Plaintiff and her husband could read and write. 'Whether Poston did in fact read the instrument before signing is not made to appear. Plaintiff says that she did not. There is no fact or circumstance tending to show that either was prevented from so doing. It is presumed they knew the contents and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be assumed they signed the instrument they intended to sign.
While plaintiff alleges that a defeasance clause was omitted therefrom “due to mistake or inadvertence on the part of plaintiff and her husband and to the mistake, inadvertence, fraud or undue advantage on the part of the defendants,” the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff tends to show only that Bowen agreed that whenever Poston was able he could get his place back, that whenever he “was able to pay back the $600, plus the amount that Mr. Bowen had paid on it, that he could get his property back.” Possession was surrendered contemporaneously with the delivery of the deed and the grantors became tenants, paying the rent agreed upon' at the time.
We do not consider the mere fact an employer aids and assists a faithful employee who finds himself financially embarrassed is a circumstance tending to establish fraud or undue advantage. To so hold would deprive many worthy people of their principal source of help in the time of financial distress.
Hence there is no sufficient evidence that a defeasance clause was omitted from the deed by mutual mistake of the parties or of the draftsman or by mistake of the grantors, induced by the fraud of the defendant.
The plaintiff on this record in effect seeks to prove a contemporaneous oral agreement by defendant to reconvey to the grantors upon the repayment by them of certain stipulated sums. In short, she in fact seeks to engraft a parol trust in her favor upon her deed to the defendant. This she cannot do.
“All inconsistencies that may exist between the contract of sale and the deed are to be determined by the deed alone. The prior oral nego*204tiations cannot be set up for tbe purpose of contradicting tbe deed.” 2 Devlin, Real Property, 3rd Ed., 1572-3.
Tbe grantor in a deed absolute, in tbe absence of proof of mental incapacity, mistake of tbe parties, undue influence, or fraud, is bound by tbe terms of bis deed. He may not convey a fee and tben recover tbe premises or any interest therein upon parol evidence in contradiction of or in conflict witb tbe terms of bis deed. Tbis is established law in this jurisdiction as evidenced by a long line of decisions among which are: Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C., 222, 63 S. E., 1028, and cited cases; Walters v. Walters, 172 N. C., 328, 90 S. E., 304; Newton v. Clark, 174 N. C., 393, 93 S. E., 951; Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N. C., 302, 98 S. E., 830; Perry v. Surety Co., 190 N. C., 284, 129 S. E., 721; Tire Co. v. Lester, 192 N. C., 642, 135 S. E., 778; Waddell v. Aycock, 195 N. C., 268, 142 S. E., 10; Briley v. Roberson, 214 N. C., 295, 199 S. E., 73; Davis v. Davis, 223 N. C., 36, 25 S. E. (2d), 181.
Since we conclude that tbe plaintiff has failed to prove an enforceable agreement, it is unnecessary for us to discuss questions relating to tbe admissibility of evidence which appellant seeks to present.
Tbe judgment below is '