The primary question presented on this appeal is whether or not the equitable remedy of subrogation is available to a lessee whose enjoyment of the use of the demised property is about to be destroyed by the foreclosure of a prior deed of trust, and who, to prevent such destruction, tenders to .the holder of the secured debt the full amount of the debt and expense and demands an assignment, without recourse, or a surrender to him of the uncanceled documents evidencing and securing the debt.
*505It is said m 50 American Jurisprudence, 699: “The right of subrogation is not necessarily confined to those who are legally bound to make the payment, but extends as well to persons who pay the debt in self-protection, since they might suffer loss if the obligation is not discharged. In this class are included subsequent encumbrancers paying off a prior encumbrance. The extent or quantity of the subrogee’s interest which is in jeopardy is not material. If he has any palpable interest which will be protected by the extinguishment of the debt, he may pay the debt and be entitled to hold and enforce it just as the creditor could.” See also 60 Corpus Juris, 189.
In Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed.), Vol. 4, page 637, et seq., the general rule as to the right of subrogation is stated as follows : “In general, when any person haying a subsequent interest in the premises, and who is therefore entitled to redeem for the purpose of protecting such interest, and who is not the principal debtor (primarily and absolutely liable for the mortgage debt, pays off the mortgage, he thereby becomes an equitable assignee thereof, and may keep alive and enforce the lien so far as may be necessary in equity for his own benefit; he is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee to the extent necessary for his own equitable protection. The class of persons coming within this description include the grantee from the mortgagor or any subsequent grantee who has taken the land simply subject to the mortgage, the heir or devisee of the mortgagor; the widow of the mortgagor or of any subsequent owner; a subsequent encumbrancer by mortgage, judgment, or otherwise; a subsequent lessee, and the like.”
“The doctrine of subrogation is broad enough to include every instance in which one person, who, not being a mere volunteer, pays a debt which in justice, equity and good conscience ought to be paid by another.” Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed.), Yol. 2, p. 570.
A lessee for a term of years is entitled to subrogation when, in order to preserve his lease, it becomes necessary for him to pay off a lien superior thereto. Averill v. Taylor, 8 N. Y., 44; Hamilton v. Dobbs & Robinson, 19 N. J. Eq., 227; Bacon v. Bowdoin, 43 Metcalf’s Rep., 591 (Mass.); Dundee Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell, 65 Fla., 15, 61 Sou., 108; Wunderle v. Ellis, 212 Pa., 618, 62 A., 106; Hopkins Mfg. Co. v. Ketterer, 237 Pa., 285, 85 A, 421; Dollar Savings Bank v. Duff, 269 Pa., 29, 112 A., 23; Schenectady Savings Bank v. Ashton, 201 N. Y. S., 288, 206 App. Div., 345.
In the case of Averill v. Taylor, supra, the facts were on all fours with the case before us, the lease covered only a part of the mortgaged premises, and the Court said: “A court of equity would not be obliged to enforce a redemption that was merely frivolous, and for vexation. In a case like the present, the mortgagor is bound in equity and good con*506science to permit bis lessee to do that, wbicb according- to bis contract, be ought himself to have done. As be has not paid bis debt, which was bis duty, for the protection of bis tenants, be has no right to object that they should pay it, and upon such payment be subrogated to the original rights of the mortgage creditor.”
In Hamilton v. Dobbs & Robinson, supra, the Court held: “The tenant, or other person, like a second mortgagee or judgment debtor, having a right to redeem, has not, perhaps, strictly the right to demand a written assignment of the bond and mortgage; but he stands by redemption in place of the mortgagee, and will be subrogated to his rights against the mortgagor and the reversioner. He has the right to have the bond and mortgage delivered to him uncanceled, which, in such case, is, in equity, and may be, at law, a complete assignment of them.” See Sherrill v. Hood, 208 N. C., 472, 181 S. E., 380; Wilson v. Trust Co., 200 N. C., 788, 158 S. E., 479; and Liles v. Rogers, 113 N. C., 197, 18 S. E., 104.
It is said in Wunderle v. Ellis, supra: “There is no solid reason why the principle of subrogation, that where a party asserting a legal right can be fully secured in it and at the same time the interests of another in the subject-matter can be protected from impending injury, should not be applied in regard to the assignment of a mortgage and in favor of a lessee, as well as to any other case to which the principle is applicable.”
Applying the equitable principles laid down in the above cited authorities to the undisputed facts disclosed by the record herein, the plaintiffs’ exception to the granting of defendants’ motion for judgment as of nonsuit must be sustained.
The'plui^diffe also except and assign as error the refusal of his Honor to dismiss the answer filed by the defendant, Moche, or to give judgment on the pleadings against him for the relief sought by the plaintiffs.
The defendant, Moche, undertakes to set up a cross-action against the plaintiffs, and to have the court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, set aside the lease held by Joe Leno from Birdie Buford; and to require plaintiffs to give bond in the sum of $20,000.00, to indemnify the defendant, Moche, “in respect to the payment of reasonable rental value of the said premises for rents which have already accrued, and which may accrue pending the trial and final adjudication of” this action.
As a matter of fact, the lease from Birdie Buford to Joe Leno, under which the plaintiffs now hold possession of the premises occupied by the Red Apple Cafe, was executed and filed of record 10 September, 1940, eleven days prior to the execution of the deed from Birdie Buford to Spero Moche, et al., which deed was declared invalid by this Court in an opinion filed 19 April, 1944, and reported in 224 N. C., 235, 29 S. E. (2d),- 729. Furthermore, the deed under which the defendant, Moche, *507now claims bis equity of redemption in tbe mortgaged premises, was not executed until 5 July, 1945, and conveyed tbe property subject to all rights and encumbrances of record. Moreover, tbe validity of tbe lease beld by Joe Leno was unsuccessfully attacked in a summary proceeding in ejectment by tbe defendant, Moche, in tbe case of Moche v. Leno, in wbicb tbe validity of tbe lease'was upheld in tbe opinion filed in tbis Court 26 February, 1947, and reported in 227 N. C., 159, 41 S. E. (2d), 369.
Tbe defendant Mocbe’s cross-action is without merit in law or equity, and should have been stricken from tbe pleadings.
Tbe plaintiffs assign as error tbe refusal of tbe trial judge to grant their motion for judgment for tbe relief prayed for, on tbe pleadings and admissions.
We think on tbe pleadings, tbe undisputed facts, and admissions disclosed by tbe record, tbe plaintiffs are entitled to tbe relief wbicb they seek in tbis action. Therefore, tbe judgment of tbe court below is reversed and tbis cause is remanded to tbe end that judgment may be entered in accord with tbis opinion.
Reversed.