Tbe appeal poses tbe questions whether tbe case as made survives tbe demurrer, repels tbe plea of tbe statutes of limitation and withstands tbe challenge to the correctness of tbe trial.
First, tbe demurrer to tbe evidence: When services are performed by one person for another under an agreement or mutual understanding (fairly to be inferred from their conduct, declarations and attendant circumstances) tbat compensation therefor is to be provided in tbe will of tbe person receiving tbe benefit of such services, and tbe latter dies intestate or fails to make such'provision, a cause of action accrues in favor of tbe person rendering tbe services. Lipe v. Trust Co., 207 N. C., 794, 178 S. E., 665; Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N. C., 363, 171 S. E., 331; Whetstine v. Wilson, 104 N. C., 385, 10 S. E., 471; Miller v. Lash, 85 N. C., 52.
The method of enforcing such claim may depend upon whether it is within or without tbe statute of frauds. An agreement to devise real estate is within the statute. Daughtry v. Daughtry, 223 N. C., 528, 27 S. E. (2d), 446; Price v. Askins, 212 N. C., 583, 194 S. E., 824. A contract to bequeath personal property, simpliciter, is not. Neal v. Trust Co., 224 N. C., 103, 29 S. E. (2d), 206.
In tbe instant case, tbe evidence fully justifies tbe finding of tbe jury that plaintiff rendered valuable services to her father-in-law under an agreement or mutual understanding tbat she would be compensáted therefor in bis will. Indeed, in support of tbe finding, it may be noted tbat “where services are rendered by one person for another, which are *432knowingly and voluntarily accepted, without more, the law presumes that such services are given and received in expectation of being paid for, and will imply a promise to pay what they are reasonably worth.” Winkler v. Killian, 141 N. C., 575, 54 S. E., 540; Patterson v. Franklin, 168 N. C., 75, 84 S. E., 18; Ray v. Robinson, 216 N. C., 430, 5 S. E. (2d), 127. True it is, that in certain family relationships, services performed by one member of the family for another, are presumed to have been rendered in obedience to an obligation of kinship with no thought of compensation. Francis v. Francis, 223 N. C., 401, 26 S. E. (2d), 907. Nevertheless, this is a presumption which may be overcome by proof of an agreement to pay or of facts and circumstances permitting the inference that payment was intended on the one hand and expected on the other. Nesbitt v. Donoho, 198 N. C., 147, 150 S. E., 875; Brown v. Williams, 196 N. C., 247, 145 S. E., 233.
The agreement here, however, is to devise real estate; it rests only in parol, and is not subject to specific enforcement. Dunn v. Brewer, 228 N. C., 43; Coley v. Dalrymple, 225 N. C., 67, 33 S. E. (2d), 477.
Second, the plea of the statutes of limitation: "When personal services are rendered with the understanding that compensation is to be made in the will of the recipient, payment therefor does not become due until death, and the statutes of limitation do not-begin to run until that time. Helsabeck v. Doub, 167 N. C., 205, 83 S. E., 241; Freeman v. Brown, 151 N. C., 111, 65 S. E., 743; Miller v. Lash, supra.
Whether the plaintiff might have sued for anticipatory breach when J. G. Stewart became incompetent to execute a will, and thus reduce the services thereafter rendered to a purely quantum, meruit basis, is not presented by the appeal. Patterson v. Franklin, supra; Einolf v. Thompson, 95 Minn., 230, 103 N. W., 1026.
Third, the measure of recovery: As the contract between plaintiff and her father-in-law rests in parol and is not subject to specific enforcement, the plaintiff is entitled to recover only what her services were reasonably worth. Grantham v. Grantham, supra.
The contract being unenforceable under the statute of frauds, no recovery can be had upon it; no damages can be recovered on account of its breach for the same reason; and upon the same principle, the contract being unenforceable, the value of plaintiff’s services cannot be concluded by its terms. Faircloth v. Kenlaw, 165 N. C., 228, 81 S. E., 299. In place of the unenforceable promise to devise real estate in consideration of services to be performed, the law substitutes the valid promise to pay their reasonable worth. Anno. 69 A. L. R., 95. The mainspring of the statute of frauds is to prevent frauds, not to promote them.
The form of the 6th issue, standing alone, might indicate a different basis of recovery. However, viewed in the light of the record, no seriouá *433difficulty is encountered. It is tbe established rule with us, both in civil and criminal cases, that a verdict may be given significance and correctly interpreted by reference to the pleadings, the facts in evidence, admissions of the parties, and the charge of the court. Reynolds v. Express Co., 172 N. C., 487, 90 S. E., 510; S. v. Whitley, 208 N. C., 661, 182 S. E., 338, and cases cited. As thus interpreted, we think the record should be resolved in favor of affirmance. The court instructed the jury to answer the 6th issue in whatever amount they found the plaintiff’s services reasonably to be worth. This, the jury answered at much less than the value of the estate left by the deceased, which indicates no misunderstanding on the part of the jury.
A careful perusal of the entire record leaves us with the impression that the verdict and judgment should be upheld.
No error.