Decision on the challenge to the judgment from which this appeal is taken may fairly turn upon the answer to this question: Where the testator, domiciled in Richland County in the State of South Carolina, makes provision in his will for his wife, expressly in lieu of dower, and, upon the will being duly proven and probated in the probate court of said county and recorded therein, the widow files in the probate court of said county a valid dissent to said will, — thereby rejecting and renouncing the provision so made for her, and electing to take such interest in the estate of the testator as she would take had there been no will, may the widow claim dower in real estate in Alamance County in the State of North Carolina, of which testator died seized, without also dissenting there, upon the filing of an authenticated copy of the will as proven and probated in Richland County, South Carolina ? The answer is “Yes.”
In this connection, it is the law in the State of South Carolina that the legal right of the wife to dower in the lands of her husband cannot be defeated by his last will and testament, but if, by his will, he makes a provision for his widow, and declares it to be in lieu of dower, she must elect between the two, the provision made in the will and the dower, and cannot take both. See Bannister v. Bannister, 37 S. C., 529, 16 S. E., 612; Gordon v. Stevens, 11 S. C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.), 46; 27 Am. Dec., 445; Bailey v. Boyce, 23 S. C. Eq. (4 Strobh.), 84; Hair v. Goldsmith, 22 S. C., 566; Callahan v. Robinson, 30 S. C., 249; 3 L. R. A., 497; Mat *550 thews v. Clark, 105 S. C., 13, 89 S. E., 471; Bomar v. Wilkins, 154 S. C., 64, 151 S. E., 110, 68 A. L. R., 501. See also Anno. 22 A. L. R., 444.
If the widow accepts provision made for her by her husband in his will, declaring that such provision is made in lieu of dower, she by her voluntary act loses dower. Bomar v. Wilkins, supra.
But where a widow dissents and renounces the provision made for her by her husband in his will, declaring that such provision is made in lieu of dower, the whole estate is open in so far as she is concerned, and she is let into the enjoyment of all her rights thereto in as ample manner as if her husband had died wholly intestate. 17 Am. Jur., 746, Dower, Sec. 92.
Moreover, while there is conflict of law in this respect, the better reasoned authorities it seems hold that the widow’s renunciation in the State of the decedent’s domicile of the provisions of his will in her favor is a total renunciation of the will everywhere, and, having renounced it there, she cannot take testamentary benefits under it elsewhere. See Anno. 105 A. L. R., 271, at p. 283, where the cases Colvin v. Hutchinson (Mo.), 92 S. W. (2d), 667, 105 A. L. R., 266, and Jones v. Gerock, 59 N. C., 190, among other citations, are cited in support.
In the Colvin case, supra, it was held that a renunciation in Illinois by the widow of the testator resident in that State, of the provisions of the will in her favor, was effective in Missouri as to land in that State without further renunciation there, and that the widow did not, by her failure to make a new renunciation in Missouri, lose her right to claim her dower interest in the lands in Missouri against the will. Hyde, C., writing in that case for the Supreme Court of Missouri, pertinently states: “Surely it is a poor rule that will not work both ways. We think that the reason of the matter is that, when a man dies owning real estate in several states, leaving a will providing for his wife benefits which under the law she would take in place of dower if she accepted it, his widow’s situation is as follows: The will offers her testamentary, benefits; each state offers her instead certain estates in the land located therein; but the law of each state governs the kind of an estate she may have there if she renounces the will ... If she renounces the will, in order to make the choice between different estates any state offers for renunciation, she must do what that state requires or get only what she would receive there upon her failure to make such a choice in the required way. But, when she renounces the will in the state of her residence, where its validity is established by probate, she renounces it in toto everywhere, and cannot take testamentary benefits under it anywhere. At least, in the absence of a statute with specific requirements, no filing of the renunciation elsewhere is necessary. Likewise, if she accepts it in the state of her residence and its probate, she is bound by it everywhere and cannot renounce it in some other state. This view is supported by *551well-considered authority, and gives effect both to tbe principle that title to real estate is governed by tbe laws of tbe state where it is located and to tbe principles upon which tbe doctrine of election is based,” citing among other cases Jones v. Gerock, supra.
In tbe case of J ones v. Geroch, supra, tbe will of a decedent, domiciled in Alabama was probated there, and bis widow filed dissent there, according to tbe laws of that State, and afterwards when tbe will was admitted to probate in Onslow County in this State, tbe widow also dissented there. This Court held that there can be no question that tbe widow of one domiciled in another state is entitled to dower in tbe lands situate in this State, of which he was seized and possessed at time of bis death. Moreover, Pearson, G. J., in writing tbe opinion, bad this to say: “If tbe plaintiff bad not entered her dissent in tbe State of Alabama, but bad talcen under the will tbe lands devised to her in that State, and bad then come here and entered her dissent and claimed dower, we are inclined to tbe opinion that she would not have been entitled to it, because, having taken under tbe will, she would not be allowed to take against tbe will here, according to tbe doctrine established by Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 53 N. C., 287. But, as she dissented there, and has also dissented here, and claims against tbe will in both States, her acts harmonize, and her right seems to be a very clear one.”
Moreover, “in accordance with tbe general rule that an election once made in one jurisdiction, particularly where made at tbe domicil, is binding and estops tbe person so electing from inconsistent conduct in other jurisdictions, tbe necessity for election under tbe law of tbe situs, as well as other matters pertaining to election, may be obviated by a previous election or renunciation at tbe domicil.” 11 Amer. Jur., 348, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 58. This principle is in keeping with what is said in tbe case of Jones v. Gerock, supra, and is applicable to factual situation now in band.
Furthermore, tbe dissent filed by the widow in tbe probate court of Richland County in tbe State of South Carolina, tbe domicile of tbe testator, wherein tbe will is proven and probated, establishes tbe extent of tbe effectiveness of tbe provisions of tbe will, in so far as tbe widow is concerned. Tbe dissent became a part of tbe proceedings in respect to tbe will. An authenticated copy of tbe will to be allowed, filed and recorded in Alamance County, North Carolina, under tbe provisions of G. S., 31-27, pertaining to recording of certified copies of will of nonresidents, should include as a muniment of title, tbe proceedings in dissent as same appear of record in tbe probate court of Richland County, South Carolina. Such copy duly authenticated may be now made and allowed, filed and recorded in said Alamance County, nunc pro tunc, and will relate back to date of filing tbe authenticated copy of tbe will in said county, provided no rights of third parties have intervened. Scott *552 v. Lumber Co., 144 N. C., 44, 56 S. E., 548; Vaught v. Williams, 177 N. C., 77, 97 S. E., 737.
In the light of the foregoing principles applied to facts in hand in relation to point raised by the appeal, the judgment below is
Affirmed.