On a motion to strike tbe test of relevancy of a pleading is tbe right of tbe pleader to offer in evidence at tbe trial tbe facts relied upon to sustain tbe plea which, if established, will constitute a cause of action or a defense. And so, if tbe ultimate fact pleaded in a reply is not inconsistent with tbe cause of action alleged in the complaint and constitutes a defense, in whole or in part, to a plea for affirmative relief set up in tbe answer, it should not be stricken. Patterson v. R. R., 214 N. C., 38, 198 S. E., 364; Trust Co. v. Dunlop, 214 N. C., 196, 198 S. E., 645; Pemberton v. Greensboro, 203 N. C., 514, 166 S. E., 396.
Tbe right to reply is not restricted to cases in which tbe defendant pleads a counterclaim. G. S. 1-140, 1-141. If it alleges facts, upon tbe proof of which tbe court should give some relief, it is properly filed. Lumber Co. v. Edwards, 217 N. C., 251, 7 S. E. (2d), 497.
*168Tbe lapse of time does not discharge tbe liability. It merely bars recovery. Insurance Co. v. Motor Lines, Inc., 225 N. C., 588. Hence tbe statutes of limitations (except when annexed to tbe cause of action itself, Hanie v. Penland, 193 N. C., 800, 138 S. E., 165) are not available to a litigant as a defense unless pleaded. Insurance Co. v. Motor Lines, Inc., supra; New Hanover County v. Sidbury, 225 N. C., 679; Motor Co. v. Credit Co., 219 N. C., 199, 13 S. E. (2d), 230.
Here tbe petitioner alleges tbe existence of tbe City's claim without admitting its amount or validity. When tbe City filed an answer asserting a lien for taxes, street assessments, and other items, and prayed judgment therefor, tbe plaintiff, for tbe first time, was in a position to plead tbe bar of tbe ten-year statute of limitations. This plea was properly made by way of reply to tbe answer.
Tbe judgment below is
Affirmed.