The appellants present only two questions for our consideration and determination: (1) Is the testimony of H. L. Rayburn, as to the statement made to him by H. R. Keaton, now deceased, as to the location of the dividing line between the lands of the Town of Belhaven and H. R. Keaton competent? (2) Can a surveyor disregard the beginning point in a deed and start his survey at the second call of the deed, when suek point is neither known nor established, and is his testimony based upon such survey competent evidence?
Ordinarily a corner or line called for in a junior deed will not be controlling in establishing a corner or line in a prior deed, if the corner or line can be ascertained from the description in the prior deed. Thomas v. Hipp, 223 N. C., 515, 27 S. E. (2d), 528; Jarvis v. Swain, 173 N. C., 9, 91 S. E., 358.
We do not think, however, exception to the testimony of Mr. Rayburn, the surveyor, relative to statements made to him by Mr. Keaton, as to the location of his northeast corner can be sustained. Mr. Keaton, according to the testimony of Mr. Rayburn, also pointed out to him the iron stake, designated on the court map by the letter D., as the northwest *491comer of the Town Dock lot. Moreover, witnesses for the plaintiff and the defendants testified without objection, as to the location of the line between the Keaton lot and the Town Dock lot. In fact, it does not appear on this record that there is any dispute as to the location of the northwest corner of the property of the Town of Belhaven. Therefore, if we consider the evidence relative to the statements made by Keaton as to his own corner, was erroneously admitted, it was harmless error in the light of other testimony admitted without objection. Yadkin Motor Co. v. Insurance Co., 220 N. C., 168, 16 S. E. (2d), 847; Edwards v. Junior Order, 220 N. C., 41, 16 S. E. (2d), 466; McKay v. Bullard, 219 N. C., 589, 14 S. E. (2d), 657; Teseneer v. Mills Co., 209 N. C., 615, 184 S. E., 535; Shelton v. R. R., 193 N. C., 670, 139 S. E., 232; Hamilton v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C., 47, 75 S. E., 1087.
In considering the second question presented, we think the appellants are in error in assuming that the Surveyor, in making the survey of the property of the Town of Belhaven, started at a point that is neither known nor established.
The sole question for the jury to determine upon the evidence in this case was which one of the lines in dispute is the dividing line between the property of the plaintiff and the defendants. In order to correctly decide the issue it became necessary for the jury to ascertain the true location of the beginning corner of the property of the Town of Belhaven, which is the northwest corner of the property of the defendants. The location of the beginning corner, not being marked and in dispute, it was permissible for the surveyor to reverse the first call in the Town’s deed, beginning at what is known or established as. the northwest corner of the Town Dock lot, in order to locate the beginning corner. This Court said, in Cowles v. Reavis, 109 N. C., 417, 13 S. E., 930: “It is too clear to need citation of authorities that if the beginning corner has been destroyed, as in this case, it is competent, in order to ascertain the true boundary to survey the land by beginning at any known corner or point from which the boundaries may be located.” Norwood v. Crawford, 114 N. C., 513, 19 S. E. 349. And in Jarvis v. Swain, supra, the Court said: “The rule is, in running the calls of a deed, to begin at the beginning corner if it is known or established, and to follow the calls in their regular order, and it is said in Harry v. Graham, 18 N. C., 76, and approved in Gunter v. Mfg. Co., 166 N. C., 166, that there is no case in our reports where the Court has given its sanction to the correctness of a survey made by reversing the lines from a known beginning corner; but it is equally well established that if the beginning corner is uncertain and the second corner is known or established, that the first line may be reversed in order to find the beginning; and the same rule prevails as to the other corners and lines. Dobson v. Finley, 53 N. C., 495; Norwood v. Crawford, 114 N. C., 513; Clark v. Moore, 126 N. C., 1; Hanstein *492 v. Ferrall, 149 N. C., 240.” See also Cornelison v. Hammond, 224 N. C., 757, 32 S. E. (2d), 326, and the cases cited therein.
Furthermore, it is disclosed by the documentary and oral testimony that the Swindell lot, now the property of these defendants, and the Lupton lot, have a frontage on Front Street of only 50 feet each, and the northwest corner of the Swindell lot, according to the documentary evidence, is north 43 west 100 feet from the U. S. Coastal Geodetic monument, designated on the court map by the letter K. Also, Mr. Rayburn testified that the point on the map designated by the letter B., is the point shown as the line of the Town lot in his 1943 survey, measuring from the point designated by the letter K., or the U. S. Coastal Geodetic monument, which was pointed out as the northeast corner of the Lupton property by Mrs. Lupton and one of the defendants, and the point designated by the letter B. is the same point located as the beginning point of the Town lot in his 1944 survey by reversing the first call in the town’s deed.
It will be noted that the town’s deed calls for the northwest corner of the defendants’ property as its beginning corner, and the defendants’ deed merely calls for the property lying between the Lupton property and the property of the Town of Belhaven; nevertheless, the deeds to all their predecessors in title, beginning with the deed to Anna M. Montgomery, and prior thereto, call for a frontage of only 50 feet on Front Street beginning at a point 50 feet from the L. Latham corner, now designated as the U. S. Coastal Geodetic monument, or the letter K.
While the evidence is conflicting as to which is the true dividing line between the properties of the respective parties, we think there is ample evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury and we find no prejudicial error in the trial below.
No error.