Two questions arise bn this appeal: (1) Does the complaint contain a misjoinder of causes of action? (2) Is there a mis-joinder of parties to the action? Testing the complaint by well settled principles of law in this State, a negative answer to each question follows.
(1) The general rule, deducible from the decisions of this Court pertaining to the appropriate statute, G. S., 1-123, is that, if the causes of action be not entirely distinct and unconnected, if they arise out of one and the same transaction, or a series of transactions forming one dealing and all tending to one end, if one connected story can he told of the whole, they may be joined in order to determine the whole controversy in one action. See Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224, 50 S. E., 659; Barkley v. Realty Co., 211 N. C., 540, 191 S. E., 3, and numerous other cases.
Applying this rule to the allegations of the complaint in hand, the series of transactions alleged form one dealing, and a connected story of the whole is told, — all tending to one end,- — an accounting by the guardian for specific property of his wards.
A guardianship is a trust relation in which the guardian acts for the ward, whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. And in that relationship a guardian is a trustee and is governed by the same rules that govern other trustees. 25 Am. Jur., pp. 7 and 113. Moreover, the legal title to the property of an infant ward is in the ward, rather than in the guardian. The guardian, being merely the custodian and manager or conservator of the ward’s estate, has no beneficial title thereto. Thus when a deed or mortgage is taken by a guardian for his ward, the title is regarded as being in the ward. 25 Am. Jur., 69. Small v. Small, 74 N. C., 16; Wallace v. Wallace, 210 N. C., 656, 188 S. E., 96. Hence, where a guardian takes title to his ward’s property in his own name, the guardian holds the title as trustee for the ward. See Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 N. C., 411, 130 S. E., 45.
Moreover, the allegation of fraud in attack upon the conveyance by defendant E. R. Hines to defendant Janie L. Hines is merely one of a series of transactions tending to one end, — the single purpose of the action.
*240(2) It is provided by statute, G. S., 1-69, that all persons who have, or claim, any interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary parties to a complete determination or settlement of the questions involved, may be made defendants, and any person claiming title or right of possession to real estate may be made a party plaintiff or defendant, as the case requires, in such action.
In this connection, it is said in Barkley v. Realty Co., supra, “If the objects of the suit are single, and it happens that different persons have separate interests in distinct questions which arise out of the single object, it necessarily follows that such different persons must be brought before the court in order that the suit may conclude the whole subject.”
In the light of the above statute, the feme defendant in the present action is a necessary party, and may be joined as party defendant to the end that she may be concluded by the judgment in respect to the principal question.
The judgment below is
Affirmed.