The defendant offered no testimony. At the conclusion of the evidence of the State his demurrer to the evidence was overruled and he excepted. By this exception he now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence offered.
The record is filled with evidence of family discord, assaults, threats, and infidelity of defendant. Detailed repetition would serve no useful purpose. In addition, the testimony tends to show that several weeks prior to the homicide defendant endeavored to buy a pistol; the week before the homicide he borrowed from a friend the pistol with which the deceased was killed; in 1945 he contracted a bigamous marriage with a woman in Raleigh; his wife learned of this marriage, which became the cause of dissension between them; he stated he had gotten rid of his Raleigh wife and “I’m going to get rid of the other one, I don’t need any woman in my business”; and after the shooting he made conflicting statements as to how the homicide occurred. Furthermore, the location of the wound and the absence of powder burns tend to negative the inference the wound was self-inflicted.
Thus it appears there was evidence sufficient to require the submission of the cause to the jury on the capital charge of murder in the first degree. Its probative force was for the jury. *279 S. v. Watts, 224 N. C., 771, 32 S. E. (2d), 348; S. v. Todd, 222 N. C., 346, 23 S. E. (2d), 47, and other decisions to like effect do not compel a contrary conclusion. It is true the State offered evidence of a number of statements made by defendant, either one of which, standing alone, may tend to exculpate. But its case does not rest entirely on such statements. Indeed the multiplicity of inconsistent, contradictory statements made by defendant is an incriminating circumstance to which, no doubt, the jury gave considerable weight.
The testimony of the Raleigh woman, innocent party to the bigamous marriage, was a proper link in the chain of circumstances tending to show motive. The complaint filed by her in an action to annul the bigamous contract of marriage was not offered “against the party as proof of a fact admitted or alleged in it.” G. S., 1-149; S. v. McNair, 226 N. C., 462. Only that part thereof which tended to corroborate the witness was admitted. The error, if any, was harmless. In any event, its contents are not made to appear. Hence no prejudicial error is disclosed.
A careful examination of the other exceptive assignments of error discussed in defendant’s brief fails to disclose cause for disturbing the verdict.
In the trial below we find
No error.