It is questionable whether the broadside nature of defendants’ exception to the “rulings of the court as appears in the judgment signed by the court, and the signing thereof,” even as somewhat expanded in the assignment of error, serves to bring before us, on this review, more than the form of the judgment to which objection is made. the exceptions do not point out any specific defect in the “rulings” or findings which might engage special attention of this Court — whether not supported by evidence, or in some particular beyond the power of the court, or otherwise legally objectionable. But treating the exceptions with the greatest liberality in this respect, we do not find them meritorious. Findings of fact by the referee to which no exception was made by defendants, and which were confirmed by the judge without alteration or substitution, including the location of the true line, want of coverage of the lands by defendants’ deed, the date which the first occupancy by defendants began, array the deciding factors against the defendants and are sufficient to support the conclusions of law made by the court upon review. Whether material to this decision or otherwise, other findings of fact, differing from those found by the referee, were not without evidence to support them. In reviewing the referee’s report, the judge acted within the scope of bis powers under the statute, and within the rules laid down for its observance. G. S., 1-194; Williamson v. Spivey, 224 N. C., 311, 30 S. E. (2d), 46; Thigpen v. Trust Co., 203 N. C., 291, 293, 165 S. E., 714; Trust Co. v. Lentz, 196 N. C., 398, 406, 145 S. E., 787; Thompson v. Smith, 156 N. C., 345, 347, 72 S. E., 379.
Tbe main contention of tbe appellants, as developed here, is that tbe conduct of plaintiffs in not warning them that they were building on plaintiffs’ land, or otherwise trespassing upon it, although plaintiffs bad actual knowledge and frequent observation of defendants’ operations, now estop plaintiffs from asserting tbeir claim, or denying title in defendants to tbe lands.
Whatever may have been plaintiffs’ moral or legal duty in tbe matter — and we do not imply that there was any — its infraction could not result in tbe loss to plaintiffs of tbeir land. Carolina R. R. Co. v. McCaskill, 94 N. C., 746; Boddie v. Bond, 154 N. C., 359, 70 S. E., 730; Holmes v. Crowell, 73 N. C., 613; Exum v. Cogdell, 74 N. C., 139; Mason v. Williams, 66 N. C., 564; Melvin v. Bullard, 82 N. C., 33. It is to be *594observed that although plaintiffs’ deed was not at the time on record, the defendants might have assured themselves of proper respect for their neighbors’ boundary by a survey of their own deed.
The statutes fix the time within which the owner of the true title must take action against those committing acts implying a claim of ownership, either under color of title or by adverse possession — G. S., 1-38, G. S., 1-40 — and-this cannot be abridged on the theory advanced by the appellants.
It having been found on competent evidence that the disputed strip is on plaintiffs’ side of the dividing line and without any color of title thereto by the defendants, and that defendants have not occupied the same or committed other acts adverse to plaintiffs’ possession prior to 1933, whereas perfection of title by adverse possession takes at least twenty years, and since it is admitted the parties hold under a common title, the judgment of the court was proper and will be sustained.
Other exceptions are without merit.
We find no error, and the judgment is
Affirmed.