The contention of the appellant that defendants had not provided for him a peaceful, quiet and comfortable home as required in the condition precedent to delivery of the deed, brings the appeal into' a field of unusual difficulty and severely challenges the propriety of dealing with the standards involved — if indeed there are any standards except those that are relative and shifting' — -as a matter of law or legal inference. The court below had the question whether an inference of a breach of the contract could be drawn from the evidence, and its negative answer passed that question to us; one which we may not decide as chancellors but with respect to appellant’s right of trial by jury where there is evidence of the fact.
The conditions which the plaintiff claims were breached are conditions precedent to the investment of title and in fact the deed was put in escrow, not to be delivered until the full performance of those conditions.
Ordinarily, substantial compliance with the conditions subsequent in a deed will suffice, while it is said that conditions precedent must be “strictly, literally, and punctually performed.” 36 C. J. S., page 488, sec. 151. There are obviously some situations arising in which such a rule cannot be rigidly enforced; where, for instance, the conditions relate to conduct of the grantee over a considerable period of time, to which the rule of reason must apply rather than to a performance of a more definite nature such as the payment of purchase price within a certain time, or the like.
But, however liberally we may construe the conditions imposed upon the defendants in the case at bar and their conduct with respect to it, we are hardly relieved of the necessity of determining whether the final appraisal of the conduct of the defendants in performing the conditions was a matter for the court or the jury.
No doubt the trial court sustained a demurrer to the evidence on the theory that, taking everything into consideration, the matters of which plaintiff complained, admitting them to be true, were too trivial to upset a solemn deed, constituted a minor family disagreement, evanescent in character, and which a proper exercise of forbearance and tolerance on both sides would have straightened out without serious interruption of the peace, quietude and comfort of the home. Reflecting that view here, counsel for the appellees reminds us that “de minimis non curat lex.” But how small or wanting in significance are the facts in evidence, by what standard are they to be weighed, and who shall hold the scales ?
What is a home ? What measure of peace, quiet and comfort within its precincts was in contemplation of the parties signing the contract? *705What tare is the court permitted to make as a matter of law before submitting the body of the offending to the jury? What consideration must be given to age and condition of the plaintiff and such allergy as he may have had to a threatened chastisement on his own premises? To what extent may physical, cultural and moral conditions be considered as affecting the peace, quiet and comfort of a home to be created by the joint living of the contracting parties?
Certainly, people are not perfect; and the plaintiff, appellees contend, could not expect “all this and Heaven too” under the known conditions with reference to which they contracted. But, before we apply the analogy, let us remember that the ordinary home is integrated by family ties, not by contract. In such a home the sanctions for peace, quiet and comfort are not forfeiture of a property right but loss of intangibles of far greater importance.. Fortunately such a home may be retrieved from a b'ad situation by a lot of living and forgiving. But the person who is furnished a home by contract is not required to forgive or condone a breach of the condition when it occurs; he may look to his contract.
Beferring to the incidents which occurred the day and night before the plaintiff sought residence elsewhere, we could hardly say that there was no substantial evidence tending to show that the condition in the home, temporarily at least, was wanting in peace, quiet and comfort. How often the same thing must be repeated to amount to a breach of condition cognizable in law brings up the question of a quantitative standard of evidence which the Court has hitherto thought it is not competent to determine. The accumulation of nothings can never amount to evidence and evidence need not be cumulative to demand its submission to the jury.
These are only a few of the considerations that incline the Court to the view that a solution of the factual problems involved here peculiarly calls for the offices of the jury rather than those of the Court.
It is proper to say here that in the opinion of the Court the plaintiff has mistaken his remedy, if upon a new trial he is able to make good on the facts. The deed sought to be canceled has never been delivered and is not effective without such delivery. By a separate contract between the parties it was put in escrow with the First National Bank of Asheboro, to be delivered upon the death of the grantor provided the holder of the escrow deemed the conditions to have been satisfactorily performed. Upon breach of the conditions, — if such breach is found to have taken place, — the plaintiff would be entitled to a rescission of the contract of escrow and return to him of his deed. Nevertheless, disregarding the prayer for relief, he would be entitled to whatever remedy might be appropriate to the facts alleged and proved.
On this appeal we are not concerned with either the weakness or the strength of plaintiff’s evidence but only whether, taking the evidence in *706its most favorable light, legitimate inferences in his favor may be drawn from it. Applying that principle, we think there was error in taking the case from the jury.
The judgment of the court below in sustaining the demurrer to the evidence and rendering judgment as of nonsuit is
Reversed.