending it.” Numerous decisions are cited by Justice Barnhill in substantiation of this rule. That tbe act in question is in violation of a statute does not take it out of tbe rule. Conley v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., supra.
In Reeves v. Staley, 220 N. C., 573, 18 S. E. (2d), 239, cited by ap-pellee, tbe collision occurred at a junction of highways. Tbe automobile in which tbe plaintiff’s intestate in that case was riding was driven from a subordinate road into tbe dominant highway at an undiminished speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour and- in front of an oncoming truck. There it was said in tbe opinion of tbe Court written by Justice Winborne that tbe failure of tbe driver to stop was “evidence of negligence to be considered with other facts in tbe case in determining whether be was guilty of negligence. "When so considered tbe evidence of bis conduct makes him guilty of negligence as a matter of law.” Tbe circumstances of that case indicated such a failure on tbe part of tbe driver to exercise due care as to be regarded by tbe Court as conclusive on tbe question of proximate cause.
Here tbe plaintiffs’ evidence tended to show that their intestates reduced tbe speed of their vehicle from 30 to 20 miles per hour, and bad already entered tbe intersection before tbe defendant’s truck reached it. "While tbe defendant’s evidence tended in some respects to contradict that of tbe plaintiffs, this, under tbe rule, does not help tbe defendant on bis motion for nonsuit.
For tbe reasons stated we are of opinion, and so bold, that on tbe evidence presented tbe plaintiffs were entitled to have their case submitted to tbe jury under appropriate instructions, and that tbe judgment of nonsuit must be