The appellant assigns error in the charge on the ground that the instruction given by the trial court as to the only controverted issue amounted to a directed verdict for the defendant, and was based *670upon the erroneous view, as thus expressed, that there was no competent evidence to support the plaintiff’s contentions.
The question presented is whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient competent evidence to require the submission of the controversy on the determinative issue as an open question. From an examination of the report of the testimony set out in the record, it is apparent that the evidence on the principal question at issue was not all one way. It was conflicting in material respects. In Kearney v. Thomas, 225 N. C., 156 (165), 33 S. E. (2d), 871, 877, it was said: “Where the evidence is contradictory, obviously no instruction can be given hypothecated on a finding of fact by the jury, which will have the effect of a directed verdict either way.” Having admitted in his pleading the execution and delivery of the notes in suit, the burden was on the plaintiff to offer evidence tending to show non-liability thereon, and if the testimony on that point, considered in the light most favorable for him, afforded any competent evidence in support of his contention, he was entitled to have it submitted to the jury with appropriate instructions from the court as to all material phases of the case presented by such evidence. R. R. v. Lumber Co., 185 N. C., 227, 117 S. E., 50; Taylorsville v. Moose, 212 N. C., 379, 193 S. E., 394.
While the notes in question were under seal, thus importing consideration (Coleman v. Whisnant, ante, 258, 37 S. E. (2d), 693), and indicated on their face that they were given “for value received,” this would not preclude the plaintiff from showing if he can that the obligation was assumed upon a contingency which was not fulfilled, Lerner Shops v. Rosenthal, 225 N. C., 316, 34 S. E. (2d), 206; Ins. Co. v. Morehead, 209 N. C., 174, 183 S. E., 606; Kindler v. Trust Co., 204 N. C., 198, 167 S. E., 811; Sykes v. Everett, 167 N. C., 600, 83 S. E., 585, or that the notes were given upon a condition which failed, Thomas v. Carteret, 182 N. C., 374, 109 S. E., 384; Roebuck v. Carson, 196 N. C., 672, 146 S. E., 708; Federal Reserve Bank v. Mfg. Co., 213 N. C., 489, 196 S. E., 848; Jones v. Casstevens, 222 N. C., 411, 23 S. E. (2d), 897; or that as between the parties there was a failure of consideration, the notes being negotiable in form; G. S., 25-33; Farrington v. McNeill, 174 N. C., 420, 93 S. E., 957; Patterson v. Fuller, 203 N. C., 788, 167 S. E., 74; Lentz v. Johnson, 207 N. C., 614, 178 S. E., 226. “In proper cases it may be shown by parol evidence that an obligation was to be assumed only upon a certain contingency.” Kindler v. Trust Co., supra. “The manual delivery of an instrument may always be proved to have been on a condition which has not been fulfilled, in order to avoid its effect.” Garrison v. Machine Co., 159 N. C., 285, 74 S. E., 821. “Parol evidence is admissible in an action between the parties to show that a written instrument executed and delivered by the party obligor to the party obligee absolute on its face was conditional and not intended to take *671effect until another event should take place.” Ware v. Allen, 128 U. S., 590; Bowser v. Tarry, 156 N. C., 35, 72 S. E., 74.
We think the plaintiff in this case has offered evidence which, when considered in the light most favorable for him, affords ground for the permissible inference, deducible therefrom, that the $2,300 papers and the $1,971 note relate to the same transaction, and evidence in the main the same obligation; that the three notes aggregating $2,300 were not based upon a present consideration, but were executed upon condition that the payee take up the outstanding liens on plaintiff’s land; that upon the payee’s failure so to do the $1,971 note was later given by the plaintiff to the payee’s administrator to cover these same obligations, or a substantial part thereof; and further that this note for $1,971, which the plaintiff stands ready to pay, was accepted by the then acting administrator as constituting a discharge of the previously executed notes. Ins. Co. v. Morehead, 209 N. C., 174, 183 S. E., 606.
While the testimony of the plaintiff himself as to a personal transaction with the defendant’s intestate was properly excluded as coming within the prohibition of G. S., 8-51 (Wilder v. Medlin, 215 N. C., 542, 2 S. E. (2d), 549), we think there was some competent evidence tending to support plaintiff’s contentions, which he was entitled to have submitted to the jury, with appropriate instructions.
In stating this conclusion we must not be understood as expressing any opinion as to the weight or conclusiveness of the testimony. Conflicting or contradictory evidence invokes “the true office and province of the jury.” G. S., 1-180. That there is such evidence here, in view of the peremptory instruction given, renders another hearing necessary. Boutten v. R. R., 128 N. C., 337, 38 S. E., 920.